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Abstract
Within the last 15 years, the first three Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) in
North America formed and completed their work. Patterned after similar efforts in South
Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere, the TRCs in Greensboro, North Carolina; Maine;
and Canada heard voluntarily-offered testimony from members of the general public and
key parties to decades-long conflicts. The Commissions also evaluated responsibility for
the conflicts and offered recommendations for change in their respective communities
and countries, informed by the testimonies they received. This qualitative methods
multiple case study of the three Commissions’ recommendations involved archival
research and data analysis of testimony to the Commissions, alongside the subsequent
recommendations made by those Commissions and any further policy measures taken by
host governments in Greensboro, Maine, and Canada. The dissertation attempts to
answer the research question: to what extent can truth and reconciliation commissions
empower parties to long-running and wide-reaching conflicts to influence changes in
their communities, states, or countries in ways courts cannot? Among the conclusions
reached in this research is that TRCs integrated public testimony to a significant extent
into their findings and recommendations, though the three governments in Greensboro,
Maine, and Canada have implemented those recommendations with varying levels of
commitment. This study can assist others tackling large-scale conflicts to consider how
best to incorporate a truth and reconciliation commission into their efforts at healing and
growth in their communities.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
In the 1990’s, the newly democratic nation of South Africa captured international
attention by forming a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), designed to address
the country’s painful and notorious history of racial injustices and human rights
violations, inviting witnesses, victims, and perpetrators to come forward voluntarily,
without fear of prosecution or persecution (Tutu, 2017). Although not the first of its kind,
it quickly became the most widely known TRC, and over the next decade, this landmark
method of resolution and understanding opened never before explored avenues of
reconciliation for many countries and cities (Truth Commission Digital Collection, 2011).
In 2004, inspired by the Commissions of South Africa, Peru, and some twenty
other countries around the world, the city of Greensboro, North Carolina organized the
first ever Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the United States (Schooler, 2009).
Within the next decade, two other commissions formed in North America: in the state of
Maine, and a national Commission in Canada.
The Greensboro Commission emerged not from any government mandate, but
rather from the grassroots initiative of a pained community. Greensboro had suffered too
long from unhealed, festering wounds stemming from a violent confrontation between
anti-Klan protesters from the Communist Workers Party (CWP), and Ku Klux Klansmen
and American Nazi party members, at a morning anti-Klan rally twenty-five years earlier
(Wheaton, 1988). Although four crews from nearby television stations had captured the
shooting deaths of five of the protesters, and the wounding of ten others, subsequent
criminal trials produced no guilty verdicts, and left witnesses and survivors – and the city
at large—shaken, and forever changed.
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In the aftermath of the shooting, a shocked city government quickly worked to
restore peace. The mayor convened a meeting of African-American ministers later that
day, in the hopes they would include calls for calm in their sermons the next day. Police
enforced a curfew at Morningside Homes, site of the original anti-Klan protest and the
shooting deaths of five protestors, which further angered many residents who wanted
answers, not restrictions on their movements (Cunningham, 1980, 46-47). The city
avoided a backlash of violence, even after the surviving members of the Communist
Workers Party staged another anti-Klan march, this one nonviolent and monitored by the
National Guard and scores of police officers (Wheaton, 1988). But in the aftermath of the
shootings, many Greensboro residents felt deserted by a city that did not protect them and
now would not help them sort out what had happened. In the scramble to restore order
and preserve Greensboro’s stable reputation, they felt they had been swept under the rug.
When the Klansmen went to trial nine months later, an all-white jury did acquit
the shooters, accepting that the Klansmen didn’t go to Morningside Homes intending to
kill the protesters and that the Klansmen were defending themselves when protesters
showed their guns (Berry, 1980, 1).
Although the CWP won some vindication a few years later in a civil lawsuit
ruling that police did not adequately protect the protesters from a possible confrontation
with the Klan and American Nazis, the City of Greensboro did not admit any fault or
wrongdoing in its handling of November third and its aftermath—primarily in its
declaration of a state of emergency and in its jailing of some protestors. The Klan also
admitted nothing and paid nothing (Barkley, 1985, 1). That lack of more definitive
closure gnawed at the survivors, and others in Greensboro, for many years to come.
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After an off-Broadway play retold the story of the shooting as a collection of
unhealed wounds, local leaders invited South African Archbishop and Nobel Laureate
Desmond Tutu to Greensboro. They worked with him and other veterans of South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to design a similar process for
Greensboro (Tosczak, 2003).
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(Wheaton, 1988). Although four crews from nearby television stations had captured the
shooting deaths of five of the protesters, and the wounding of ten others, subsequent
criminal trials produced no guilty verdicts, and left witnesses and survivors – and the city
at large—shaken, and forever changed.
In the aftermath of the shooting, a shocked city government quickly worked to
restore peace. The mayor convened a meeting of African-American ministers later that
day, in the hopes they would include calls for calm in their sermons the next day. Police
enforced a curfew at Morningside Homes, site of the original anti-Klan protest and the
shooting deaths of five protestors, which further angered many residents who wanted
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shootings, many Greensboro residents felt deserted by a city that did not protect them and
now would not help them sort out what had happened. In the scramble to restore order
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When the Klansmen went to trial nine months later, an all-white jury did acquit
the shooters, accepting that the Klansmen didn’t go to Morningside Homes intending to
kill the protesters and that the Klansmen were defending themselves when protesters
showed their guns (Berry, 1980, 1).
Although the CWP won some vindication a few years later in a civil lawsuit
ruling that police did not adequately protect the protesters from a possible confrontation
with the Klan and American Nazis, the City of Greensboro did not admit any fault or
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wrongdoing in its handling of November third and its aftermath—primarily in its
declaration of a state of emergency and in its jailing of some protestors. The Klan also
admitted nothing and paid nothing (Barkley, 1985, 1). That lack of more definitive
closure gnawed at the survivors, and others in Greensboro, for many years to come.
After an off-Broadway play retold the story of the shooting as a collection of
unhealed wounds, local leaders invited South African Archbishop and Nobel Laureate
Desmond Tutu to Greensboro. They worked with him and other veterans of South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to design a similar process for
Greensboro (Tosczak, 2003).
Greensboro’s commission withstood political resistance, violence, and threats to
complete its work. In the process, the Commission’s proceedings inspired
acknowledgments of responsibilities and apologies from all sides; recognition that the
issues raised by the shootings went far beyond the specifics of the incident; and
mobilization to reform the police department, whose responsibility for both the shooting
deaths and other social unrest had not previously been understood. This study examined
the testimony given, both privately and publicly, to the Greensboro commission, and the
extent to which the Commission’s findings and recommendations incorporated that
testimony. This study also examined the formation of similar commissions in Maine and
Canada and explored the impact testimony to those Commissions had on the
Commissions’ final reports.
Maine and Canada: Differing Scales, Similar Topics
Truth and Reconciliation commissions formed in the U.S. state of Maine and at a
national level in Canada both sought to understand why so many indigenous, First
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Nations, or Native American families had been broken up by authorities who relocated
children to boarding schools away from their reservations or communities. The strategy
dates back centuries, all the way to the 1800’s, when church groups took Indian children
to residential schools and forbade the use of their own language, clothes, or religious
practices.
Maine: Residential Schooling and Foster Care
In Maine, while the relocation of Native children to residential schools became
systematic in the late 1800s with more than 50 children from Maine ended up at Carlisle
alone over the course of several decades (Gluckman, 2014), the closure of Carlisle and
other boarding schools like it did not stop Native American children from being removed
from their families' care well into the 20th century (Gluckman, 2014). These children
were primarily placed in foster homes, where they alleged physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse.
An experiment undertaken by the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (a federal
government agency) and the Child Welfare League of America (a nonprofit organization)
involved the relocation of hundreds of Indian children from their families to the homes of
Caucasian-Americans. According to the National Indian Child Welfare Association,
Studies revealed that large numbers of Native children were being separated from
their parents, extended families, and communities by state child welfare and
private adoption agencies. In fact, research found that 25%–35% of all Native
children were being removed; of these, 85% were placed outside of their families
and communities—even when fit and willing relatives were available” (2018).
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In Maine, Indian children were taken from their families and placed in white foster
homes at a higher rate than most other states (Burns, 2015). One state official cited a
federal government review that showed that as late as 1999, Maine was not in compliance
with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, a law that intended "to protect the best
interests of Indian children" by involving tribal members in the cases of children from
their own communities. As one family support specialist in Maine put it, “The foster care
and child welfare system kind of picked up where the boarding schools left off”
(Gluckman, 2014).
In an article framing the work of a truth and reconciliation commission in Maine
(Attean et al, 2012), the authors write,
The dominant narrative in Maine is that Wabanaki people aren't able to take care
of their children, that it's best to leave the past in the past, and that the state and
tribes cannot work together as equals. Although this narrative was constructed by
the dominant white culture. Native people have internalized these messages and
have become complicit with their own consequential invisibility. . . .There are
thousands of Native people whose experiences with the child welfare system have
been silenced. (Attean et al, 2012, 16-17).
A subsequent “declaration of intent” and mandate for the TRC signed both by Maine’s
governor and leaders from five recognized Native American tribes or nations indicated,
This TRC was formed to investigate the experiences of Wabanaki people with the
Maine state child welfare system and to promote healing and lasting change for
Wabanaki children and families. This process gave voices to the stories of
Wabanaki people and incorporate them into a new dominant narrative about this
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history in an effort to work toward creating a better child welfare system for
Native children and families” (LePage et al, 2012).
As Attean et al (2012) note, “the Maine TRC represents the first truth and reconciliation
commission within U.S. territory that has been collaboratively developed between Indian
nations and a state government with a focus on Native child welfare issues” (17). The
TRC’s objectives included giving “voice to Wabanaki people who have had experience
with Maine state child welfare” and “create a common understanding, promote healing,
and make recommendations for child welfare systems reform through seeking, learning
and reporting the truth” (LePage et al, 2012). In the articulation of this objective, the
TRC directly links the participation (via testimony) of ordinary individuals to potential
policy and societal changes, which form the basis of this study.
Canada
As in Maine, Canada’s truth and reconciliation commission formed out of a desire
to rectify actions taken towards indigenous (often called Aboriginal or First Nations)
children. Just as in Maine, according to the report of Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (2015), “Canada’s residential school system separated Aboriginal children
from their families, in order to minimize and weaken family ties and cultural linkages,
and to indoctrinate children into a new culture—the culture of the legally dominant EuroChristian Canadian society” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2). The TRC quotes
Canada’s first prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, as saying,
When the school is on the reserve the child lives with its parents, who are
savages; he is surrounded by savages, and though he may learn to read and write
his habits, and training and mode of thought are Indian. He is simply a savage
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who can read and write. It has been strongly pressed on myself, as the head of
the Department, that Indian children should be withdrawn as much as possible
from the parental influence, and the only way to do that would be to put them in
central training industrial schools where they will acquire the habits and modes
of thought of white men (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2)
The schools were in existence for more than a century; according to one report, “Since
the 1880s, more than 150,000 aboriginal children had been torn from their families and
sent to residential schools that, in many cases, resembled violent prisons. Seven
generations of children were scarred by physical, emotional and sexual abuse” (Kennedy,
2015). According to the TRC report, “Children were abused, physically and sexually,
and they died in the schools in numbers that would not have been tolerated in any school
system anywhere in the country, or in the world. . . .” (Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, v). Eventually, the settlement of a large class-action suit brought by
residential school survivors helped bring about the formation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
The ultimate formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, writes
researcher Rosemary Nagy (2014), took on a hybrid approach crafted by First Nations
leadership and a group known as the “TRC Roundtable,” which included survivor,
indigenous, and Protestant organizations: combining a more formal, investigative
approach in which individuals and institutions would be held accountable with a “bottomup” process with hundreds of community events and witnesses. As Nagy puts it,
Central to both approaches: statement-taking/truth-sharing, national events, and a
report for public education with recommendations. Central to the [TRC]
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Roundtable approach: community events and a Survivor Committee. Central to
the [Assembly of First Nations] approach: an agreement for the provision of
documents and the creation of a National Research Centre (Nagy, 214).
This hybrid model is significant to this study in that it afforded thousands of Canadians,
over a six-year period, to participate directly in the work of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, offering both their own testimony of their residential school experiences as
well as their recommendations for change in Canada’s relationship with First Nations.
This study examines how closely the TRC’s recommendations, and the Canadian
government’s actions, aligned with the testimony.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
To understand the idea behind a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is worth
examining how it contrasts to other forms of conflict resolution. Humans have used
battlefields and courts to resolve conflicts for centuries. But wars and trials have failed to
resolve age-old conflicts that continue to leave thousands or millions with lasting
wounds. South Africa’s racial discrimination under apartheid, Peru’s twenty-year-long
civil war between the government and the Communist “Shining Path” party, Ghana’s
numerous coups d’état and military regimes, and Indonesia’s authoritarian rule over East
Timor all extend beyond the reach of traditional justice. Their courts often have massive
existing backlogs, and the public often views courts as biased in favor of a governing
party partially (or fully) responsible for the atrocities in question. For instance, judges in
South Africa appointed by the government of former president F.W. de Klerk would
likely face concerns about their ability to remain impartial in the face of accusations
against de Klerk’s government.

11
In the past three decades, dozens of countries have turned to Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) as a method of bringing closure and healing to
communities wracked by strife. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have given those
accused of wrongdoing and those hurt by that wrongdoing a chance to stop pointing
fingers and, in some cases, start holding hands. TRCs have enabled people in countries
like South Africa, Peru, Ghana, and East Timor, to realize that many of their countrymen
feel similar pain, hurt, and guilt about their shared past. The Commissions have coupled
that awareness with a venue empowering people to step forward, en masse, and share
their experiences feelings openly, in the hopes that the ensuing conversation will
contribute to greater communal good. In the process, people in many countries with
TRCs have developed new bonds of trust amongst themselves and with institutions like
the police and the military. Courts and wars punish or destroy individuals guilty of
wrongdoing but rarely change the underlying culture that enabled the wrongdoing to
occur. TRCs probe the tragedy, its contexts, its causes, and its lasting effects on society to
affect more substantial and meaningful change. However, few researchers have reached
any definitive conclusions about the impact that past TRCs have on their communities, a
fact which has inspired this dissertation. Researchers have attempted evaluations of truth
commissions and found they often produce more negative outcomes when carried out in
isolation from other strategies like trials or amnesties, but their evaluation explored
different, more politically transitional contexts than the cases to be studied here (Olsen et
al, 2010, 95-101). Researchers Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter
themselves concede,
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Those advocating truth commissions, in particular, will find it puzzling that truth
commissions on their own have a negative and significant impact on human rights
and democracy. Why? It may be that by failing to bring perpetrators to justice
perpetuates, rather than ends, the culture of impunity. But if this were the only
explanation, amnesties should have an equally negative and significant outcome
for democracy and human rights measures, yet they do not. An alternative
explanation is that encouraging the truth about the past may catalyze spoilers to
reemerge and threaten human rights and democracy. But this would mean that
trials should have the same effect as truth commissions, yet they do not.
Alternatively, perhaps truth commissions raise expectations about justice or
amnesty that they do not fulfill, disillusioning those who once supported them and
undermining their accountability and stability functions. Certainly, this puzzling
finding echoes our earlier discussion about the importance of creating categories
of truth commissions. Without such typologies, we cannot know specifically
which of the truth commission’s characteristics negatively affects democracy and
human rights (Olsen et al, 2010, 100).
While the cases under review in this study differ from those studied by the researchers
above, it is clear that truth and reconciliation commissions, or “truth commissions” (with
less emphasis on reconciliation) have significant limitations. For one thing, the
commissions often lack the authority to compel the participation of anyone, particularly
alleged perpetrators and state actors who directed, encouraged, or facilitated alleged
wrongdoing. That can open the TRC up to criticism that the “truth” that it posits in its
final report will lack validity because it lacks key sources of information (i.e., the
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testimony and perspective of those who choose not to participate). TRCs also generally
cannot implement any reforms in the wake of their findings; they can merely make
recommendations and hope that the sponsoring government (as well as other
organizations and individuals) act on them. That can engender feelings of disinterest or
distrust in the TRC’s process generally, in the sense that potential witnesses may doubt
that anything will come from their participation in the TRC’s work; they may, in turn,
choose not to participate, which could limit the findings and recommendations. It could
also produce a traumatic reaction in a participant twice over, in encouraging them to
revisit painful memories and subsequently failing to deliver on healing mechanisms.
Additionally, without the power to institute reforms, countries, states, localities, or other
societies seeking structural change cannot rely upon a TRC to deliver that structural
change; they can merely recommend it.
TRCs fit into a larger model known as “restorative justice,” a movement that
emphasizes repairing the harm caused by a crime by involving victims, offenders, and the
surrounding community (Centre for Justice & Reconciliation). Examples include an
initiative in High Point, North Carolina, in which police worked with prosecutors,
community leaders, alleged drug dealers, and their families to understand the impacts of
drug dealing and provide incentives to stop the practice and repair the harm (Kennedy
and Wong, 2005). Practitioners have used restorative justice practices in households,
schools, courtrooms, prisons, workplaces, and beyond.
TRCs: How They work
While traditional courts often review a single incident, TRCs have most often
been used to review massive and long-running acts of violence, discrimination, and other
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wrongdoing.i Truth and Reconciliation Commissioners are often chosen by an
independent selection panel, which often includes representatives from several different
and even opposing communities or political groups. Commissioners can invite witnesses
to testify, but they generally lack the power or legal authority to compel anyone to do so.
They conduct their own research but cannot demand any evidence using warrants; they
can only review what is voluntarily made available to them. ii When a TRC is formed,
governments often lend their endorsement, but they have largely pledged to stay out of
the TRCs operations and conclusions.
In maiiiny cases, TRCs have replaced traditional courts that would impose
definitive verdicts and punishments on wrongdoers. In South Africa, for instance, the
TRC allowed those alleged to have participated in apartheid-era crimes to offer a public
confession to the TRC in lieu of a criminal trial, thereby avoiding punishment. The
Peruvian TRC set up a “judicialization unit” to recommend that certain individuals be
later prosecuted. But a TRC usually restricts itself to completing an inquiry of past
events, an account of those events from the perspectives of those who lived them
(particularly victims), and recommendations for how to reconcile parties embittered
toward one another.
A new model for North America
During and since the Commission’s work, other U.S. communities have followed
in Greensboro’s footsteps. In Maine, a truth and reconciliation commission was formed to
examine the troubled history of foster care placements allegedly designed to assimilate
Native Americans by separating them from their language, clothing, and religion. At the
founding of the Commission, Maine’s governor declared, “I see this Commission as a
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critical step to improve relations between the State and the Tribes. . . . Repairing damage
from prior administrations is a gesture that is important to me” (LePage et al, 2012).
Other cities have launched similar efforts that, like a truth and reconciliation
commission, aim for “restorative justice”—which focuses on repairing the harm caused
by crime rather than punishments for the offenders. Programs in Texas, Connecticut,
California, and elsewhere empower numerous practitioners—including judges, social
workers, mediators, and mental health professionals—to help victims, offenders and
community members process the effects of a crime or other tragic incident and find
healing.
Numerous communities in North America have pasts as dark, and often as
silenced, as Greensboro’s November third, Maine’s decades of Native American
adoption, and Canada’s similar experiences. Historians and social activists are still
learning the extent of damage and societal pain caused to people and groups, from
women to African-Americans, Native Americans to immigrants, at the hands of events
and tragedies that have gone unresolved for years, and even centuries. In many cases,
Americans have redressed past wrongs in courtrooms—often relegating the task of
knowing and disseminating the truth to a chosen few legal professionals. Those attorneys
carefully and strategically select witnesses, guiding them in their testimony in hopes of
reaching a predetermined outcome. Courtroom trials usually focus primarily on definitive
findings of right and wrong and on punishment, not healing.
As with Greensboro’s case, a TRC also gives those guilty of past crimes and
transgressions a chance to speak candidly about their misdeeds and offer apologies. The
Greensboro TRC represents a bold, new experiment being embraced worldwide and
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examined nationally—complementing traditional processes for punishment and
retribution with communication and reconciliation. Widespread interest in recent
independent commissions like the Iraq Study Group underscore Americans’ desire to do
more than vote out, impeach, or even prosecute elected officials when things aren’t right.
Many Americans now want to understand why extraordinarily bad things happened, how
to heal, and how to prevent recurrences. The TRC experiences in Greensboro, Maine, and
Canada provide a guide for seeking that understanding, that healing, and that sense of
restorative justice and transformation.
Examining the Effectiveness of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in North
America
Around the world, “truth and reconciliation commissions” have spent months or
even years examining entrenched, decades-old conflicts that courtroom battles have not
resolved. A single definition of, or set of standards for, a “truth and reconciliation
commission” or a “truth commission” has proved elusive for scholars and organizers of
commissions. Generally speaking, a “truth and reconciliation commission” or “truth
commission” commonly functions independently of a court, using laypeople as
commissioners, who receive voluntarily given testimony, which the commissioners then
condense into a report with recommendations to the government. Those
recommendations may include policy changes, reparations to victims, or even future
prosecutions of alleged wrongdoers.
As one might imagine, these commissions can be fraught with controversy.
Governments often establish these commissions, but because they themselves may be
under investigation by the commissions, they avoid micromanaging the commissions’
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work. That arms-length relationship between the commission and the host government
can limit the commission’s ability to get to the truth. The commission often lacks
authority to subpoena witnesses, even though requests to have witnesses testify
voluntarily have yielded substantial results for past Commissions. The commission also
usually does not have the power to punish those found to have committed wrongdoing.
Some believe a public confession, particularly in front of one’s victims, is punishment
enough. A commission also can undertake a broader analysis and investigation than can
a court of law. Commissions usually meet for extended periods of time and hear from
hundreds or thousands of witnesses, occasionally triggering a backlash among adherents
and making them feel desperate to “move on.” Others, though, view the commissions as
vital to moving on—providing healing as long hidden truths are revealed.
In North America, use of the truth and reconciliation commission has caught on
more slowly than it has worldwide; only a few commissions have met, compared to more
than three dozen globally. Activists and elected officials have called for commissions to
examine numerous national events, from Hurricane Katrina to the alleged torture of Iraqi
war prisoners, but those calls have largely gone unheeded. Commissions have
successfully formed and met in Kent, Ohio; Detroit; and in New York, among other
places, but their work has attracted neither significant attention nor popular support. It is
somewhat puzzling to see commissions fail to gain traction in the United States but
become wildly popular in countries newly introduced to democracy, usually after
emerging from decades of suppression.
The discussion of truth and reconciliation commissions comes amidst a broader
national discussion about the use of “retributive justice” compared to “restorative
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justice.” Where retributive justice focuses on alleged crimes or violations of the law and
appropriate punishments, restorative justice incorporates harm offenders do to victims
and communities. It involves victims and communities in responding to the crime—
confronting offenders who pay reparations deemed appropriate by the parties, offering
closure to those who harmed and those harmed. The roughly 30-year old practice of
restorative justice encompasses at least 300 programs across the U.S., by one estimate,
along with 500 in Europe and more than 100 in Canada. The United Nations has noted
that restorative justice fosters “a balanced approach that is offender-directed and, at the
same time, victim-centered” (Centre for Justice & Reconciliation, 2008, 4). Yet the truth
and reconciliation commission, one of restorative justice’s most well-known devices, has
not captured the North American imagination.
Research Design
This study of truth and reconciliation commissions and the way in which
testimony from the public influences recommendations and reforms took the form of a
multiple, comparative, and qualitative case study. These three cases (Greensboro, Maine,
and Canada) were chosen based on a number of factors. They represent the three most
widely recognized and publicized truth and reconciliation commissions in North America
to date and all convened under mandates that stand in stark contrast to other TRCs around
the world. In other words, while other TRCs in Africa, Latin America, and Asia have
chiefly worked to help with a transition in government, the three North American cases
chosen here operated under mandates designed to bring about reforms carried about by
the existing regimes.
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Two of the three cases (Maine and Canada) are highly similar in the nature of
their work, though with differing outcomes (a much stronger embrace of TRC
recommendations in Canada than in Maine). Both Maine and Canada also enjoyed
significant governmental support at the beginning and, in Canada’s case, throughout and
after its work. The third case (Greensboro), which seems to have inspired Maine’s work,
is far different in scope than the other two cases—the Greensboro TRC focused on a
single event and its broader context, while Canada’s and Maine’s examined years of
repeated behavior. The three TRCs also conducted themselves on different levels of
government—Greensboro was aligned with local government, Maine with the state
government, and Canada with its federal government. Interestingly, in all three cases,
allegations of government malfeasance or neglect played a role in the TRCs’ formation;
the courts and city government in Greensboro, state government and social service
employees in Maine, and Canada’s federal government. Churches also played a
prominent role in the narratives examined in Maine and Canada, complicating the
traditional separation of church and state and the church’s ability to help with healing
from trauma. Additionally, levels of governmental support varied significantly among
the three cases. Greensboro’s TRC received very little support from the city of
Greensboro (save for a referral by the then-Mayor to the TRC nominations committee),
while Maine’s Governor signed memoranda of understanding with Native American
tribes to form the TRC there, and Canada’s government provided several forms of
ongoing support to the TRC there.
Despite their differences, Greensboro, Maine, and Canada all made
recommendations for reform designed to allow their respective societies to strengthen
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and grow from tragic pasts. These three cases, then, in their similar aims, and differing
contexts and results, will help form conclusions about the effectiveness of TRCs across
multiple settings in facilitating public influence on recommendations and reforms. By
examining cases from multiple contexts, some shared realizations emerged about a
TRC’s ability to incorporate public input into recommendations that can impact society.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Studies of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
Literature devoted to truth and reconciliation commissions is both extensive in
quantity and limited as it relates to the use of commissions in the United States. Most of
the research and analysis on commissions deals with international case studies from the
perspectives of commission participants; former commissioners and commission staff;
and social scientists, journalists, historians, and other disinterested observers. In
assessing the value, effectiveness, and even appropriateness of truth and reconciliation
commissions, analysts have ranged in their verdicts from highly skeptical to profoundly
praiseworthy—but very few have explored what it takes for a commission to have a
meaningful impact on its surrounding society.
In both book length surveys of truth and reconciliation commissions, books or
essays about specific commissions, and articles exploring potential future commissions,
the authors focus primarily on the basic facts of a commission—its focus, its revelations,
and its impact. But the literature is missing an analysis of what makes truth and
reconciliation commissions more challenging in the United States, what elements an
American truth and reconciliation commission needs to be born, to survive, and to have
its work endure, and what criteria define its success.
Thus, this literature review will examine the trends among truth and reconciliation
commission research, including the wide variety of views and the consensus definitions
of how commissions work and function; a sense of where gaps in the research exist,
particularly as it relates to truth and reconciliation commission in the U.S.; and my idea
of what makes commissions succeed—namely, a broad base of community support,

22
efficient use of time and resources, and the blazing of new trails of discovery untouched
by courts of law.
Schools of Thought
It is not easy to distinguish schools of thought on this subject. Many of the
researchers and analysts arrive at versions of the same conclusion—while flawed, truth
and reconciliation commissions have merit but must be very carefully managed to have a
meaningful impact on society. The schools of thought, then, seem to focus more on the
degree to which a researcher supports a truth and reconciliation commission—
unequivocally, conditionally, or perhaps only under very unique circumstances.
One school of thought seems to revolve around the belief that truth and
reconciliation processes are critically needed—particularly to address issues of race. An
essay by Taunya Lovell Banks (2003) entitled “Exploring White resistance to racial
reconciliation in the United States,” conveyed this school of thought forcefully. Banks
argued that the reconciliation of all Americans estranged from one another because of
racial subordination should be the ultimate goal of the black reparations’ movement—
referring to the effort to pay the families of deceased slaves for unpaid labor. AfricanAmericans, Banks argued, need to find productive ways to cleanse themselves of the past
and move beyond racial subordination and segregation. She uses case studies in Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to argue that Americans need a complete
picture of the history of racial discrimination and the use of a truth and reconciliation
process as a way to heal wounds.
Banks argued the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission provided
the means for achieving a national catharsis and a mutually acceptable political
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settlement that hasn’t occurred in the U.S. She suggests reparations payments
recommended by a truth and reconciliation commission could make it appear as if the
U.S. has fixed its racial problems by writing checks rather than by searching for ways to
achieve true racial reconciliation. She later delved into unsuccessful efforts in Congress
both to establish a commission to study the impact of slavery and to get a governmental
apology for slavery. Banks explored efforts similar to a truth and reconciliation
commission—like President Bill Clinton’s effort to convene a conversation on race and
an apology issued to Japanese survivors of World War II internment camps. But she
suggested the government has not shown a willingness to remedying the consequences of
racism—as it might be expected to do if a truth and reconciliation commission issued
recommendations. A truth and reconciliation commission, she argues, would help protect
African-Americans in ways they were not protected by courts from lynching, law
enforcement conspiracies, and even stereotyped depictions in mass media.
Banks argued that whites have resisted reparation and truth/reconciliation efforts
because they are ignorant of the nature of slavery, the de facto segregation that remains in
place, and the vestiges of discrimination. She also contended opposition to such a
commission comes from a combination of sources: whites who feel ambivalently about
reparations because of what it might reveal about past racism; the prioritization of
harmony over discussions of the real history; and the demographics of voters, skewed
towards older whites who are more racially biased. In short, Banks forcefully made the
case for bringing truth and reconciliation techniques to the U.S., but her analysis of what
has impeded use of the concept was limited to slavery and race issues, and she devoted
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little energy to a more detailed understanding of what has prevented the concept from
taking hold.
Other authors made a compelling case for use of a truth and reconciliation
commission to examine U.S. history. Sherrilyn Ifill (2003) gently critiqued the South
African commission for not focusing enough on the stories of “average people” in
individual communities, and for paying more attention to high-profile perpetrators or
victims. Ifill (2003) made the case that instead of searching for the perpetrators of
lynching incidents in the United States, a commission should focus on those who
promoted, condoned, and tolerated lynching in their communities—the roles of local
institutions, governments, the press, the churches, and the criminal justice system, all of
which have been absent from the efforts to establish a truth and reconciliation
commission on lynching. Nigel Biggar (2001) made a similar case in “Making Peace or
Doing Justice: Must We Choose?” within a collection of essays entitled Burying the Past:
Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict. Biggar suggested that victims of a
great harm, like South Africa’s apartheid that he explores in case study, can never forget
what occurred, and government has to attend to the victims and their injuries; grievances
without redress tend to fester. For Biggar, a truth and reconciliation commission
represented an initial step in searching for healing; he did not consider it necessary to
trade justice for peace or vice versa, but rather that the search for justice can help
bringing peace. Biggar suggested that the public testimony of both victims and
perpetrators have greater value for society than the price paid for amnesty (i.e., immunity
from prosecution) given to some alleged apartheid ringleaders. While that may seem, in
fact, like a trade of justice for peace, Biggar seems to believe that the Commission’s

25
facilitation of confessions via public testimony represents a form of justice, alongside
peace. On the other hand, Biggar did reference a poll which found most South Africans
believed more things were “stirred up” than were put to rest by its Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (Malan, 1998). While making a more nuanced case than
Banks, Biggar seemed to believe that truth and reconciliation commissions hold value for
Americans and others as ways to discover both justice and healing for a community.
Other essayists made similar cases to Biggar’s and Banks’s. Donald Shriver’s
essay “Where and When in Political Life is Justice Served by Forgiveness?” (2001)
suggested that Americans regularly bury the past, but the political world must take
account of America’s painful past, especially if (as was often the case in the United
States) political powers were among the perpetrators of that pain. As Shriver (2001, 28)
described it, a society “needs an inquest before burial,” and in this case, Shriver is
referring to a truth and reconciliation commission. Shriver used case studies from South
Africa’s Commission and others to suggest a commission can create a punishment for
those who feel compelled to confess their crimes publicly, while it can also nourish a
desire not to repeat the evil. The United States, he argued, is infatuated with the
punishment of criminals, spending billions on prisons, but almost completely neglects
restoration or compensation for victims. For Shriver, truth and reconciliation
commissions presented important opportunities for healing while still allowing a form of
justice to occur.
Other essays commended the “restorative justice” approach taken by truth and
reconciliation commissions, compared to the “retributive justice” a judge might take in
sentencing an offender to prison. In “Politics and Forgiveness,” Jean Bethke Elshtain
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(2001, 45-64) suggested that truth and reconciliation commissions, as forums where
public apologies can occur, can help parties begin to reconcile by allowing parties to hold
each other accountable while releasing them from the burden of the past. Elshtain
acknowledged that the recognition of a wrong does not carry with it a clear-cut remedy
and does not necessarily mean that old wrongs can be righted, but she nevertheless
endorsed commissions like South Africa’s because of its emphasis on victims’ needs,
both for them to remember the past and for them then to release themselves from its
shackles. Tuomas Forsberg (2001, 65-84), in “The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing
with the Past: Some Conceptual and Normative Issues,” used South Africa’s Commission
experience as a case study to offer qualified support for truth and reconciliation
commissions. He suggested the relationship between truth and justice is essential, but
truth and reconciliation are contingent—i.e., one cannot assume that truth will bring
reconciliation. In South Africa, Forsberg argued that once the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission finished its work, the South African people were not fully reconciled just
because truths emerged, but they also did not launch civil war once they learned the truth.
Forsberg suggests states must consider their political circumstances, the nature of their
problems, and cultural factors in deciding whether a truth and reconciliation commission
can truly work—emphasizing the place that public confession of wrongdoing may have
as a societal value.
Other authors gave more conditional support to truth and reconciliation
commissions as an effective solution for communities in search of healing and justice.
Priscilla Hayner’s Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth
Commissions (2010) used several case studies of commissions around the world to
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suggest that truth and reconciliation commissions have a meaningful place in society—as
a way to help recreate a “livable space,” where history is understood and not forgotten
but not carried as an albatross. She suggested that it may not always be cathartic to
participate in a truth and reconciliation commission, and she acknowledged that there is
limited scientific evidence available to prove that assertion one way or the other. Despite
its limitations, though, Hayner wrote that a truth and reconciliation commission “can
fundamentally change how a country understands and accepts the most contentious
aspects of its history” (Hayner, 23). She saw commissions falter most often when they
lack political support, when political circumstances change, when commissioners are
pressured to limit their inquiry and not have an impact upon the current government, and
when logistical challenges arise. Hayner referred to data gathered in a survey on the
South African Commission that suggests more than half of all South Africans regretted
participating publicly as witnesses because of the trauma. Hayner argued that many
factors influence whether a truth and reconciliation commission can truly achieve
reconciliation, including the end of violence, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, issuance
of reparations, addressing of structural inequities and material needs, and the passage of
time. Hayner is one of very few authors to tackle how to evaluate the success of a truth
and reconciliation commission: process (how much the commission engages the public);
product (the quality and nature of the Commission report and its proposals for reform);
and impact (how it contributes to reconciliation and healing). In that respect, Hayner set
a high bar for a commission to do more than just give the public chances to speak out, but
rather to influence the course of a community or a nation.
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Other literature examined what conditions should be met in order for a truth and
reconciliation commission to emerge. In an article, “International Guidelines for the
Creation and Operation of Truth and reconciliation commissions: A preliminary
proposal,” Hayner (1996) expanded on the critical questions communities and countries
must answer as they consider whether to create creating a commission. She suggested a
commission should not be imposed upon a community or nation from the outside; a
commission has an important role to play in a national transition, but it shouldn’t
necessarily have the power to institute reforms; and publicizing details about past abuses
will not always reduce the likelihood of future abuses. In “Commissioning the Truth:
Further Research Questions” (1996), Hayner used case studies to demonstrate the
potential truth and reconciliation commissions have to effect change as well as the risk of
convening a commission while violence and human rights abuses are ongoing (as was the
case in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda). Hayner debated whether a commission
should identify alleged perpetrators if it is not offering those accused “due process,” as a
court would. She wondered what the relationship between truth and reconciliation
commissions and courts should be, especially where amnesty for perpetrators is
considered vital to the commission’s success. She also suggested further study into what
follow-up activities or policies a commission should pursue on behalf of community
reconciliation after it releases its findings and recommendations.
Others took on the question of why truth and reconciliation commissions should
convene. In Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Martha Minow (1998) spelled out
several goals for truth and reconciliation commissions, including to “overcome
communal and official denial of the atrocity and gain public acknowledgment…end and
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prevent violence…forge the basis for a domestic democratic order that respects and
enforces human rights…restore dignity to victims…punish, exclude, shame, and diminish
offenders…” (Minow, 1998, p. 88). She also suggested that truth and reconciliation
commissions are better suited to meet many of those goals than court prosecutions,
though these goals are clearly ambitious and difficult to fulfill. Throughout her book,
Minow relied primarily on case studies to make the point that simple forgiveness without
any consequences seems to leave victims deeply hurting and societies unstable, but
vengeance can produce further atrocities. Truth and reconciliation commissions allow for
a third way, in which parties eschew vengeance and consider forgiveness only after
hearing the truth publicly confessed. In “Innovating Response to the Past: Human Rights
Institutions,” Minow (2001) examined multiple truth and reconciliation commissions and
finds controversies, particularly surrounding decisions to provide amnesty to alleged
perpetrators, and some demands for criminal trials following the truth and reconciliation
commission testimony, but she also found survivors who appreciated the public
acknowledgements of wrongdoing.
Truth and reconciliation commissions do have their critics in the literature.
Journalist Ellis Cose (2004) took a broader survey than Minow or Hayner in Bone to
Pick: Of Forgiveness, Reconciliation, Reparation, and Revenge, and his conclusions on
truth and reconciliation commissions were a bit different. He referred to the South
African Commission as something of a disappointment because of the lack of reparations,
the inability to stop perpetrators from lying about their crimes, limited resources, and
(perhaps) orchestrating scenes of forgiveness that were not real. Cose sympathized with
the power of truth and reconciliation commissions to give victims an opportunity to
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forgive their perpetrators and let go of their rage, but he did not seem to believe that
America’s wounds could be reopened and cleansed and soothed with a commission’s
“healing balm” (Cose, 2004, 124). As Cose put it,
It is extremely difficult to convince groups of people who see no need for
collective healing to get deeply involved in process that supposedly will heal them
or their community. It is even more difficult when that process requires them to
acknowledge so called truths that their very self-image requires that they reject or
deny (Cose, 2004, 124).
Despite his skepticism, Cose reviewed commissions in both the U.S. and the world and
concluded that a commission can help “clean up the debts of the past” (Cose, 2004, 156).
Similarly, Barahoa de Brito (2013) documented flaws in the execution of a truth
and reconciliation commission in “Passion, Constraint, Law, and Fortuna: The Human
Rights Challenge to Chilean Democracy.” His case study of Chile’s truth and
reconciliation commission, which utilizes surveys, reparations data, and sales of the
Commission report, among other statistics, found that Chile’s commission may have
erred on the side of reconciliation in accommodating the wishes of the “old guard” who
stayed in power after Augusto Pinochet left office. Where other commissions may have
focused more on revealing damning truths about the actions of perpetrators and issuing
apologies or reparations, Chile’s commission seemed so fixated on ensuring peaceful coexistence that it may have declared reconciliation “victory” prematurely, in de Brito’s
view. While de Brito seemed supportive of the ways in which the Commission forced
Chileans to face truth more directly, he nevertheless seems disappointed by the limited
judicial impact the Commission appeared to have. Similarly, Rachel Sieder’s “War,
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Peace, and the Politics of Memory in Guatemala” (2001) suggested that “the extent to
which truth and reconciliation commissions will improve the prospects for overcoming
legacies of authoritarianism depends on the degree to which they are linked to and allow
for broader social processes” (Sieder, 2001, 185). In Guatemala, the commission
produced substantial results, including a statement of regret from U.S. President Clinton
for the U.S.’s role in the conflict, along with reparations and the exhumation of the graves
of victims. But the key to the success of Guatemala’s commission were other efforts
occurring prior to the commission’s start that were designed to uncover truth and secure
compensation and other forms of justice. Thus, Sieder seemed to argue that only with
substantial groundwork laid before the launch of the truth and reconciliation commission
could the commission then succeed.
Similarly, Charles Villa-Vicencio (2003) suggested that a truth and reconciliation
commission provides a fragile foundation that has to be reinforced by other nationbuilding initiatives. His article, “Restorative Justice in Social Context: The South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” argued that a commission can serve as
the beginning of a process towards peaceful coexistence, eventually reintegrating both
offenders and victims into society. Anecdotal evidence that Villa-Vicencio gathered
suggested that testimony at the South African Commission did help bring some healing
and reconciliation between victim and perpetrator, but lower-profile witnesses had to
struggle to get much public attention for their individual stories. Reconciliation, in a
word, takes much work and time, more time than a Commission may spend on its review.
Howard Zehr (1997) made a similar argument based on the South African case study in
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his article, “Restorative Justice: When Justice and Healing Go Together.” Calling the
Commission historic and “a bold step on an uncharted path,” he wrote,
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s emphasis is on validating and
vindicating victims by allowing them to tell their stories and by investigating what
happened goes far to meet this requirement. Still, given the scope of the wrongs
and the mandate time frame, the process will be partial at best; only a tiny fraction
of victims can be heard. Also, when victims feel pressure to forgive and reconcile
prematurely, healing will be incomplete. Restorative justice also requires that we
find ways to make things right to victims as much as possible; through its
Rehabilitation and Reparations Committee, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission addresses this principle, although belatedly and incompletely. (Zehr,
1997, p. 20).
Zehr and others essentially praised South Africa’s willingness to experiment with truth
and reconciliation while cautioning others to follow their example only with their eyes
wide open to the myriad challenges. Healing, after all, remains complex for the
individual and for the collective—for some it may deal strictly with apologies around an
incident, while for others it may involve more exhaustive levels of support for victims
during the process of truth and reconciliation.
Several authors picked up Zehr’s case in other countries, arguing either for a
commission in Rwanda or against one, at least for now, in Northern Ireland. In the case
of Rwanda, Jeremy Sarkin (1999) argued that Rwandans have not had an outlet for the
anger and pain of the conflict there—and the criminal justice system has not been up to
the task. In an article in Human Rights Quarterly, Sarkin suggested that the new
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Rwandan government should empower a commission to generate public awareness of the
truth and counter the propaganda from both sides that has led to anger and frustration.
But Sarkin cautions that a commission in Rwanda would obviously open many old
wounds, renewing resentment and hostility, and needs careful planning and preparation—
what time period to cover, how to protect commissioners from violent interference or
intimidation, how to appoint commissioners, etc. In the case of Northern Ireland,
Terence McCaughey and Marie Smyth each focused on the difficulties of setting up a
truth and reconciliation commission. McCaughey’s piece, “Northern Ireland: Burying the
Hatchet, Not the Past” (2001), suggested a commission would only be possible in the
context of a wide-ranging political accord. He feels that establishing a commission
would be complicated by competing versions of Northern Ireland’s past and debates over
whether or not amnesty for alleged perpetrators is a fair outcome for the victims. Marie
Smyth’s “Putting the Past in Its Place: Issues of Victimhood and Reconciliation in
Northern Ireland’s Peace Process” (2003) utilized an extensive database that documents
where atrocities and violence occurred, suggesting that a commission would not be able
to generalize about suffering there. She also wondered whether armed parties to the
Northern Irish conflict would have incentives to participate prior to a meaningful powersharing agreement.
But other surveys of truth and reconciliation commissions cast the prospects for
TRCs in a more positive light. In another survey, Eli McCarthy (2010) suggests that
truth and reconciliation commissions had a bright future in the United States despite
several missteps in early experiments with the concept. His article, “Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions: Toward a More Just U.S. Society,” highlighted the ways in
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which some commissions have compromised their impact by working in isolation from
civil society and their victims, failing to work closely with judges and courts, or
becoming subject to the agendas of interest groups rather than society as a whole.
McCarthy suggested that viewed through the lens of nonviolent peacemaking, truth and
reconciliation commissions “can cultivate and richer and sustainable justice in the U.S.
through human dignity…reconciliation, and the constructive program” (McCarthy, 2010,
2). More importantly, he recognized the need for further research on the U.S. experience
with truth and reconciliation commissions, particularly investigating how to establish
them, how to make them consistent with U.S. constitutional law, and how to determine
their subject matter jurisdiction.
One of the very pitfalls McCarthy mentioned for a commission—working in
isolation from civil society—afflicted the first truth and reconciliation commission in the
United States, meeting in Greensboro, North Carolina. The Commission there was
convened to re-examine a Ku Klux Klan shooting at an anti-Klan rally, during which
labor activists and Klansmen exchanged gunfire and five activists were killed in front of
television news cameras. No Klansmen were ever convicted in the incident. In Learning
from Greensboro, Lisa Magarell and Joya Wesley (2008) reported that the Greensboro
Commission struggled to attain the support of political, business, and other establishment
leaders, while fending off threats from parties being scrutinized by the Commission.
They recognized that the truth and reconciliation commission is, in some ways, a political
endeavor and will alienate some in the community who are uncomfortable with what a
commission inquiry might find, especially in the context of America’s racial history. But
they also contended that truth and reconciliation commissions aren’t just for emergent or
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fragile states coming out of dictatorship, and prosecutions need not be the preferred
method for addressing alleged human rights abuses—commissions can be well suited for
that task as well.
Some analysts explored whether national-level truth and reconciliation
commissions can make a meaningful local impact. Hugo van der Merwe (2001)
suggested that truth and reconciliation commissions functioning at a national level, like
South Africa’s, have to recognize their limited ability to affect reconciliation at a local
level. In “National and Community Reconciliation: Competing Agendas in the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Van der Merwe’s more detailed,
qualitative and quantitative analysis of South Africa’s Commission, local communities
received very limited contact with the Commission, leaving them with unclear
expectations of the Commission’s work (beyond amnesty for certain perpetrators). In
this essay and his related dissertation, Van der Merwe referenced surveys of various
South African communities that found they felt treated differently by the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission—one predominantly black, one predominantly white.
Through in-depth interviews in the two communities, Van der Merwe discovered that
community perceptions and Commission approaches to reconciliation varied significantly
between the two communities. He suggested that a truth and reconciliation commission
conducted on a large scale must either focus merely on initiating some community
dialogue aimed at reconciliation or must invest numerous additional resources in townby-town activities in order to achieve meaningful success among individuals.
Within the school of thought that seems more supportive of truth and
reconciliation commissions, authors like Brandon Hamber (2001) seemed respectful of,
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but not wedded to, the concept. In “Does the Truth Heal? A Psychological Perspective
on Political Strategies for Dealing with the Legacy of Political Violence,” Hamber stated,
“Despite little research and empirical evidence, the ability of processes of recovering the
truth to contribute to healing and reconciliation with the past has been ubiquitously
asserted” (Hamber, 2001, 134). Despite that skepticism, Hamber utilized case studies to
demonstrate value added by truth and reconciliation commission testimony, official
acknowledgements, and reparations. But, he went on, “the long-term ability of a once-off
statement or public testimony to address the full psychological impact of the past is
questionable…It would be an error to exaggerate the ability of truth and reconciliation
commissions or public testimony to address en masse needs of individuals struggling
with a personal and social history of human rights abuses” (Hamber, 2001, 134). Citing
studies done in South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, where truth and reconciliation
commissions met, Hamber found evidence that South Africans found the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission useful, but some believe that the exposure of the past
atrocities may have made the nation more violent. Ultimately, Hamber seemed to find
that commissions have merit, but he seems more skeptical than most scholars of whether
the commission can deliver on the promise that the admission of wrongdoing will lead to
reconciliation.
Two authors have also tackled commissions that have either very recently
completed their meetings or are in the process of meeting—a national poverty
commission and a commission reviewing the shootings at Kent State in 1970. In the case
of the poverty commission, organizers convened panels on topics like the right to health
care, housing, education, living wages, water, and basic utilities. The panels primarily
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featured laborers and labor unions, rather than a more balanced mix of stakeholders, but
commissioners came from around the world to hear the testimonies. While the Poverty
Commission boasted “enormous success,” like other commissions before it, the metrics
used to measure that success are not immediately clear. The Kent State Tribunal,
supported by filmmaker Michael Moore, is seeking to make sense of the Kent State
shootings, in the wake of newly released forensic evidence suggesting that National
Guard troops had an order to shoot. Despite Moore’s involvement, the commission has
received limited media attention and does not have the blessing of any governmental
entity, leading to questions about its long-term impact.
Critique of Existing Literature
Much of the existing literature on truth and reconciliation commissions has
followed a pattern: it has dealt primarily with commissions meeting in transitional states
outside the United States, usually national in scope, and it has treated a commission’s
work superficially, without delving into a more in-depth analysis. In so doing, the
literature has largely overlooked local efforts or commissions in North America.
Additionally, as some of the authors have even suggested, commissions have, to some
extent, been showered with positive feedback without bona fide evidence to support that
positive assessment. Furthermore, even case study analyses of truth and reconciliation
commissions seem to have relied less on the direct accounts of participants and more on a
“birds-eye view” taken by either a journalist or a social scientist.
Truth and reconciliation commissions, particularly the three in North America
with the highest profile who have completed their work, warrant much more extensive
investigation. One must examine what testimony emerges from a call to the general
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public to testify (without the power of a subpoena), how that testimony impacts the
Commission’s work and final report, and how or whether those reports produce
meaningful reform in a community or nation. Through an in-depth analysis of the
process, product, and impact of these three truth and reconciliation commissions, this
research project explored how testimony given to the commissions ultimately affects the
Commission’s own recommendations and the extent to which governments and other
actors implement the recommendations. In so doing, it evaluated how well-equipped a
Commission is to influence policy reform and societal change based on the testimony
they receive and the recommendations they issue.
Theoretical Foundations and Frameworks
This dissertation attempts to answer the research question: to what extent can
truth and reconciliation commissions empower parties to long-running and wide-reaching
conflicts to influence changes in their communities, states, or countries in ways courts
cannot? It aims to explore the extent to which the Commissions’ applications of
restorative and transitional justice traditions in North America, against entirely different
contexts than those used with Commissions in places like South Africa and Chile, have
produced changes in North Carolina, Maine, and Canada. It draws upon theories of
public dialogue and deliberation, in which citizens actively participate in the co-creation
of change that other entities like state actors (governments) or non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) could spearhead. In his seminal work When the People Speak:
Deliberative Democracy & Public Consultation, James Fishkin (2011) draws from direct
experience involving ordinary citizens in decision-making to define deliberation as “faceto-face discussion by which participants conscientiously raise, and respond to, competing
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arguments so as to arrive at considered judgments about the solutions to public problems”
(Fishkin, 2011, 17). The truth and reconciliation commission model differentiates itself
from a judicial or formal legal proceeding in that it empowers anyone with interest or a
stake in the outcome to step forward and, in essence, deliberate on the questions at hand-namely, how should our society move forward from a dark event or era. Fishkin
conducted experiments with what he calls “deliberative polling,” a multi-day discussion
of policy issues among a sample of the population designed to reflect the makeup of the
population as a whole, and he found that given the chance to hear from multiple
perspectives and discuss issues in depth, participants’ opinions often evolved beyond
what they might say during a spur-of-the-moment survey (Fishkin, 2011, 30-31). To the
extent that truth and reconciliation commissions aspire to bring previously warring
factions together or help give healing and a path forward for all, such diverse groups of
participants aid in painting a clearer picture of the public’s views. This study is therefore
a test of the theory that, first, a population like Greensboro’s would embrace an
opportunity to participate in a multi-stage dialogue, and that those convening that
dialogue would use what they heard from the population in rendering its judgments. This
study also tests the theory that participation in such a dialogue could change previously
held views by the parties—either about the truth as to what had occurred or about what
should happen as a result.
Similarly, Fung and Wright (2003) argue for the notion of “Empowered
Participatory Governance” (Fung and Wright, 2003, 5), suggesting that opportunities for
citizens to contribute directly to public problem-solving “are participatory because they
rely upon the commitment and capacities of ordinary people to make sensible decisions
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through reasoned deliberation and empowered because they attempt to tie action to
discussion” (Fung and Wright, 2003, 5). John Clayton Thomas (2012) suggests that the
public can and should take on different roles in decisions about public administration,
including citizen, customer, and partner. He writes,
The public probably plays its most important role in public management when its
members participate in decision making, joining with public managers in
deliberating about the nature of public programs and their implementation.
Members of the public here take the citizen role, sharing responsibility for
determining the course of government (Thomas, 2012, 6).
While the nature of the three TRCs under review here encompass more than simply the
course of government, each of the three TRCs recommend a broad range of government
action in response, suggesting that the public was given a chance to share in the
responsibility for determining the course their government would take on the TRC’s
specific matter.
In the spirit of reconciliation and conflict resolution, Leighninger and Nabatachi
(2015) write of public participation as anything that “describes the activities by which
people’s concerns, needs, interests, and values are incorporated into decisions and actions
on public matters and issues” (Leighninger and Nabatchi, 14). They later argue, “When
participation brings together citizens on different sides. . . they often find common
ground” (Leighninger and Nabatachi, 33), and they cite numerous studies suggesting that
broad public participation in dialogue about their society “are correlated with a range of
positive outcomes, from economic development to public health” (Leighninger and
Nabatchi, 2015, 30). Longtime public opinion scholar Daniel Yankelovich (2015) also
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argues in support of a more participatory, deliberative framework to address lingering
“wicked problems” in America, a label which could certainly be applied to race relations
studied by the TRCs:
with all the wicked problems the nation faces, it will be difficult to get back on
track without a more thoughtful, more fully engaged public. . . Today’s public
feels powerless, mistrustful, inattentive, and disengaged. This makes our wicked
problems harder to resolve. . . . .The public . . . are venting their anger and
frustration in the public square, but without having thought through practical
solutions to their grievances. In the United States we haven’t reached this tipping
point yet, but we inevitably will unless we find some way to give Americans as
citizens more say over their lives and governance” (Yankelovich, 2015, 5).
The notion of powerlessness comes up again and again in the work of the three TRCs that
make up this multiple case study. In Greensboro, even the Ku Klux Klan argued it was
powerless not to respond to repeated provocations from members of the Communist
Workers Party, up to and including using sticks to bang on their approaching cars on
November 3rd. Many of those who witnessed the shootings on November 3rd expressed
similar powerlessness, particularly as the police department stayed back from the “Death
to the Klan” rally that turned deadly and later enforced a curfew in the affected
neighborhood and denied any responsibility for the bloodshed. Native children placed in
foster care in Maine or in Canada’s residential schools also felt powerless over their fate,
either being placed or enduring abuse of varying forms while in care or school. Prior to
the launch of the three TRCs, many of the populations enumerated above certainly also
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felt powerless to improve their lot in life, feeling as if their suffering had been forgotten
or ignored.
The authors of Democracy in Motion (2012) tout the benefits of what they call
“deliberative civic engagement,” meaning activities that include “thoughtful and reasoned
consideration of information, views, experiences, and ideas among a group of
individuals” and “working to make a difference in the civic life of our communities. . .
promoting the quality of life in a community, through both political and nonpolitical
processes” (Nabatachi et al, 2012, 6-7). They outline a series of steps in their theoretical
framework, from “the creation of a solid information base about the nature of the
problem at hand” to “the arrival at the best decisions possible in light of what was learned
through deliberation. . . or the arrival at independent judgment” (Nabatachi et al, 2012, 89). These steps could certainly align with the work of TRCs, which endeavor to ascertain
a clearer sense of what occurred and a set of recommendations they believe will most
benefit society in the future. The authors argue the benefits of this approach include the
cultivation of “greater mutual understanding or at least tolerance among persons with
divergent views. Because people deliberating together often think beyond their own selfinterest, the experience can yield greater empathy for the wider community” (Nabatchi et
al, 2012, 9). And in support of the multiyear timeframes associated with allowing a
broad audience to participate in truth and reconciliation commission processes, authors
Susan Clark and Woden Teachout (2012) coined the phrase “slow democracy” to mean
“firsthand knowledge of the local decisions that matter to us. . . [it] encourages us to
govern ourselves locally with processes that are inclusive, deliberative, and citizen
powered. . . . It is a reminder of the care needed for full-blooded, empowered community
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decision making (Clark and Teachout, 2012, xxii-xxiii). Finally, in contrast to the winlose outcomes of criminal prosecution or civil litigation, the mediators Lawrence
Susskind and Patrick Field (1996) advocate for what they call a “mutual-gains approach
to dealing with an angry public” (Susskind and Field, 1996, 13), in which conveners
“acknowledge the concerns of the other side, encourage joint fact finding. . . [and] accept
responsibility, admit mistakes, and share power” (Susskind and Field, 1996, 13). Some
years after the Greensboro TRC finished its work, the Greensboro City Council did, in
fact, accept responsibility and acknowledged the concerns of those who had opposed the
city’s management of the 1979 crisis. Maine’s Governor also expressed his own
acknowledgement of state government’s poor treatment of and relationship with its
Native American tribes, and Canada’s Prime Minister offered a formal governmental
apology. This mutual gains approach helps describe the approach taken by governments
in Maine and Canada to truth and reconciliation commissions--granting them
independence while providing political, financial, and other forms of support. In sum,
the frameworks described above situate the truth and reconciliation commission among a
spectrum of both dispute resolution and public participation--in which parties have much
greater access to, and influence over, the TRC process than they can ever get in courts or
government proceedings.
Transitional and Restorative Justice theory
In addition to the theories described above, this research links to work done in the
fields of transitional and restorative justice. Transitional justice is defined by the
International Center for Transitional Justice (2009) as
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a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks
recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation
and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice
adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human
rights abuse” (ICTJ, 2009, 1).
Another definition from Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza (2006) reads, “the conception of
justice associated with periods of political chance, characterized by legal responses to
confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” (Roht-Arriaza and
Mariezcurrena, 2006, 1). The Maine and Canada TRCs, in particular, represent responses
to systematic and widespread treatment of indigenous (or Native) children that nearly all
view as violations of their human rights, and all three TRCs included in their reports
recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation, and
democracy. Within these frameworks, scholars like Martha Minow (1998) argue that
truth and reconciliation commissions bring advantages to societies, in part, based on their
participatory quality: “The chance to tell one’s story and be heard without interruption or
skepticism is crucial to so many people, and nowhere more vital than for survivors of
trauma” (Minow, 1998, 58). Undoubtedly, each of the TRCs provided the public with
that chance, and the notion of being heard without interruption was of particular
importance; each TRC seemed to err on the side of silence in its treatment of statement
providers, asking primarily clarifying questions, if any.
That said, a TRC may or may not provide the needed resolution to the conflict
under its consideration if it functions in isolation from other potential conflict resolution
and transitional justice interventions. In circumstances where no prosecution has
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occurred or reparations paid, for example, those who identify as victims in the matters
under a TRC’s purview may decline to participate if they believe the TRC will provide
amnesty to alleged perpetrators. That is, they may only support a TRC if they have
confidence that alleged perpetrators will be held to account whether they voluntarily
appear before the TRC or not. As such, a TRC may benefit from (or even require) a
parallel judicial process that allows for the prosecution of alleged perpetrators who fail to
take responsibility before a TRC or comply with recommended restitution measures.
Additionally, some matters that could benefit from the work of a TRC could also benefit
from parallel processes such as negotiation, mediation, or arbitration to settle their
individual claims. For example, a TRC could review overarching issues associated with
a government’s failure to respond to a crisis—a natural disaster, a crime spree, the
foreclosure crisis, the opioid crisis, etc. However, an individual seeking assistance for
repair to their own home or resolution to their own challenges in foreclosure would be
better served by a process like arbitration or mediation, where they can explore the
intricacies of their specific case in more detail and develop customized solutions to
address their concerns. A TRC can help a society explore macro-level factors that caused
a tragedy and recommend measures to prevent a recurrence, but it is ill-equipped to give
each individual victim their own chosen form of closure. For that, other methods are
more likely to succeed.
The connection between this research and transitional justice is a somewhat
tenuous based on the settings in which these three TRCs convened. While all three cases
being examined in this dissertation would align with the ICTJ definition (and, to a lesser
degree, with Roht-Arriaza’s), Canada, Maine, and Greensboro were not making a

46
transition of the sort made by other countries who hosted a TRC--like South Africa and
Chile. The TRC process as it has been applied in these three North American cases could
certainly help victims’ transition to a higher quality of life and could help the respective
regimes (the Canadian national government, the Maine state government, and the
Greensboro city government) transition to policies that treat all of its citizens more
equitably. Nevertheless, the connection between transitional justice seems stronger in the
case of earlier TRCs than it does in these cases, though it remains relevant. Particularly,
aspects of transitional justice that allow for someone to see their traumatic experiences
publicly at monuments or museums, to feel “heard” and hear apologies or accountability
from others, and potential institutional reform all play important roles in the three cases
chosen for this study (Brett et al, 2007). These three cases certainly aim to help those
affected by their respective incidents (in Greensboro) or eras (in Maine and Canada) to
transition from a sense of injustice to one of justice.
Additionally, this research connects to the school of thought around restorative
justice, predicated on the notion that direct interactions between victim and offender can
bring more permanent benefits to the parties than the “retributive” system of courts. One
definition of restorative justice is “a non-adversarial approach usually monitored by a
trained professional who seeks to offer justice to the individual victim, the offender, and
the community, all of whom have been harmed by a crime or other form of wrongdoing”
(Wormer, 2011, 44-46). As one of restorative justice’s leading voices, Howard Zehr,
puts it, “rather than obsessing about whether offenders get what they deserve, restorative
justice focuses on repairing the harm of crime and engaging individuals and community

47
members in the process” (Zehr, 2009). Zehr outlines a series of questions that can
establish whether or not a process could fit into the category of restorative justice:
Are the wrongs being acknowledged? Are the needs of those who were harmed
being addressed? Is the one who committed the harm being encouraged to
understand the damage and accept his or her obligation to make right the wrong?
Are those involved in or affected by this being invited to be part of the ‘solution?’
(Zehr, 2009)
In the cases chosen for this research, truth and reconciliation processes do seem to satisfy
that criteria: each TRC used its report to acknowledge what it perceived as wrongs that
had been done; the TRC recommendations seek to address the many needs of those who
were harmed, and those involved or affected by the harm were invited to be part of the
‘solution.’ Less clear, in these three cases, is the extent to which the TRC encouraged
those who committed harm to understand the damage and accept obligations to make
right a wrong. If anything, the three TRCs studied here created ample opportunities for
those who committed harm to participate in dialogue around that harm, but in both Maine
and Canada, that participation often occurred in private, and acknowledgement of
responsibility was limited in all three cases, with some exceptions (a Klan apology in
Greensboro, some statements from state officials in Maine, etc.).
While much of the current practice of restorative justice seems to be found in
schools or in cases initially brought before courts and deferred (or referred) to a
restorative justice program, the principles associated with restorative justice overlay
closely with those involved in the three truth and reconciliation commissions being
studied in this dissertation. The theoretical foundations of restorative justice (as a
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practice) align very closely with the infrastructure of a truth and reconciliation
commission. Several theories connect closely with the practice and values of restorative
justice, including “control theory,” which contends “that state intervention cannot replace
the power of community ties and community acceptance to control misbehaviour”
(Marshall, 1999, 30). This seems particularly true in the case of Canada’s TRC, where
state intervention did not stop a class action lawsuit over treatment in residential schools
that ultimately produced the creation of the truth and reconciliation commission. It also
carries particular weight in Maine, where the state intervened numerous times on behalf
of a child, only to find later that the severing of community ties proved particularly
harmful to that child’s wellbeing.
A UK government review of restorative justice outlines other theoretical
foundations for restorative justice work, including “abolitionism, which advocates
community control in replace of state control. . . peacemaking and conflict resolution
theory, which both treat crime as a conflict better resolved through participation and
voluntary agreement than by dictate” (Marshall, 1999, 31). In all cases, the role of the
broader community, beyond the primary parties to the conflict, remains significant in the
conflict resolution process; thus, the role of the public’s testimony becomes significant to
the study of truth and reconciliation commissions as well. Other scholars like Gordon
Bazemore and Diane Green (2007), point to principles of “repair, stakeholder
participation, and community/government role transformation” as critical foundations of
restorative justice practice:
Justice requires that we work to heal victims, offenders, and communities that
have been injured by crime. . . . Victims, offenders, and communities should have
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the opportunity for active involvement in the justice process as early and as fully
as possible. The principle of stakeholder involvement is focused on the goal of
maximizing victim, offender, and community participation in decision-making
related to the response to crime. Focused primarily on the process of a restorative
encounter, the larger, overall goal associated with this principle is to ensure to the
greatest extent possible inclusion and input of the victim, offender, and
community by paying attention to stakeholder interests. . . . We must rethink the
relative roles and responsibilities of government and community. In promoting
justice, government is responsible for preserving a just order, and community for
establishing a just peace (Bazemore and Green, 2007).
The restorative encounter, between victim and offender, happened infrequently in
Greensboro, Maine, and Canada, but both victim and offender did participate in many
ways in the work of the three TRCs. Their words and participation in decision-making
related to the response of the crime under consideration did ultimately seem to influence
the direction taken by the TRCs. Additionally, scholars Paul McCold and Ted Wachtel
speak of a “Social Discipline Window,” “Stakeholder Roles,” and the “Restorative
Practices Typology” as critical theoretical bases for restorative justice. In the Social
Discipline Window,
By combining a high or low level of control with a high or low level of support
the Social Discipline Window defines four approaches to the regulation of
behavior: punitive, permissive, neglectful and restorative….The restorative
approach, with high control and high support, confronts and disapproves of
wrongdoing while affirming the intrinsic worth of the offender. The essence of
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restorative justice is collaborative problem-solving. Restorative practices provide
an opportunity for those who have been most affected by an incident to come
together to share their feelings, describe how they were affected and develop a
plan to repair the harm done or prevent a reoccurrence (Wachtel and McCold,
2003).
Once again, the authors suggest that a successful resolution of conflict within restorative
justice practice can only occur if those affected by the conflict participate in the
discussion of its resolution. Critically, they also speak of affirming the intrinsic worth of
the offender, which manifested itself on more than one occasion in Greensboro, Maine,
and Canada. The Greensboro TRC was able to facilitate the public testimony of multiple
Klan members without incident, and while Commissioners may have abhorred the views
expressed in Klan testimony, they did not render their judgment during the hearings.
Maine’s TRC also affirmed the important roles played by state social workers, even when
the state had, in their mind, violated federal law and the rights of children placed into
foster care outside their Native tribes. Thus, this dissertation will unpack the
participation of those parties who testified before the commission and offered (either
directly or indirectly) suggestions for change and elements of a resolution to the conflict.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Theoretical Foundations
This dissertation also explores elements of the underpinnings of truth and
reconciliation commission more generally, including “trauma healing”--the notion that
the chance to bear witness to a sweeping retelling of a dark, destructive, and traumatic
past can help provide healing in the future. As Judith Lewis Herman puts it,
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The ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness. Certain
violations of the social compact are too terrible to utter aloud: this is the meaning
of the word unspeakable. Atrocities, however, refuse to be buried. Equally as
powerful as the desire to deny atrocities is the conviction that denial does not
work. ... Remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites
both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual
victims (Herman, 1997, 1).
It is important, however, to consider the complexities associated with healing in the
context of a truth and reconciliation process—how unique an individual’s healing may
be, what leads to healing (for some, less may be required than for others), etc.
Additionally, the role of narratives--personal, communal, and even national--figures
prominently in discussions of truth and reconciliation commissions and, in particular, the
testimony given by participants. Indeed, much of what is shared orally or verbally with
truth and reconciliation commissions takes the form of stories, rather than a more specific
set of recommendations for societal change or memorialization of the past. In an essay
on narratives and storytelling, Julia Chaitin (2016) writes,
The narrative mode deals with the dynamics of human intentions; when in this
mode, we seek to explain events by looking at how human actors (including
ourselves) strive to do things over time. As we comprehend these actions, we see
what obstacles were encountered and which intentions were realized or
frustrated.. . . Telling one's story, through oral or written means, has been shown
to be a key experience in people's lives, especially those who have undergone
severe social trauma. Stories, narratives, and storytelling . . . play key roles both
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in the escalation and potentially the de-escalation of intergroup conflicts. In order
for the storytelling to be effective, it must engage the self and other, and provide a
narrative that is both cognitively and emotionally compelling. While denigrating
myths of the other and self-aggrandizing myths of self can refuel the winds of
hate, the open and honest recounting of one's life story, and the willingness to be
an empathic listener for the other, even if this other has caused your group
suffering and pain in the past, can open the door for peacebuilding and
coexistence (Chatlin, 2016).
This notion of both the recollection of narratives and the creation of new narratives ties
into notions of generative and regenerative justice, in which stakeholders take the
opportunity to create new meaning from past events or “make sense out of suffering and
move forward with a sense of purpose” (Hansen and Umbreit, 2018). Along with notions
of trauma healing and narratives, truth and reconciliation commissions connect closely
with the “theory of recognition” advanced by (among others) Charles Taylor, connected
to human needs theory, and described by one scholar as follows:
Recognition of cultural identity is “a vital human need” that is essential to the
group survival . . . However, [it] is for more than cultural survival, as [Taylor]
calls for “reciprocal recognition among equals” and the acknowledgement of
cultures’ worth . . . . [Taylor] argues that the various cultures need to adequately
recognize each other’s identities in order for social equality to exist...Taylor also
argues that recognition is something to which every member of society is entitled
and withholding recognition constitutes a form of oppression.” (Petoukov, 2011,
55).
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The withholding of recognition certainly seemed to come into play in Maine and Canada,
where children were viewed not as members of Native tribes or First Nations but simply
children who needed to be removed from their homes. That lack of recognition,
particularly in the face of the Indian Child Welfare Act in the United States, deprived the
children and their tribe of rights guaranteed them by Congress. Canada’s government
also withheld its recognition of First Nations in seeking to disconnect children from their
culture. This research seeks to examine how testimony offered to truth and reconciliation
commissions fits into a context of seeking recognition, “to be heard,” in addition to a
possible desire to see their testimony turn into action.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Choice of Case Study Method
This research took the form of case study. By its very nature, a case study
includes an extensive, in-depth look at a unique set of circumstances or case—here, those
three cases include truth and reconciliation commissions designed to review past
incidents or eras in stable regimes, which received testimony from the public and made
recommendations based, in part, on that testimony. The case study approach would
enable researchers to delve deeply into the unique qualities of the three cases—to conduct
what one researcher calls “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, 18). It would also
allow researchers to examine how and why the phenomena of the truth and reconciliation
commission in North America has evolved as it has—namely, how public testimony
given voluntarily has influenced recommendations across a variety of Commission
contexts, why testimony has had a greater or lesser impact on recommendations and
reforms in one community or country than another, and so on. Additionally, the case
study would allow for a deeper examination of the use of a truth and reconciliation
commission in a non-transitional society such as Greensboro, Maine, or Canada—i.e., a
society in which any “regime change” would be less significant than in, say, South Africa
or Chile (where other TRCs convened). This research will hopefully help inform the
work of future TRCs seeking to complete work in similar settings. The case study
approach therefore enabled an in-depth examination of these particular phenomena in
ways that could later apply to other similar conflicts elsewhere.
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That said, the case study certainly brings with it limitations. By examining only
three TRCs rather than a larger sample, it can be challenging to draw broad conclusions
about how influential public testimony is to a TRC’s work. By limiting the study to
North American commissions rather than the many others that have convened, it could
limit the validity of the findings only to those meeting in less “transitional” contexts. Of
course, this study also limits itself to TRCs rather than examining the many other ways in
which the public gets the chance to provide input or perspective to influence policy.
Despite these limitations, the use of a more in-depth examination of these three cases,
particularly given their combination of similarities and differences, still yielded
meaningful results for the field.
Archival Research
To gather the data needed for this research, the collection of data occurred
primarily within archives, both those available virtually via the Internet and those only
available at physical archives. I perused all available documents that shed light on the
processes used by the three truth and reconciliation commissions. That included the
documents establishing a commission, documentation of its work, statements given to the
Commission, and records of their public events.
In Greensboro, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission maintained extensive
documentation of their work. This includes video recordings of all of their public
hearings, transcripts of testimony provided to the Commission, and internal planning
documents, notes, and other materials related to their work before and after public events.
The materials that document the Greensboro TRC’s work at public events were available
online and via DVD and easy to procure. Other documents, like memos, notes, plans for
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public events, and other Commission working materials, are kept at an archive housed at
Bennett College in Greensboro, which is open to anyone interested in the topic. I
traveled to Greensboro to visit the archive and review its contents. Additional records in
the form of newspaper coverage of the Commission and its work, and the deliberations of
the Greensboro City Council (videos, transcripts, and minutes) are all easily accessible
online. Some emails and other information exchanged by government officials were
viewable via an open records request.
In Maine, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has also maintained
extensive records. As in Greensboro, video and transcripts of testimony provided to the
Commission (both at open public events and focus groups) are available online to the
general public.

A portion of the archives of the Maine TRC is housed at Bowdoin

College in Brunswick, Maine, and is open to any interested researcher or member of the
public. The archive includes video, audio, and written statements, and other personal
documents contributed by individuals and focus groups to the Maine Wabanaki-State
Child Welfare Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The collection also includes
TRC founding documents and final report and research, policy, and administrative
records that document the work of the Commission. I gained access to those archives
through an in-person visit to Bowdoin. Access to some testimony to the Commission has
been restricted only to members of Native American tribes or nations. Additional records
in the form of newspaper coverage of the Commission and its work, and the deliberations
of Maine state government (videos, transcripts, and minutes) were all easily accessible
online. I also prepared an open records request to obtain additional materials related to
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the actions regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission taken by the state of
Maine.
Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has the most extraordinary of
archives, both in terms of volume and ease of access online. The National Centre for
Truth and Reconciliation, housed at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, allowed me
to review material held in the archives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
which includes over 5 million records in its archival collections. Most of the records
come from those created or co-created or collected by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission during its mandate. Records created or co-created by the TRC include the
business records of the Commission and Statements gathered by the TRC from
individuals impacted by residential schools. Some of the Canadian records are restricted
(as in the case of Maine) or redacted to respect privacy and what it calls “collective
rights” of the indigenous to protect aspects of their shared narrative of the residential
school experience (National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation, 2018). Additional
records in the form of newspaper coverage of the Commission and its work, and the
deliberations of Canada’s national and provincial governments (videos, transcripts, and
minutes) were all easily accessible online.
In all three cases, my purposive sampling of the material focused on the verbatim
text of testimony from the public, the verbatim reports of the three TRCs and their
recommendations in particular, and any additional archival material that refers to the
TRC recommendations and the public’s testimony. This sample was chosen in order to
explore connections between testimony and recommendations—or, more specifically, the
extent to which the three TRCs incorporated public testimony and sentiments into their
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recommendations. The archival research provided me with background how the
Commissions reached out to the public for testimony; how the Commissions received
testimony; a survey of that testimony; a look at how the Commissions arrived at their
recommendations and reacted to the testimony they received; and a look at how the
Commissions’ recommendations were received by the public and responsible
governments (the national government in Canada, the state government of Maine, and the
city council in Greensboro, for example). It helped me gain a preliminary understanding
of the extent to which testimony influenced Commission recommendations and the
implementation of those recommendations.
Research Methods: Oral
I sought and conducted interviews (conducted either in-person, by video
conference, or telephone) with several surviving members of the three Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions: one Commissioner in Canada at the time of the report’s
release (the other two were not reachable or available), four with Commissioners in
Greensboro (of the seven, two have died and one did not respond to queries), and three in
Maine (two did not accept invitations to interview). I also conducted interviews with
staff who worked for the Commissions: Greensboro TRC executive director Jill Williams
and Canada TRC director Kimberly Murray (Maine’s TRC directors declined requests for
interviews). Additionally, I sought interviews from key governmental officials in the
three jurisdictions where the Commissions met and conducted interviews wit: the mayor
and mayor pro tem of the city of Greensboro; and a representative of the Prime Minister
of Canada (Justin Trudeau). Governor Paul LePage of Maine initially accepted a request
for interview but later declined, citing scheduling conflicts.
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The purpose of these interviews, which were more narrative in nature in order to
learn how Commissioners went about their work in writing recommendations, was to
glean information from Commissioners, their staff, and those receiving their
recommendations (in government) that would be impossible to learn from archival
documents alone: what did they think and feel as they heard testimony; what motivated
them to produce the recommendations they produced; what did they think and feel when
they heard the recommendations; and what motivated them to act (or perhaps to choose
not to act) on the recommendations.
The choice of these interviewees reflected a desire to hear directly from
Commissioners who made recommendations and policymakers who received those
recommendations and could choose how to respond. While helpful data could emerge
from a broad survey of the public who participated in Commission events or a greater
number of interviews or focus groups, the purposive sample of interviewees chosen here
will shed helpful light on how TRCs reflected public testimony in their recommendations
and how policymakers took public testimony into account. Undoubtedly, the
interviewees chosen for this sample brought biases that could affect the data. For
example, former commissioners might believe their work was more impactful than others
in their communities might, while elected officials might downplay the significance of
the TRC’s recommendations. Additionally, the amount of time that has passed since the
three TRCs completed their work varies—Greensboro completed its work in 2006, while
Maine finished in 2013 and Canada in 2015. Memories of the commissioners and staff
might fade a bit over longer periods of time. That said, the interviews undoubtedly shed
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important light on the way that public testimony impacted subsequent work by the TRC
and surrounding governments.
Data Collection
Data for this case study came from several sources. First and foremost are
statements given by individuals, both in private and in public settings. The Greensboro
TRC transcribed all statements given during its three two-day public hearings and posted
those statements online to its website, http://www.greensborotrc.org, which remains
active as of this writing. Statements given privately to TRC Commissioners and staff are
available to researchers at Bennett College in Greensboro. While a small number of
statements were not accessible due to the preference of the statement provider to keep
their statement confidential to all but TRC personnel, most of the statements were
available in the form of notes and transcripts from the person taking the statement. Some
written statements were also submitted. Additionally, the Commission preserved
extensive records of its community dialogues, including all recommendations given by
dialogue participants and other reflections on the dialogue experience.
The Bennett College archives also contained an assortment of other primary
source documents, particularly notes during internal TRC meetings in advance of TRC
public events. These documents helped shed light on decisions the TRC made related to
how to engage the public—whom to invite to speak at public hearings, what to ask them,
how to adjust the 2nd and 3rd hearings after the results of the 1st, and so on. These notes,
coupled with interviews conducted with Greensboro TRC commissioners and staff, help
shed significant light on the relationship between the public’s sentiments and the
Commission’s work. Additional interviews conducted with officials from the city of

61
Greensboro shed further light on how those with an opportunity to act upon Greensboro
TRC recommendations and the public’s input viewed their responsibility to respond to
public concerns.
Interviews
Given the length of time that had elapsed since the work of the Greensboro TRC
had concluded, it was not obvious how each of the TRC Commissioners might be
reached—that is, the TRC did not maintain an office, phone number, or email address
where the Commissioners could be contacted. Thus, invitations to participate in research
interviews were conveyed through the TRC’s former executive director, Jill Williams,
with whom I had maintained occasional professional contact. Ms. Williams forwarded an
electronic invitation verbatim to the five surviving members of the TRC, encouraging
them to respond directly to the researcher if interested in participating. Of the five
contacted, four responded with interest in participation. An interview with Ms. Williams
was also conducted, owing to her direct involvement in devising the process for involving
the public in the TRC’s work. Two other interviews were conducted with officials within
Greensboro’s municipal government—one was with its current Mayor pro tem and
former Mayor, Yvonne Johnson, who had consistently supported the Commission and its
recommendations, and another was with current Mayor Nancy Vaughan, who was not in
office during the TRC’s existence but did vote on whether to implement some of its
recommendations. Interview requests to former Mayor Keith Holiday were not
answered.
These interviews were designed to gain a deeper understanding of how the TRC
developed its process for engaging and involving the public in the work, as well as to
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understand how government responded to the TRC’s recommendations. In the case of
Greensboro, questions included:
1) What role did you view the public and public input playing in your work and in
your recommendations, separate from archival or other forms of research or datagathering?
2) What made the GTRC decide to hold public forums separate from hearings,
statement-gathering, etc.?
3) How did you choose whom to have testify during public hearings?
4) How did you decide upon questions to pose during public hearings?
5) How did you decide upon time limits or other conditions for public testimony?
6) What guidelines did you have for taking private statements, in terms of questions
you asked, other ways in which you interjected or participated during the giving
of statements?
The interviews also included questions about the TRC’s recommendations, seeking to
understand how public input influenced deliberations over what the TRC would
recommend. Some of the interview questions were targeted at a specific
recommendation or set of recommendations made by the Commission, while other
questions identified themes within testimony given by the public that had less of a clear
connection to any recommendations or other aspects of the Commission’s report or
findings. Finally, questions directed at Mayor pro tem Johnson and Mayor Vaughan
were meant to discern why the City of Greensboro did or did not choose to accept and
implement TRC recommendations.
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Data Analysis: Testimony
The analysis of the data from archives included multiple coding cycles (Saldana,
2009). Initially, I reviewed transcripts of TRC testimony and applied simultaneous
descriptive first-level coding (Saldana, 2009, 62-64) to discern multiple meanings behind
a comment, as well as values coding to ascertain the values, attitudes, and beliefs
embedded within the testimony (Saldana, 2009, 89). I also used “versus coding” to
define dichotomies in testimony that could ultimately affect the recommendations of a
TRC (Saldana, 2009, 93).

I then applied second-level pattern coding to help group

codes together and identify recurring themes throughout the testimonies collected by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. A coding sample can be found in Appendix C.
Data Analysis: Commission Recommendations
Analysis of the text of the Commission’s recommendations (which are listed in
Appendix D) would include some “provisional coding” and “hypothesis coding” based
on my preliminary review of other sources related to the Commission’s work (Saldana,
2009, 120-124). These forms of coding were helpful in focusing my review of the
Commission recommendations based on what they heard from those providing testimony,
as well as what had already been reported on the incidents under their review. I
developed a list of provisional and hypothesis codes based on themes discovered in
coding the testimonies.
I also used first-level descriptive coding and values coding on Commission
recommendations (Saldana, 2009, 70) to help summarize themes from the
recommendations. At the second-level, I applied pattern coding to recommendations as I
did on testimonies.
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Data Analysis: Interviews
Analysis of data from the interviews began with transcription, a reading of the
transcripts, and a second reading of those documents. Through that transcription and
review process, it became clear that members of all three TRCs felt an obligation to
provide accurate representations of the narratives presented to them privately and
publicly. That held true even when the narratives conflicted: for example, a Canadian
TRC official noted the inclusion of testimony in its report that suggested an overall
positive residential school experience, even when other witnesses specifically refuted that
testimony later in the same hearing. In another example, the Greensboro TRC chose to
include sentiments drawn from testimony by both the Klan and the Communist Workers
Party, even when they seemed diametrically opposed to one another. Interviews with
TRC officials also revealed a shared belief that the Commissioners had, in fact,
meaningfully incorporated testimony into their findings, particularly in cases where they
had directly asked statement providers for their recommendations. Interviews with
government officials had more variety in their tone. Participating Greensboro officials
seemed either disengaged from the TRC’s work or disillusioned by the City Council’s
decision to ignore many of its recommendations. Meanwhile, in Canada, federal officials
interviewed for this study demonstrated a keen understanding of and connection to TRC
recommendations, to the point of downplaying their own government’s progress in the
implementation of the TRC’s 94 Calls to Action while reiterating their commitment to
implementation.
Coding of interview data utilized in vivo coding to help notice specific words and
phrases that recur in multiple interviews and questionnaire responses, along with
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affective coding that blends evaluation with emotion (Saldana, 2009, 74). The coding
identified emotions that the interviewee or focus group participant remembers or felt,
and/or what the researcher assumes the participants felt (Saldana, 2009, 86), and the
coding also evaluated how effective the truth and reconciliation commission process was
in meeting participant needs--focusing on statements of satisfaction or disappointment
with the process and its outcome (Saldana, 2009, 98). To some degree, an analysis of
such a conflict has to consider both the basic facts of the process along with the emotions
for all involved carrying out the process. The analysis ultimately looked for both
verbatim and interpreted cues about how the stakeholders and participants view the
process and understand its purpose, its values, its goals, and its ability to achieve those
goals. Second Cycle coding benefitted from a pattern code to help describe major
themes, patterns, and theories (Saldana, 2009, 150).
Data Analysis: News Coverage
For articles that document the work of the Commission, including public hearings
where testimony was given and other reporting on their work and recommendations, I
used first-level descriptive coding and second-level pattern coding. I was looking for
recurring themes in what the news coverage focuses on and selects out of the hours of
testimony and pages of TRC recommendations to report on.
The ultimate goal of this analysis was to ascertain how closely the final TRC
recommendations in the three cases (Greensboro, Maine, and Canada) align with themes
that emerge from an analysis of testimonies given to those commissions. I looked for
whether recommendations address concerns identified by those testifying, as well as
evidence from interviews that those responsible for recommendations or reforms
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incorporated themes from testimonies into their deliberations. This analysis required
careful examination both of what is literally articulated in testimony and how
Commissions extrapolated recommendations for action as the result of that testimony. In
other words, testimonies to the Commission were often focused on a person’s
recollection of past events, rather than what the person testifying thinks should occur in
the future. That said, the commissions made recommendations both as to corrections in
the record of past events based on information gleaned from testimony as well as actions
to take to prevent future conflict and address concerns raised by parties to the conflict and
those who testified. Thus, the analysis of testimony extracted what those who testified
believed to be the most important issues raised by the conflicts under review--not just
their literal comments on what happened in the past. Then, that analysis was paired with
a review of Commission recommendations to determine how thoroughly concerns raised
in testimony are addressed by recommendations. Finally, interviews with Commissioners
were analyzed with an eye towards determining the extent to which the Commission
specifically linked themes from testimony to recommendations.
With regard to comparison of the three cases, the analysis involved a comparison
both of the data and of the findings—that is to say, comparing what was said to each
Commission and how each Commission reacted in its report. While the three cases under
review were all truth and reconciliation commissions convened in North America, with
two undertaking similar reviews of the treatment of indigenous children, their differences
stand out. The Greensboro TRC studied a largely local and regional conflict (albeit with
national or even global connections to communism and labor relations); Maine’s TRC
studied their issue at a statewide level (albeit with ties to larger trends); and Canada took

67
a national perspective on the issue of residential schools. Canada received significant
public funding in the tens of millions and hosted dozens of public events; Maine and
Greensboro only used private donations for its work and had many fewer public events.
Greensboro’s government also chose to note its official opposition to the TRC there;
Maine’s governor initially honored and then opposed its TRC; and Canada’s government
offered so much initial support that Commissioners ultimately asked them to step back
from the process and allow it to function more independently. Nevertheless, the
differences among the context for the three TRCs can be juxtaposed against stark
similarities in how each TRC incorporated the testimony it received into the findings and
recommendations it ultimately issued. In other words, the cases represent very different
kinds of historical review and analysis with very similar outcomes.
Qualitative research into the truth and reconciliation commission process,
therefore, benefitted from a case-study approach that mixes document-based research
with interviews to understand how the commission could be used to involve stakeholders
and the public in finding a way forward on the project, such that all parties ultimately feel
satisfied. The research could also help make better sense of a process that likely
befuddles participants. While this research may be more applicable to truth and
reconciliation efforts in a “non-transitional” context (i.e., stable regimes with less
likelihood of major turnover) or to TRCs meeting in democratic governments, it should
also contribute a helpful understanding of how the public can meaningfully influence the
direction taken both by truth and reconciliation commissions and by responding
governments.
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Chapter 4: Results
Case I: Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The first case studied examined in this research involves a truth and reconciliation
commission with a uniquely concentrated scope among all other commissions: review of
a single incident within a single municipality. The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation
Commission drew inspiration from TRCs in South Africa and elsewhere but differed in
significant ways, namely: it received no governmental support (political, financial, or
otherwise), it made no plans to bring alleged perpetrators to court, and it focused
exclusively on the five shooting deaths of November 3rd, 1979, in east Greensboro, as
well as the context that led to the deaths and its lingering after-affects (Brown et al, 2006,
13-17).
This case provides compelling questions for research into the impact of public
testimony and input given to the Commission. Political scientists and other scholars have
often contended that actions taken by local government have the greatest impact on daily
life, while the public can often have the greatest influence over their mayors and councils,
compared to state legislatures or the federal government. Thus, it would seem possible
for those who chose to participate in the Greensboro TRCs public processes to have
significant impact over its work. Ironically, Greensboro’s own municipal government not
only declined to endorse the work of the Commission but the City Council voted, along
racial lines, to oppose it in ways that were never clearly manifested (Crotts et al, 2005,
30). The mayor at the time of the Commission’s formation, Keith Holliday, said in a prevote speech, “I believe I would have found most if not all of the defendants guilty” in the
two criminal trials held to prosecute alleged shooters, indirectly lending credence to the
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s quest for justice in the matter (Holliday, 2015).
But it was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process itself with which he took
most issue, arguing
Without any real authority, subpoena power, ability to grant immunity, not to
mention recount through 25-year-old memories, absolute truth will be
impossible… In short, the truth may be skewed or not be completely accurate…I
simply do not believe that this effort will open doors to forgiveness and
healing…I believe the good that is hoped to be accomplished will in fact not
happen but rather a tremendous amount of negative feelings and characterizations
of Greensboro will be seen and heard by hundreds of thousands, maybe millions,
and that will be detrimental to our future. In other words, I believe more harm
can come from this process than progress. (Holliday et al, 2015).
Other council members contended that the Commission played an important role in
analyzing why certain of the city’s challenges had persisted—challenges identified in
previous studies of low social capital and community connectedness, as well as sizable
economic disparities. Councilwoman Dianne Bellamy-Small, a Commission supporter,
argued,
We seem to be okay when the way we deal with our “isms” or cultural problems
are by handling them in feel-good like ways…but as great as we want Greensboro
to be, we have had incidents that say it isn’t necessarily so…the whole
community is not involved in dealing with the ills of Greensboro…no one likes to
admit to themselves or their community that there may be unaddressed problems.
It’s like being an alcoholic: until you acknowledge that you have a problem, the
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twelve-step program will not happen. November 3rd 1979 was a traumatically
ugly event, and many of us had nothing to do with it and wish that it had not
happened in our backyard, but the truth of the matter is it did, and as
uncomfortable as we may feel about it…it is a part of our history. A people who
will not deal with the lessons that should be learned from our history are doomed
to repeat as failures” (Holliday et al, 2005).
The City Council ultimately declined to support the Commission as an official matter, but
they subsequently addressed several of the Commission’s recommendations as described
in later sections of this dissertation.
The formation of the Greensboro TRC had several elements of democratic
engagement. A local task force made up of community members who volunteered to
participate (rather than being chosen) then created a selection committee deliberately
made up of representatives from a diverse cross-section of local society; that committee,
in turn, actively and openly solicited commissioner nominations from the community.
Following their appointment in the summer of 2004, the Greensboro TRC held a press
conference to announce the opening of an office and to invite community members to
participate in their work and give statements (Brown et al, 2005). As their work began in
earnest, TRC members and staff went door-to-door to solicit feedback, particularly from
residents in the neighborhood where the shootings took place, a practice that
distinguished them from other similar TRCs (Brown et al, 2005 33). In interviews, TRC
officials suggested that door-to-door outreach enabled them to receive statements from
those deeply affected by the 1979 shootings and still fearful of the consequences of
speaking out. The Maine and Canadian TRCs received testimony in private homes but
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did not appear to take the step of knocking on doors without an invitation, a sign of the
difficulty residents in part of Greensboro felt in making their TRC participation known.
Greensboro’s TRC took statements both at the TRC office, in private homes, and
anywhere else an individual wanted to submit their statement.
The acceptance of statements in private at a variety of venues reflected the TRC’s
awareness of high anxiety among statement providers. According to interviews with
former TRC Commissioners, some statement providers feared a public statement and an
admission of any culpability could result in legal liability. Others had safety concerns,
particularly given the presence of Klansmen at public hearings where African-Americans
and Jewish Americans might testify in front of people with racially and religiously
prejudicial views.
The TRC also held three two-day public hearings that were televised and
streamed live for members of the public who could not attend in person. As described by
Commissioners during interviews, these hearings differed from a governmental public
hearing in that speakers were invited to participate, rather than an “open mic” provided to
anyone who wished to speak, but that open mic was otherwise granted in the form of
many months of opportunity to give a statement privately (Brown et al, 2006, 29-30).
The Commission described the hearings goals as follows:
to affirm the humanity of the five people who died as a result of Nov. 3, 1979, the
other people directly involved, and all those whose lives were affected; To
provide a safe public space for invited speakers to tell their stories and for
community members to hear them; to increase – through personal stories –
community understanding of the event, the issues surrounding the event, the
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complexity and the range of impacts; to encourage other individuals to
participate in the truth and reconciliation process; to help create a foundation
and context for community reconciliation by encouraging individuals to recognize
the relevance of these events to their own lives (Brown et al, 2006, 34).
TRC officials indicated in interviews that they held the public hearings less out of a need
to glean additional information from those testifying and more as a way to build public
trust in the TRC process. In their report, the Greensboro TRC listed criteria for the
selection and invitation of their hearing speakers:
Have already given a statement or published relevant work that a. is clear and
illustrative of the scope of issues surrounding Nov. 3, 1979; has the potential to
generate community dialogue; Have direct, personal knowledge of the hearing
topic and the ability to educate or help the community make connections between
the events and the surrounding issues; contribute to the complexity and diversity
of our speakers with regard to race, gender and age, as well as offering diverse
viewpoints and perspectives, particularly those not heard previously (Brown et al,
2006, 35).
Most public hearing speakers had provided statements to the TRC before the hearings,
though some, like Klan leader Virgil Griffin, testified in public for the first time. In
interviews, TRC Commissioners described feeling as if the hearings could demonstrate to
the public that the Commission was hearing numerous perspectives (rather than just the
victims’) on what happened during the shootings, why they happened, and what impact
the shootings had . The hearings also gave the public an opportunity to learn much of
what the TRC was learning as it was learning it—providing the public with a level of
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transparency that a legal deposition would not, for example. The TRC grouped the
speakers based on a theme for the hearings—what brought the community to November
3rd, what happened on and immediately after November 3rd, and what were the long-term
effects of the shootings and their immediate aftermath (Brown et al, 2006, 34). They
developed and provided questions to speakers in advance, though they also had
opportunities to ask questions that occurred to them during the hearings.
In interviews, TRC officials shared that they walked a fine line in deciding how to
conduct themselves during hearings. On the one hand, they felt pressured by community
members or other stakeholders to challenge aspects of the November 3rd narrative that
were in dispute, but on the other hand, they feared re-traumatizing the speaker or other
observers if questioning appeared to be too aggressive. After the first hearing, a former
TRC staff member, Scott Pryor, drafted a memo to Commissioners in which he
encouraged them to ask more probing questions during the hearings. Pryor wrote, in part,
Commissioners, I encourage you to be more vigorous in your questioning of the
person giving statements. Don’t let them get away with a short answer.
Remember that the hearings are as much about various people telling their stories
for the benefit of the community as they are helping you in your inquiry. Help the
statement makers tell their story (even if they don’t want to) in a way that
illustrates this history for the community. Virgil Griffin aside (he was going to
make it difficult for you one way or the other!) I thought in general you could
have asked more questions (and in some cases more focused questions) of the
people giving statements. Encourage people to talk in detail. Help the audience
and yourselves really understand what it was like (Pryor, 2005)
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But in interviews, TRC officials said their questioning during hearings occasionally
became a source of internal conflict among the Commissioners. Some Commissioners
felt their colleagues took a less aggressive tone in their questioning with members of the
Klan than they did with surviving relatives of shooting victims. Nevertheless, by
showcasing testimony from a variety of perspectives on the November 3rd shootings
(Klan, police, Communist Workers Party, etc.), they believed the public would see the
TRC process as fair, neutral, and a historic opportunity to advance the community.
Even more significantly, the Greensboro TRC held a community dialogue event,
with facilitated discussions in small groups, “designed to encourage community members
to reflect on the public hearings and begin thinking about what community reconciliation
looks like in Greensboro around the events of Nov. 3, 1979” (Brown et al, 2006, 35).
These events differed from public hearings and statement collection in that they
facilitated dialogue among participants, many of whom had drastically different points of
view on responsibility for the deaths of November 3rd, 1979. These workshops produced
a wide array of compelling comments from the community which will be discussed later
in this section. But it appears that the Greensboro TRC remains one of very few
Commissions to conduct such an in-depth level of public engagement separate from the
more formal or official process of taking statements. That additional engagement may
have increased pressure on the Commission to demonstrate it incorporated public
sentiments into its final recommendations, given the numerous opportunities it afforded
the public to influence those recommendations.
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Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Public Testimony on Economics
The analysis of the data from the public’s testimony and statements to the
Commission revealed a significant focus on the economic context surrounding the
shootings on November 3rd, 1979, the subsequent economic impacts after the shooting,
and more modern and persistent economic inequities. Many of those who made
statements to the Greensboro TRC discussed the genesis of the Communist Workers
Party’s work in Greensboro in economic terms—citing efforts to organize workers in
textile mills and improve wages, for example. In a statement, organizer Si Kahn
contended that the work of the civil rights movement
and the result of more African-Americans moving into the labor movement is a
new surge of energy and power. And we see this particularly in the South, where
for example, in the textile mills. The textile mills are a rigidly segregated
institution that in the period up to let’s say 1965 it would be almost unheard of for
an African-American to be on the inside of a mill. … So that black workers
would be on the outside, but not on the inside. And in that period between 1965
and 1975 we see such a movement of black workers into the mills that some of
the mills become 30, 40, 50, 60 percent African-American. And this changes the
possibility for unionization and for labor activism (Kahn, 2005).
Others spoke of broader issues with poverty in East Greensboro, where the shootings
took place, and several spoke of how the shootings affected their ability to secure
employment of any kind based on their involvement or perceived ties to the Communist
Workers Party and the violence of November 3rd. East Greensboro community activist
Nettie Coad told the Commission:
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I’ve been, my neighborhood, people in my community have been struggling for so
long, and you just get tired of the struggle, you really do, you know. And, not
only that, but when the answers, when you struggle, when you know in your
heart, what could make something better, and you don’t have the power to be
heard, then it doesn’t get better, because the answers that come and the solutions
that come don’t really fit the problem, don’t always fit the problem (Coad, 2005).
Statement providers certainly referenced the Ku Klux Klan’s racially prejudicial
principles and attitudes, and several alluded to perceived inequities in city services based
on race, but race played a somewhat more limited role in dialogue around the events of
November 3rd, their aftermath, and lingering after-effects of the shooting than notions of
economic depravity.
Alongside notions of ongoing economic challenges that came to the fore before,
on, and after November 3rd, statement providers also spoke extensively about the limited
or nonexistent opportunities they had to process the mix of feelings generated by the
shootings. Former Morningside Homes resident Candy Clapp recalled at a Commission
hearing,
It was like the children didn’t matter to the city of Greensboro. They knew we
were there, but they didn’t seem to care. Nobody came back from the city to
question about what we were feeling, what our feelings were after the
killings….The schools didn’t do anything to support us. Nobody seemed to care
how we were affected. We had to go to school the following Monday. We were
expected to function and be focused. And some of us couldn’t. There were rumors
that the Klan was going to blow up the gas line running through Morningside
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Homes so we were afraid to sleep at night. …After November third the police
treated us like we had committed a crime, like we had killed the Communist
Workers on November the third. We were put on curfew. There were helicopters.
There were tons of police. We were in a war zone. We were treated like prisoners
in our own community. The police threatened to put us in jail if we broke curfew
and everybody knew that the police were always in the community because of the
fights, the drugs and the illegal activity that went on in the community. So the
community constantly questions why there were no police when those Communist
Workers were shot. … To me Greensboro is still a mess because nobody ever
paid the penalty for those workers and the unborn child that was killed.
Greensboro leaders have never done anything that was necessary to think about
justice for those people who were killed and the people that were affected in the
community (Clapp, 2005).
Other statement providers spoke of the effects of lasting trauma made worse by no formal
acknowledgement of the event by the City of Greensboro, including no physical
memorial in the area of the shooting or commemoration at City events or the Greensboro
History Museum. Some contrasted the historical treatment (or lack thereof) of the 1979
shootings with the extensive work to memorialize Greensboro’s role in the civil rights
movement, and even Greensboro’s contribution to the American Revolution. To several
of those who spoke of that lack of recognition for the 1979 shootings, that represented
disrespect or a lack of care for the wellbeing of citizens of Greensboro on the part of its
city government. That especially held true for the police department, which several
statements cited as particularly unresponsive to the needs of residents in East Greensboro
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and within minority communities, both on the day of (and leading up to) the 1979
shootings and beyond, to the present day. Signe Waller, a former Communist Workers
Party organizer who helped plan the November 3rd event, argued:
I have tried to imagine the police failing to pursue fleeing assailants if it wasn’t a
white invading Morningside but a gang of blacks had entered Starmount. A gang
of blacks entered Starmount, shot up the place and then fled. I cannot imagine
police not pursuing the assailants. I can’t imagine that if it was the Northwest
quadrant of Greensboro where people were getting shot up in broad daylight and
not the Southeast quadrant of the city, it is inconceivable to me. The violation of
a poor, black neighborhood by white supremacist terrorists was another matter
entirely and one toward which GPD indifference was hardly questioned by the
city’s non-black residents (Waller, 2005).
Extensive testimony dealt with the police’s lack of a greater presence at the November 3rd
anti-Klan rally where the shootings occurred, as well as conditions the police had placed
on the permit issued for the event. One of several statements addressing the police’s
handling of the rally and shootings included this recommendation: “We definitely need
here in Greensboro some type of Police Review Board…This is a big deal to AfricanAmericans in our community. Without a Police Review Board with subpoena powers,
the fears and anxiety of the African-American population in Greensboro will not be
eased” (Guttman, 2005, 3).
Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Ku Klux Klan Testimony
Apart from statements and testimony from those in, or supportive of, the
Communist Workers Party, one of the more remarkable chapters of the Greensboro
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TRC’s public hearings occurred when former members of the Ku Klux Klan testified
publicly about the shootings. Virgil Griffin, an “Imperial Wizard” in a leadership role for
the local Klan chapter who was at the November 3rd event, did not accept responsibility
or culpability for the deaths of the five Communist Worker Party members killed by guns
fired by the Klan. But he did indicate regret that the confrontation between his group and
the anti-Klan protestors had turned violent; he voiced support for the labor organizing
and unionization efforts of the type the Communist Workers Party had undertaken; and
he suggested that the provocative “Death to the Klan” language had inflamed tensions
and catalyzed a violent confrontation.
The reason I came to Greensboro, they put the poster out: Death to the Klan, said
we’s hiding under rocks, we were scum. I’m not scum, I’m as good as any man
walks on this earth. I’m as good as anybody. That’s why I came to Greensboro.
I don’t hide under a rock from nobody. I’m not scum, I’m not ashamed to say I’m
Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, and I’m not afraid of no man. And I don’t
hide. That’s why I’m here today. (Griffin, 2005, 2).
He even suggested a more nuanced view of race relations than that typically attributed to
the Klan, saying, “I think they have as much rights as anybody else. I think they should
have a right to have a job, to whatever their ability. Have a new home, new cars, just like
anybody else. I just don’t believe in mixing races” (Griffin, 2005, 12). Additional
testimony offered in private and in public by members of the Klan, particularly by one of
the shooters, Roland Wayne Wood, expressed deeper regret and remorse for the events of
November 3rd, directly to two of the surviving members of the Communist Workers Party
(Green, November 8, 2005).
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Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: City of Greensboro and District Attorney
Statements
While some of the direct players from the Greensboro police department and the
District Attorney’s office responsible for prosecuting the Klansmen declined to offer
statements or testimony to the Commission, several did. Police Captain Rick Ball, one of
the first officers on the scene on November 3rd, 1979, gave the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission pointed advice early in his public testimony:
Reconciliation is defined as restoring harmony. To that end, I have a
recommendation for the first step. The people responsible for organizing and
orchestrating the “Death to the Klan March”, those responsible for challenging
Klansmen and Nazi’s to come to Greensboro to engage in a violent confrontation,
the Klansmen and Nazi’s who came, and all those who participated in the ensuing
violence on that day, should extend a sincere apology to the citizens of
Greensboro or more importantly to the people of the Morningside Homes
Community. (Ball, 2005, 3).
Ball also rejected allegations that the Police Department had deliberately endangered the
lives of anti-Klan protestors based on relationships with informants who also participated
in Klan activities. But another officer at the scene, Ramon Bell, indicated that plans to
maintain a low profile with fewer uniformed officers on the scene had gone awry: “In my
opinion, yes, we should have been there…I think everybody learned from it. Mistakes
were made. That was a big mistake in my opinion. Uh, conspiracy no” (Bell, 2005, 4).
Captain Ball suggested that the ill-fated strategy of minimizing the number of uniformed
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officers on the scene was revised, remarking on the security presence even at the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission hearing where he testified:
When you look around as you come through this building there is a great deal of
security here. This is a result of November 3. We do not take a low profile
anymore. As a matter of fact, we constantly get accused of overacting. Well,
that’s what we learned (Bell, 2005, 11).
Captain Ball also indicated that limited progress had been made since the 1979 shootings
in strengthening relationships and building trust in East Greensboro and with minority
populations. He recalled an encounter prior to the shootings that, in his eyes, epitomized
the struggle to improve relationships, when he interrogated an African-American suspect:
He said, “When are you going to beat me”? I started laughing. I thought what are
you talking about? And I looked in his eyes and I could tell that he was serious.
And I asked him I said, “Where did you hear this at”? He said, “Everyone knows
that when you get taken up here you get beat”. He was serious. You know I kind
of laughed it off. I said “Man, I don’t know who you have been talking to but that
that doesn’t happen”. You know, I have never forgotten that. I always wondered
what can I could do to change that. I never had an answer other than treating
people fairly. (Ball, 2005, 4)
Prosecutors contended that they had tried the case against the Klan without bias towards
members of the Communist Workers Party, who refused to testify and actively disrupted
the first criminal trial after hearing prosecutor comments in the media that they took to be
anti-Communist. As one prosecutor put it,
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There’s not one of the three of us who doesn’t believe those guys (the Klan) were
guilty. That’s what makes us so frustrated and emotional. We gave a year of our
lives. He (the other prosecutor) and I both were sick afterwards. And we had a 7-5
vote to convict on the first vote. If we could have humanized these people in any
way, we could have won it (Greeson, 2005, 4).
Prosecutors also unpacked issues associated with the jury selection process, which
yielded an all-white jury that some observers believe lessened the chances of a conviction
for the Klansmen:
The jury was not all white because the prosecution wanted it that way. African
Americans were either stricken because they were honest about their feelings
about the Klan or they were afraid for their safety. They were stricken for cause
because they were honest people who said they couldn’t be neutral” (Coman,
2005, 7).
Ultimately, the prosecutors argued that they were hamstrung in their ability to prosecute
the case effectively due to a lack of cooperation from shooting victims and other
members of the Communist Workers Party, whom they argued should still accept
responsibility for the deaths on November 3rd (Coman, 2005, 11).
Data Analysis: Commission Recommendations
The report of Greensboro’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission drew heavily
from statements given to the TRC in both private and public statements. Like the reports
produced by the TRC in Maine and in Canada, Greensboro’s TRC report included dozens
of direct quotations from statements it received, primarily in describing the context for
the November 3rd anti-Klan event, the shooting, and the aftermath. But the
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Commissioners also went to great lengths to align both their findings of fact and their
recommendations with what statement providers expressed as their concerns and their
own suggestions for healing and community growth.
In their conclusions about the events of November 3rd, 1979, the Commission held
Klansmen and the Greensboro police department chiefly responsible for the bloodshed on
November 3rd, based in part on the dozens of eyewitness accounts of the shootings, as
well as archival material from news reports and court testimony. They expressed their
firm belief that the Klan was primarily responsible for the violence, while the police
department had underestimated the need for a strong police presence at the event.
However, the Commission also took former members of the Communist Workers Party
to task for their inflammatory rhetoric and tactics in the run-up to the “Death to the Klan”
rally, and they declined to endorse the narrative advanced by several former members of
the CWP that their leadership roles in union activism led the Klan to target the shooting
victims. This finding reflects the testimony of former Klan leader Virgil Griffin cited
above, as well as the testimony of prosecutors and other statement providers who felt
uncomfortable with the CWP confrontational approach to the events of November 3rd.
They wrote,
While the WVO/CWP issues were grounded in the community’s concerns, their
tactics and politics differed significantly from those of many community
residents. The WVO/CWP party-building agenda was not shared by most of those
living in the Morningside community. Further there are those from the
WVO/CWP’s own membership who raised concerns and offered critiques and
were then overruled and marginalized by the top-down leadership of the party.
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We believe these leadership styles were hierarchical, not empowering, and
ultimately they failed as an organizing tactic. (Brown et al, 2006, 309).
The Commission, though, reserved strongest language in its conclusions for both the
Greensboro Police Department and the municipal government, writing, “city leaders
(formal and informal) appeared more concerned with protecting the city’s image and
clamping down on citizen protest in the interest of ‘security,’ than with meeting the needs
of its most vulnerable citizens and helping the community process the event and heal”
(Brown et al, 2006, 306). This finding reflects the direct testimony given by many
statement providers, particularly those traumatized by witnessing the events or living
nearby, who mentioned virtually no contact with or outreach from city officials to heal.
The Commission further argued that,
For the disempowered communities in Greensboro, the city’s response served to
compound suspicions that the police had some hand in the violence and city
officials were unwilling to undertake a good faith investigation into wrongdoing.
Further, the underhanded manner in which the city attempted to suppress citizen
protest worked to foster additional suspicion and fear. These responses fit with a
larger pattern that persists today and can be seen in the city’s relations with the
GTRC (Brown et al, 2006, 307).
The Commission’s later recommendation to institute a police review board with
subpoena power mirrored the specific recommendations it received from some statement
providers, and it came against a backdrop of a crisis of trust within the Greensboro Police
Department, and the sudden resignation of its chief months before the Commission issued
its findings (Abraham and Glazman, 2006). The Commission’s criticism of Greensboro’s
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municipal government, particularly the City Council’s decision to “oppose” the
Commission’s work, mirrored that of several members of the public who testified both to
City Council and to the Commission about the ongoing significance and relevance of
November 3rd.
Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Connections between Commission
Recommendations and Statements
The Commission’s recommendations to the community and the City reflected
specific suggestions made by statement providers and incorporated the conditions that led
to the November 3rd shootings and the lingering after-effects identified by statement
providers. First, the Commission recommended that the City “formally recognize that the
events of Nov. 3, 1979, provided a tragic, but important occasion in our city’s history”
(Brown et al, 2006, 200) through both verbal acknowledgement and apology and physical
memorials. In interviews, Greensboro TRC officials indicated that these
recommendations stemmed from testimony in which those directly affected by the
shootings expressed anger, dismay, and anxiety, as well as unhealed trauma, because of
that lack of acknowledgement. After several years, the City issued first a statement of
regret and later an apology, and they supported the placement of a historical marker by
the state of North Carolina that labeled the shootings the “Greensboro Massacre.” A
separate Commission suggestion was to have those involved in the shootings “offer
restitution to the victims by making recommendations in their name to support the public
monument commemorating this tragedy or to organizations advocating for civil workers’
rights and other economic justice initiatives” (Brown et al, 2006, 201). Response to that
recommendation is unclear; the existing monument seems to have been paid for out of

86
state funds, rather than private donations, and no separate monument has been erected. It
is also unclear whether any of the parties that the Commission held responsible for the
November 3rd shootings made any financial contributions or “restitution” to the
organizations they delineated. One statement found in the archives referred to a linkage
between restorative justice and restitution (Jones, 2005), and a South African TRC
official remarked at a faith service prior to the public hearings that “When I speak of
justice in this context, I am not talking of retribution, but restitution. We must sincerely
look to changing those circumstances that hurt people and harmed relationships” (2005).
The concept of restitution, at least symbolically, was also mentioned at the community
forum following the public hearings. Other recommendations in this regard included a
call for an exhibit on the shootings at local museums, a retreat for children impacted by
November 3rd hosted by religious leaders, and a series of community forums to review
and discuss the Commission’s report. It was not immediately clear how the call for a
religious retreat for children of CWP members related to testimony, though it was clear
from the testimony given by those children that their trauma remained unhealed decades
after the incident, even if they had not yet been born when their parent had been killed.
Recommendations around the convening of community forums certainly extended the
spirit of the Commission’s own public process, highlighted by both public hearings and
community forums, as well as the opportunity to provide comments on the Commission’s
own blog. As of this writing, museum exhibits documenting the November 3rd shootings
had not been completed, but that recommendation certainly aligns closely with others
related to formal public acknowledgement, like the memorial marker.
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The next section of recommendations, with its focus on “institutional reform,”
seems to have more indirect but still significant ties to testimony given to the Greensboro
TRC. The extensive testimony about the economic hardship both before, in the
immediate aftermath, and up to the time of the Commission’s work clearly impacted the
recommendations, particularly a call for all city and county employees to be paid a living
wage, applied to contractors doing business with government, benchmarked to federal
housing data and poverty calculations (Brown et al, 2006, 202). A few testimonies spoke
to the specific need for a living wage standard in Greensboro. Dr. Mazie Ferguson
argued “that God’s people look and work to take care of the widows and the children and
that includes those people right now who do not have a living wage and who cannot feed
their children” (Ferguson, 2005, 3). Retired professor Barton Parks argued,
We are in a truly difficult situation. I believe I do know where to begin, and it is
with our part of the problem. Those of us who want to see some changes occur in
the issue of justice in our communities. Those of us favoring initiatives such as a
police review board, a living wage, training police officers in black history and
culture, are not organized into groups that convey our views well… We need
somehow to get past these obstacles and create ways to organize a more effective
political voice (Parks, 2005, 9).
A meeting of religious leaders after the end of public testimony also called attention to
the issue of living wage as an important step Commissioners should encourage the City
and County to take, and notes on the Community Forums held in November, 2005, also
included citizen calls for living wages (Banks, 2005). This set of recommendations also
encompassed recommendations for anti-racism training given to all public employees; a
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public-school curriculum based around the November 3rd shootings; annual reports on
race relations; and increased investment in interracial dialogue programs. Then-Mayor
Keith Holliday had frequently invoked one such program, the Mosaic Project, as his
desired alternative to the Greensboro TRC process, and another Greensboro official
referenced it in his private statement (Shaw, 2005), while a local professor described it as
an important step in her public testimony (Jovanovic, 2005, 7), as did a county official
(Thigpen, 2005, 12). The concept of curriculum was raised during the community
dialogue after the hearings (Williams et al, 2005, 5) but was not frequently mentioned in
testimony, though testimony certainly referenced a lack of local awareness about the
November 3rd shootings. The recommendation for anti-racism training undoubtedly
connected to testimony about the role the TRC believed City officials and the police
department played in allowing the Ku Klux Klan easy access to anti-Klan protestors on
November 3rd and a lack of support for survivors of the shootings. The Commission also
recommended the creation of a police review board with subpoena power, clearly
connected to the responsibility the TRC felt that the police department bore and the
negligence it and many who testified to the Commission felt it exhibited on November
3rd. Such a recommendation was also specifically made by former residents of the
neighborhood where the shooting took place (Tutt, 2005, 3) and by former members of
the Communist Workers Party (Nathan, 2005, 8) and other witnesses and TRC
community dialogue participants (Parks, 2005, 11; Williams et al, 2005, 6). Such a
recommendation was eventually implemented after a slew of scandals involving the
Greensboro police department; it lacks subpoena power but seems to have little difficulty
getting police officers to comply with its requests (Green, 2017).
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Commission recommendations to increase funding for county departments of
social services and public health (Brown et al, 2006, 204) seemed indirectly related to
broad recommendations during public hearings and private testimony that government do
more to reduce poverty and improve quality of life for all residents. The TRC also made
recommendations related to the justice system, particularly a suggestion “to expand the
pool of potential jurors to be more representative of the community as a whole” (Brown
et al, 2006, 205) and drawn from more than driver’s license and voter registration data.
This suggestion ties back directly to many comments made during public hearings and
private statements about the all-white jury that acquitted Klan shooters on all counts in
their first criminal trial. While prosecutors in that trial questioned whether the racial
makeup of the jury had any effect on the verdicts, they acknowledged that nearly all
African-American jurors were struck from the jury based on responses to their negative
feelings about the Klan.
Other TRC recommendations concerned the media (the suggestion of a citizen
advisory group), anti-racism training for other institutions and individuals, more funds for
leadership training, and actions an individual could take to increase an understanding of
“issues of issues of capital, labor, race, poverty, oppression, privilege and justice, and
exploring ways to have a positive impact on the way they play out in the community”
(Brown et al, 2006, 206). Progress on the implementation of these recommendations is
either hard to measure or difficult to discern. It is unclear whether any sort of citizen
advisory group has formed for local media, and whether anti-racism or leadership
development training has increased is hard to track. The recommendation regarding the
media emerged briefly in the TRC’s community dialogue after its public hearings
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(Williams et al, 2005, 6). It also seems tied to testimony in both public hearings and
private testimony that referenced the framing of the shootings as a “shootout.” The TRC
felt that characterization affected the public’s ability to understand the Klan’s
responsibility for the deaths of five Communist Workers Party members. Media
members who testified to the Commission disputed any notion that they had deliberately
created a narrative that would make both the CWP and the Klan equally responsible for
the November 3rd bloodshed, but the TRC argued that media mistakes and underreporting of the circumstances surrounding the shootings kept residents from fully
understanding what the shootings meant to the community as a whole (Brown et al, 2006,
205).
In sum, the conclusions and recommendations issued by the Greensboro Truth
and Reconciliation reflected a conscientious effort by the TRC to incorporate public
sentiments and testimony into their work. The subsequent implementation of several
TRC recommendations seems also to reflect public support for those recommendations,
while TRC recommendations with a more indirect or limited link to testimony seemed to
gain less traction. Ultimately, though, the Greensboro TRC’s ambitious public
engagement efforts—ranging from door-to-door canvassing to private statement
gathering, from public hearings to a community dialogue—yielded plenty of fodder for
their final report, which they utilized to great effect.
Case II: Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission that convened in Maine consulted with
members of Greensboro’s TRC, but while both commissions shared similar aspects, they
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differed significantly, from the context of their creation and relationship with government
to its scope of work and the nature of its public participation process. Maine began its
TRC under a mandate that was signed both by Native American tribal leadership and
Governor Paul LePage, who also issued an executive order intended to encourage
widespread cooperation between state officials and the TRC in its work. While conflicts
between LePage and the Native American tribes not directly related to the TRC’s work or
topic undermined his support for the TRC (and led him to rescind his executive order),
TRC officials believe that his reversal of position had little to no effect on the TRC as a
whole. On the other hand, TRC officials argued that the tribes’ and Governor’s initial
support was quite significant to establishing the TRC’s legitimacy in the eyes of both
Native and non-Native populations in Maine. Since the TRC was focusing on the actions
taken by state social workers in Native households, the Governor’s willingness to support
the Commission’s scrutiny of his own government seemed especially noteworthy
(LePage et al, 2012). That level of governmental support, while not accompanied by
funding for Maine’s TRC, marked a significant difference between Maine’s TRC and
Greensboro’s. Additionally, one of the Commissioners who served on Maine’s TRC was
a high-level government official, Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap, whose appointment
the Governor repeatedly questioned and sought to block (LePage and Dunlap, 2012),
seemingly based on a fear that his service would create the presumption of the State of
Maine’s support for reparations for victims of abuse in foster care. Dunlap himself
asserted that such reparations could be sought whether or not the Commission convened
or whether he served on it, and the Commission ultimately did not recommend financial
reparations be paid, but his service in no way guaranteed that any of the TRC’s
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recommendations would be implemented by Maine’s state government, as the state has
yet to act on many of them (Wishcamper et al, 2015). Nevertheless, the Governor’s
support of the TRC’s mandate in Maine and the Secretary of State’s service certainly
distinguished it from the Greensboro TRC in the level of political support that the TRC
received.
Maine also set out a far more ambitious scope of work than Greensboro’s TRC,
examining an issue that had affected Maine residents from across the vast state and over
several decades. This choice of scope stemmed from a working group that had been
meeting regularly in Maine to discuss the state’s compliance challenges with the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act, which seeks to keep children cared for within their Native
tribe, as opposed to placements in foster homes outside the tribe. The Commission’s
mandate calls for the TRC
to uncover and acknowledge the truth, create opportunities to heal and learn from
that truth, and collaborate to operate the best child welfare system possible for
Wabanaki children… The Commission's investigation shall focus on the period
from passage of the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to the authorization
of the Mandate. (LePage et al, 2012, 1).
The term “Wabanaki” encompasses several recognized tribes or nations, and the
scope encompassed the entire state child welfare system. As a result of the expansive
geography of this scope, Maine’s TRC planned public events across the state designed to
receive testimony from anyone who wished to give it. This was a slight contrast to the
initial approach of Greensboro’s TRC, which consisted of door-to-door conversations in
the homes near the site of the shootings and collection of private testimonies either at
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TRC offices or other sites. For Greensboro, the public hearings served more of a
transparency function, to make the public aware of what the Commission had been
hearing in testimony. For Maine, public events were initially a critical part of gathering
information, testimony, and suggestions from those impacted by the child welfare system.
Unfortunately, according to interviews with TRC officials, despite their best efforts,
several public events had no attendees, while others had very few, and generally, the
affected population showed limited willingness to tell their stories in that fashion. In an
interview, one TRC official recalled several trips to various Native American
communities simply to build relationships, establish trust, and explain their work before
ever gathering statements from people in that community.
Ultimately, nearly all of the official statements collected by Maine’s TRC came in
private sessions; several were done anonymously, even in private; and others were not
shared even in the TRC’s archives after its work was complete, all indications of the
extreme sensitivity associated with discussing this topic. Unlike Greensboro’s public
hearings, in which all Commissioners were present, Maine’s Commissioners described in
interviews listening to a portion of the statements as they were being given, but they
relied on one another’s recollections and impressions for the statements they did not hear
firsthand. Additionally, the process for gathering private statements differed. In
Greensboro, typically a single Commissioner or staff person would sit with a statement
provider and allow them to tell their story uninterrupted, with interjections primarily for
clarification but no set questions or agenda for the session. In Maine, the Commissioners
usually conducted statement gathering with a staff person, a Commissioner, and a

94
“support person” there to help the statement provider manage their emotions during the
process. In the report, the Commission explained their statement gathering philosophy:
There was a desire on the part of all involved to give as much latitude and control
to participants, in recognition of the many times that Native people in particular
have wrestled with issues of intellectual property, the arrival of research teams on
Native land, and other ways in which the dominant culture has behaved without
respect for Native ways and appropriated Native knowledge (Wishcamper et al,
2015, 76).
That level of latitude occasionally meant that statements were entirely composed of a
person’s recollection of their experience in foster care, rather than suggestions on how to
rectify the past, remedy the present, and improve the future. Perhaps in response to that
trend, the Commissioners eventually developed a standard list of questions to ask during
the statement giving process, which they said stemmed from a desire to ensure they
collected the information necessary to their work regardless of how much a statement
provider had prepared to say in advance. This helped produce a vast amount of detailed
information about the child welfare system from multiple perspectives—children in care,
tribal leaders and social workers, state social workers, officers of the court (lawyers and
judges), etc.—and the Commission quoted heavily from these statements in their final
report. One other notable aspect of Maine’s process was the role some Commissioners
played of clarifying and adding to the statements they were hearing based on their own
expertise or life experience. In interviews, TRC officials indicated this was not discussed
beforehand, but they were not concerned that Commissioners were unduly influencing or
steering the testimony in any way. While their approach during statement gathering was
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more active than that of Commissioners in Canada or Greensboro, they were still able to
receive a wide array of viewpoints on how best to manage child welfare policy in Maine.
That is, the Commissioners’ interjections did not seem to influence fewer state officials to
participate in the TRC process or change their testimony in any way. Finally, the Maine
TRC instituted the use of focus groups to respond to a growing demand for statement
provision and in recognition of the discovery that “people often felt more at ease
discussing issues in groups” (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 78). This approach had not been
formally employed by the Greensboro TRC, perhaps due to higher attendance at public
events.
Data Analysis: Statements
The TRC made nearly 100 statements available via its archive, including some
where the statement provider was not identified. These statements reveal a population of
Native American young adults and middle-aged adults who experienced severe trauma
while in foster care, particularly when placed in the homes of families outside their
Native tribes. Many statement providers recounted harrowing and repeated experiences
with sexual, physical, and emotional abuse at the hands of their foster families, who often
made their Native foster children follow a different set of household rules than their
biological children. One recurring theme raised by multiple statement providers was the
sudden and frequent nature of re-assignment from one foster home to another, without
any input from the child placed in care. The TRC consistently asked each statement
provider who had been in foster care a similar question, along the lines of, “What would
you have needed in dealing with the child welfare system?” (Bailey and George, 2014,
31) or “What do you think would be important for us…to ask to change to make sure
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happens?” (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 10). Their answers provide a powerful foundation
for the TRC to use in formulating recommendations. What follows is a sample of those
answers:
I really would just like to see us sitting at the same table having conversations
about the real stuff… I wish that the - that whites would have more compassion
and understanding about the Native culture as well as the Native history…my
concern about when this - when the report comes out is, just like anything else,
there are always gonna be people who have some really hateful things to say
regarding the tribes and child welfare. And I think that we're opening ourselves to
that. And I - what I'm hoping is that we can evolve from that into something
better… (Cahill Low, 2014, 14).
I think there needs to be, there needs to be more training for the people who are
making the decisions… More training, more understanding of, I think, of Native
culture because it's not all the same (Burgess, 2014, 10).
I think if we can help educate the public, not just here in Maine, but across the
United States, about the injustices that have been done and how we can work with
the Tribes in facilitating healing, because we have generational trauma that’s been
swept under the rug… And I think by bringing it out and talking about it and
taking ownership is the only way we can start healing (Augustine, 2014, 18).
The preceding comments illustrate the desire of many statement providers to
improve the cultural education of all those dealing with Native families in the child
welfare system.
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One thing I would like to see happen is a model that's been effective, not only in
Tribal communities, but in other communities, where you have a supportive living
situation. So you might have, say, six to 12 small apartments for parents who have
issues of substance abuse. They come to live there. They cook communally. They
have substance abuse treatment…they have parenting assistance. They have job
coaching assistance available to them there. So, they have a community and their
children are with them. So, they have a community within their community
(Burgess, 2014, 10).
I felt like I learned a great deal from the children I worked with. Um, and I
learned that children love their families and want to be with their families. They
want things to be better but they want to be with their families. And they should
have the right to be with their families and their culture and their Tribe. They
should have that right (Burgess, 2014, 10).
One thing I really regret is not knowing my language….So. ... I would, somehow,
I would have the State be able to have the person keep their culture… I think
that’s important. And, also, continue to check up on the children. And don’t warn
the families that they’re coming for a visit, ’cause I think that was another
problem in the past that they were told when they were gonna come and visit, so
they can either spruce up the house or change their attitudes, and, so they’re not
really seeing what’s happening (McDonald, 2014, 10).
I think that it's not just the State of Maine, but the federal government that needs
to provides funds to the tribes and the tribal family members involved with that
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child to … travel to that child and deal with that child in a way that ICWA (Indian
Child Welfare Act) supposes it should be doing (Irving, 2014, 20).
I would have the State of Maine be responsible for assisting with documenting
ancestry and genealogy, um, for those families that were affected by noncompliance with ICWA. I think that's the very least that the State of Maine can
do, because the Tribes don't have that availability to do that (Augustine, 2014,
17).
The preceding comments all relate to the desire for Native American children to
stay closer to, or even to remain with, their families in circumstances where they might
otherwise be placed with a family outside of their tribe. If they cannot be placed within
their tribe, these statement givers want greater efforts made to maintain cultural ties
between the child and their tribe.
Like maybe we need to have more funding to recruit Native families to be able to
come forward and be resources for Native children. And I don't know how we do
that but that would be great (McKechnie, 2014, 24).
I think it'd be great if we had probably more foster families that were available,
either within the Tribes themselves, or very close to-, who have a close
connection to the Tribe, because I think, for all of us, we're, we are struggling to
find families (Bullard, 2014, 17).
The preceding comments speak to an underlying challenge for the state of Maine
in carrying out federal law requiring Native American families and tribes to be invited to
host foster children from their own tribe. The shortage of Native American foster
families comes up many times in statements.
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I do hope that there's some good structural recommendations to child welfare.
Specifically that the case reviews, the district resource people more regularly
happening (Burns, 2014, 17).
I sometimes wonder, you know, would it make sense to have somebody within
each office who has a specialty line…they and their supervisor really have
responsibility for the bulk of those cases [involving Native children], because then
there would be a comfort level, a fluency, and you also develop relationships…
(Bullard, 2014, 17).
These two preceding comments concern procedural guidance to the state of Maine
as it reviews potential child welfare cases involving Native American children.
I'd recommend that the feds sign a new treaty with the Nation and get rid of the
Land Claims Settlement Act. I think that in some point in time—and I know that's
probably too flippant. But my perspective is that there—there are—there is a
belief system that is in place because of the Maine Land Claims Settlement Act
that until that is revisited and perhaps reframed to some degree that that mindset is
going to continue in the Attorney General’s Office. That they are going to
continue to believe that the Nation is not a Nation, that it is a municipality and it's
still under their authority. And as long as that continues, there are going to be
problems (Mehnert et al, 2014, 16).
The Land Claim Settlement Act is bad and so is the Blood Quantum in my
opinion…Blood Quantum, you are a quarter, you are a half, you are three
quarters, you are full, oh you are below a quarter so you are not really… (TE:
yeah okay.) I am not sure how you would gauge that. But I feel like way before
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the Blood Quantum happened, your kids are your kids and that makes them part
of the community. That makes them part of the tribe and that makes them part of
you and you are part of it. I don't know, so I don't know how that could be
different, but the only purpose for it was to eventually eliminate the Indians. So I
think that is a negative policy that is in place (George et al, 2014, 14-15).
Blood Quantum for me would be anybody that recognizes as Native American
that has blood in them, that has relatives that are Native American (George et al,
2015, 15).
The preceding three suggestions relate more to federal policy governing how tribes and
Native Americans are identified under the law—and, by extension, whether they are
protected by the Indian Child Welfare Act from being placed outside their tribe without
the tribe’s consent.
Across these suggestions from statement providers comes a desire for
acknowledgement of their trauma and the mistreatment they endured both from state
officials who did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act and from their foster
families. Native children and officials and state officials both call for additional training
and dialogue around the Act, the history that precipitated its passage, and the challenges
and missteps in implementing the law across Maine. Many statement providers noted
inadequate efforts made to identify or certify a child as a member of a Native tribe and
the need for policy and process reforms in that regard. Importantly, Native and state
officials also called attention to the difficulty of finding foster families within tribes who
can accept children in need of placement, as well as the difficulty of keeping Native
families together or Native children within their tribes when their biological parents
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wrestle with substance abuse. Thus, taken collectively, the statements provided the TRC
with ample suggestions for how to frame their findings and recommendations to the state
of Maine in their report.
Data Analysis: TRC Report, Findings, and Recommendations
The Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare TRC’s report includes numerous
connections to those who gave statements to the Commission, including extensive direct
quotations from stories of life in foster care and recommendations that closely reflect
suggestions from statements. Among the more provocative findings the TRC rendered is
the existence of “cultural genocide” (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 8) in Maine, based on the
involuntary disconnection of Native children from their culture, whether willfully or
inadvertently. That characterization was floated during the statement gathering process
and at least one state official questioned it: “The word ‘genocide’ to me means killing
people, but it means more than that: it means killing a culture, and I don’t think I ever
thought of any of our practices as killing a culture.” But for the Commission, “we saw
over and over that the well-being of Wabanaki children was linked to their cultural
connectedness and that their heritage serves as a perhaps unparalleled source of strength
and resiliency for individuals and communities” (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 9). The
Commission echoed concerns that “more needs to be done to improve, in particular,
initial identification of Wabanaki children” (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 28-29) and also
recommended that the state “resolve problems surrounding blood quantum, census
eligibility, and the provision of services for children, as these issues are often contested
and unclear” (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 67). The Commission called on the State to
support healing and “celebrate the cultural resurgence of the tribes” (Wishcamper et al,
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2015, 67), and the Commission itself preserved tissues used by statement providers and
burned them in a special tribal ceremony in recognition of Wabanaki cultural traditions.
The TRC suggested changes to training given to state case workers, attorneys, and judges
to help “recognize bias and build cultural awareness…in ways that frame [the Indian
Child Welfare Act] within historical context (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 67).
Commissioners called for the creation of more Native foster homes and therapeutic
homes, more consistent supports for non-Native foster families to keep Wabanaki
children connected to their heritage, and improve the teaching of Maine Native American
history and culture in schools (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 67). In all of these cases, the
TRC recommendations seem closely aligned with the suggestions they received, and the
TRC’s overall findings about the history and state of child welfare in Maine clearly
reflected the stories they heard from both state and tribal officials and those with
experience as foster children.
Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Government Response
One puzzling aspect of the results of the TRC process is the state’s very limited
receptivity to the Commission’s recommendations. A bill filed in the Maine Legislature
to accept the TRC report went nowhere; curiously, officials in the Legislative clerk’s
office believed that no legislative action was needed to implement the recommendations,
while TRC officials shared in interviews that they had strategically delayed their
advocacy due to exceedingly poor relations between the Governor, the Legislature, and
tribal leadership. It is hard to know exactly what has hampered the implementation of
TRC recommendations in Maine. It may simply stem from the unique political dynamics
associated with Governor LePage’s administration, in which he vacillated from explicit

103
support for the TRC to firm opposition to it, in both word and deed (the rescinding of his
executive action). It may also have to do with a lack of legislative voices from the tribes;
Maine’s Native population has had non-voting representatives in the Legislature before,
but the most recent officeholders resigned in protest over the state’s treatment of tribes.
One other aspect of the Maine TRC’s work that may be limiting its broader impact on
policy is the relatively low levels of awareness and engagement among Maine residents
without direct experience or involvement in child welfare. In a telling focus group with
some of the TRC’s “community organizers,” they bemoaned low levels of media
attention to the TRC’s work and commitments to make statements that were not kept.
They wished that the TRC process had allowed for more spontaneous statement
gathering, where they could begin recording with someone who was sharing their story
informally. They also felt that the statement providers did not reflect a true cross-section
of perspectives among the non-Native child welfare community or among the tribal
community, with many declining to provide statements, even anonymously, out of fear of
repercussions in their careers or communities: “I think it’s pretty clear that we’re not
getting really an accurate reflection from the communities because there’s so many trust
issues and there’s a whole lot of fear. So, you know, we’re probably not getting the real
full representation from the tribes of this” (George et al, 2014, 11). Organizers expressed
disillusionment when they and other would-be statement providers realized that the TRC
could not directly implement change in Maine’s child welfare practices but could only
make recommendations. They also noticed that the TRC had not attracted official
support from leaders in the state health community, which could have, in turn, affected
the Commission’s credibility and its ability to get its recommendations adopted (George
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et al, 2014, 14-16). One focus group participant also made an important suggestion in the
framing of the TRC’s work that could help its recommendations gain more traction in the
future:
I also to hope people see that, you know, best child welfare practice for Wabanaki
children translates into best practice for all children which turns into a healthier
communities and move towards the reconciliation and, you know, moving
forward. Because I think people well, what’s so special? You know, you get that a
lot. Native kids, why is it so important that they have a federal law? And to
understand how helpful it is that every kid should have a tribe as a third parent. I
mean every kid should have a community or, you know, extended family or
something. It should, they should realize the trauma and that, you know, every
kids does experience, you know, that it is different for Native kids though
(George et al, 2014, 29-30).
This focus group participant, who had played a key role in the creation of the TRC,
underscored the tension between forming a TRC with such a broad mandate that it
becomes unwieldy but perhaps attracts greater awareness and developing a narrow
mandate that allows for greater focus and easier fulfilment but less clearly connects with
the broader population. The comment also underscores the tension between a TRC that
accepts government funding or other participation in its work and one that operates
wholly independent with grassroots support. A TRC with government funding and
involvement, like the Canada case study discussed below, can face credibility challenges
as it investigates and challenges institutions that are sustaining it, but that funding and
support can also strengthen the TRC’s ability to reach the broader population and gain
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more traction with its calls to action. A TRC without government funding, as in the cases
of Maine and Greensboro, can make a convincing claim of independence and
impartiality, but both Commissions received far less media coverage and public attention
than Canada’s TRC, and the recommendations made by TRC’s in Greensboro and Maine
have been taken up much more slowly (if at all) than those in Canada. It seems clear that
significant challenges remain in producing substantive change out of TRC
recommendations, but the widespread embrace of public sentiment in those
recommendations seems to have helped bolster their cause among elected officials.
Case III: Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In some respects, it is very difficult to compare the case of Canada’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission to the TRCs in Maine and Greensboro. The two American
Commissions had to raise all of their own funds from private donations and had budgets
of less than $10 million and fewer than a half-dozen paid staff. Canada’s TRC had a
budget of $60 million and a large paid staff in the dozens (Curry, 2015). Greensboro and
Maine functioned with limited or no government support and no government
funding. Canada’s TRC actually began as an operation of the federal government with
staff re-assigned to TRC duties until the resignations of all three Commissioners
prompted a reassessment of the government’s role. It also stemmed from the settlement
of a class action lawsuit filed by survivors of the residential schools operated by the
government and many churches, with a clause of that settlement including the convening
of a TRC. While a lawsuit was filed in the Greensboro shootings and settled, no such
TRC clause was included; Maine had not developed its TRC because of any specific
court action, either. Maine’s Governor LePage had issued an executive order calling for
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greater cooperation between state and tribal governments and the Maine Wabanaki State
Child Welfare TRC but later rescinded it (LePage, 2011). Canada’s top leadership had
already issued an apology for the treatment of thousands of students in its residential
schools prior to the launch of the TRC, and it had invested deeply in the TRC’s work, an
investment that continues to this day.
Despite those significant differences in scope, budget, and political context,
Canada’s TRC does warrant some comparison to its peers in Greensboro and Maine. All
three Commissions operated from a similar philosophy when it came to the involvement
and active participation of the public in their work. Like Greensboro and Maine, Canada
made numerous and frequent calls for those with anything to share with the TRC about
residential schools to come forward—publicly, privately, and even online (an option not
explicitly given in Maine or Greensboro). Like Greensboro, Canada staged several
public events across the country—some meant to be local hearings, some regional, and
some labeled national events of longer duration and attendance. Like Maine, Canada
focused on the child welfare experiences of the indigenous, known in Canada as First
Nations, and the broader challenges in relations between Canada’s national government
and First Nations, as well as relationships between members of First Nations and nonmembers. Canada’s approach to the provision of statements took several forms that
mirrored approaches in Greensboro and Maine. Those giving statements privately were
often asked questions similar to those developed by Maine’s commission, including what
the statement provider recommended be done to address past trauma and present
challenges for First Nations. Those giving statements publicly were allowed to speak
without specific prompting or interjection from Commissioners, as Greensboro had,
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though Canada did not impose a time limit, as Greensboro had with its invited speakers to
its public hearings. Canada shared Maine’s desire to honor indigenous culture during its
events and hosted many events that allowed for cultural and artistic expressions of grief,
sadness, and hope. Finally, while Canada’s TRC has seen its calls to action (another way
of describing recommendations) gain greater traction more quickly than either Maine or
Greensboro, an assessment from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) finds
that the government has only implemented 10 of the 94 calls to action as of this writing
(Barrera et al, 2018.). Analysis of that progress will be discussed later in this case study.
Data Analysis: Testimony (sample)
The National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation at the University of Manitoba in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, says it has more than 4,000 audio and video files containing
statements given to Canada’s TRC (each file usually contains multiple statements).
Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, a sample of these audio and video files was
drawn from eight different TRC events—one from Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario,
Manitoba, Quebec, and Saskatchewan, one from the Northern Region (inclusive of
Northern Territories, Yukon, and Nunavit), and one from the Atlantic Region (inclusive
of New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward
Island). The National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation, the archives for Canada’s
TRC, also provided a sample of private statements from multiple hearings across the
country. The goal was to analyze statements given from across the country, as well as to
hear statements given in different settings—public sharing panels and sharing circles, and
private settings as well.
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One aspect of analyzing statements from Canada is analyzing the level of
homogeneity of perspective from statement providers. A great many of the statements
given at public events came from survivors of residential schools, students who attended
and continue to carry trauma. People who were not students often functioned as silent
observers in the audience. Relatively few instructors or administrators from the
residential schools came forward to share their stories in public, though TRC officials
said in interviews several did participate in small group dialogue on the sidelines of
public events (Murray, 2018). TRC officials also said they conducted nearly 100
interviews from school officials in private meetings, often in their homes; some of them
expressed fear of sharing their story publicly. The TRC’s regional event in Victoria may
offer a partial reason why that fear arose. TRC records show more than 2,300 people
registered for the event, and nearly 400 identified as former attendees of a residential
school, “leaving almost 2,000 people who came to hear the truth be told and to share
what they have learned with others” and more than 150 statements gathered (Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 2015). The TRC’s director of statement gathering, Ry
Moran, told the CBC that the event and statement gathering process needed to be public
because, “Reconciliation cannot be achieved without the support and interest of nonaboriginal people.” Towards the beginning of the hearing, a church official (who was not
aboriginal) offered an apology for his institution’s role in administering residential
schools where abuse and maltreatment occurred. After his comments, Brother Tom
Cavanaugh, a former member of the staff at the Christie Residential School, stepped
forward. His comments included statements of regret for abuses that occurred, but he
added:
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There didn’t seem to be at that time any other viable alternative [to residential
schools] in providing a good education for so many children who lived in
relatively small and isolated communities. However, the native staff who were
related to a number of children there…[audience members begin to interject] (tell
the truth!) If you give me a chance I’ll tell the truth (you’re not telling the
truth)…provided a good education as well as an excellent care and guidance of
children entrusted to them. (Tell the truth! Tell the truth! Shame on you, shame
on Canada! We never sent our children to residential schools). Parents were
encouraged to visit the school and rooms were available for parents to stay over
(You built a prison!). For me Christie school was more like a home—(stops,
sound of audience member sobbing) (Cavanaugh, 2012).
At this point, Commissioner and Justice Murray Sinclair stepped to the podium and asked
the audience to respect the speaker and allow him to finish his statement:
This is an opportunity for a gesture of reconciliation to be made and he hasn’t
completed making it, and we want to ensure that all of those opportunities are
provided in full. We always appreciate as commissioners the opportunities for
people to have an exchange with each other about what it is that needs to be said,
and we’re providing an opportunity for this gesture to be made, and we’re going
to ask you to listen respectfully. There will be an opportunity to respond, listen
with respect and kindness…we know the difficulties you face, we understand
them, we just ask you to be respectful and let statement be completed. Thank
you. (Cavanaugh, 2012)
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Elsewhere in the hearing, Sinclair remarked, “The most important part of the
conversation is with each other” (Hartnell, 2012). Later, another statement provider at
the same event, Ina Seitcher, emotionally refuted Brother Cavanaugh’s testimony, saying,
“That priest that talked about how loving that Christie residential school was—it was not.
That priest was most likely in his office not knowing what was going on down in the
dorms or in the lunchroom…” (Seitcher, 2012). It is difficult to know whether Ms.
Seitcher and Brother Cavanaugh ever spoke to one another directly other than to listen to
one another’s comments in public, but in its report, the TRC wrote, “The fact that there
were few direct exchanges at TRC events between Survivors and former school staff
indicates that for many, the time for reconciliation had not yet arrived” (Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 16).
This episode carries great significance to an understanding of the TRC’s public
engagement process. Firstly, it suggests that Canada’s TRC hoped that residential school
stakeholders across the board (former students, staff, government and church officials,
etc.) would participate fully in providing statements and engaging in dialogue with one
another over the course of its events, and it did effectively create opportunities for that to
occur, as evidenced by Brother Cavanaugh’s decision to speak publicly. Secondly, at the
first sign of trouble in the keeping the TRC’s public space safe for all to participate
authentically, Commissioner Murray Sinclair stepped in quickly, and his intervention
seemed to facilitate the smooth completion of testimony from Brother Tom Cavanaugh.
But this episode marks one of the few times the public heard such sentiments—that
residential schools were needed and valued, that staff performed respectably and
professionally, and that residential schools had done their students good. Commissioners
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and TRC staff likely heard these sentiments at times in private interviews with staff, but
the public usually did not, indicating how difficult it must have been for the Commission
to maintain that safe space for the testimonies of all. Another former school staff
member, Merle Nisley, said at a different hearing, as recounted in the TRC’s report,
I think it would be valuable for people who have been involved in the schools to
hear stories personally. And I also think it would be valuable, when it’s
appropriate...[for] former students who are on the healing path to ... hear some of
our stories, or to hear some of our perspectives. But I know that’s a very difficult
thing to do.... Certainly this is not the time to try to ask all those former students
to sit and listen to the rationale of the former staff because there’s just too much
emotion there ... and there’s too little trust (quoted in Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 2015, 14).
Nisley made this comment on one side of the country at a smaller local hearing in
Ontario, roughly five months before Brother Cavanaugh made his remarks; it is unlikely
he had heard the earlier ones. But it is telling that Ms. Nisley is both aware of, and
reluctant or unwilling to share, sentiments about residential schools that are part of a
collective truth, one that made those listening to Brother Cavanaugh extremely
uncomfortable. This dynamic, in which some of the most important stakeholders in any
account of residential schools had difficulty telling their story in public, made it more
difficult for the TRC to tell their stories, and perhaps made it more difficult to incorporate
those sentiments in calls to action, since the public themselves might have not understood
from where those calls were derived.
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Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Testimony and Connections to Commission
Calls to Action
Of course, the statements from Brother Cavanaugh, Ms. Nisley, and Ms. Seitcher
make up an infinitesimally small sample of what Canada’s TRC heard from the public.
Elsewhere at the Thunder Bay hearing, residential school survivor Esther LachinetteDiabo used her testimony to call for the TRC to develop curriculum for Native studies
and indigenous history, including residential schools, so that Canadians nationwide
would understand why First Nations had suffered, continue to suffer, and warrant
additional support from the federal government (Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
2015, 234). One private statement giver and residential school survivor in Ontario said,
“We need to educate Canadian people on, on native Aboriginal people. In the States, or
here, sometimes I talk to people in here or in the States, they still think we live in tepees”
(Frogner et al, 2018). The TRC specifically called for review of existing curriculum and
creation of new curriculum that would cover Aboriginal history and residential schools
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 238). In parts of the country, like Alberta,
this move has been embraced (Lazzarino, 2018), while in others, like Ontario, this move
has been resisted based on cost concerns, but that resistance has come in for sharp and
widespread criticism and seems unlikely to hold, based on news coverage (Hopkin,
2018).
Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Testimony Around Residential Schools’
Legacy and Commission Calls to Action
Other speakers helped the TRC see how the legacy of residential schools
continues to affect current First Nations residents. A First Nations leader, Norma Kassi,
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testified in the Northwest Territories that “the doors are closed at the residential schools
but the foster homes are still existing and our children are still being taken away” (Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 138). Other statement providers spoke
graphically of abuse in foster homes (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 140141). Of course, comments like this closely bind together the TRCs in Canada and
Maine. Canada’s TRC called for reductions in the number of Aboriginal children in care
and improvements in services for Aboriginal families, due in no small part to testimonies
like these (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 139-140). The CBC reports that
minimal progress has been made on reducing the number of children in care, “the 2018
federal budget did commit to an increase in funding, and in 2018, the federal government
created a “six points of action” plan to address the child welfare crisis” (Barrera et al,
2018).
Meanwhile, the TRC also responded to experiences shared by students related to
the deprivation or theft of their First Nations cultural identity; at an event in Manitoba,
Doris Young remembered, “They gave us numbers, we had no names, we were numbers,
and they cut our hair. They took away our clothes, and gave us clothes … we all looked
alike. Our hair was all the same, cut us into bangs, and straight short, straight hair up to
our ears.... They took away our moccasins, and gave us shoes” (Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 2015, 145). At a Nova Scotia event, Michael Sillett testified, “at the North
West River residential school in Newfoundland and Labrador, told the Commission,
Children at the dorm were not allowed to speak their mother tongue. I remember
several times when other children were slapped or had their mouths washed out
for speaking their mother tongue; whether it was Inuktitut or Innu-aimun.
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Residents were admonished for just being Native… I cannot see the federal
government putting out the money that’s necessary for full restitution, you
know.... I can’t bring back my language; I lost that. I lost my culture, you know.
(quoted in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 153-155)
The TRC made several calls to action related to culture and language, in particular, some
of which have already been implemented within less than three years of the issuance of
their report (Barrera et al, 2018). The TRC also heard from thousands of former students
who believe problems with education for Aboriginal students continue to the present day,
including Albert Marshall, speaking at an event in Winnipeg:
The current education system has been designed to completely eradicate who
I am and to kill that Indian Mi’kmaq spirit that’s in me. But I do know I need
knowledge and I need education. But the kind of education I need has to be
reflective of who I am as a Mi’kmaq…The kind of legacy that I want to leave my
children in the future generations is one of which they will be able to excel, they
will be able to compete without having to worry about is the education system
going to further eradicate their selves (quoted in Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 2015, 149).
The TRC’s calls to action in response to these concerns included new Aboriginal
education legislation aimed at closing funding gaps between education for First Nations
communities and for non-indigenous students (Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
2015, 149-150). The TRC extended their recommendations to post-secondary education
after hearing testimony from former residential school students like Geraldine Bob
speaking at a TRC event in the Northwest Territories: “the residential school system
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owes me those lost years. You know, I lost my retirement; I have to keep working, I don’t
have a good retirement fund because it was so late when I went to school. And I’ve
proven that I can go to university and be successful as a teacher” (quoted in Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 151). The TRC noted in its report that “almost no one
with some university or college education who spoke to the Commission had been able to
obtain that education directly after high school” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
2015, 151). One statement provider said in a private statement, “Truth and reconciliation
mean that I would have unlimited education, that I can finally get the education that my
father, and my grandfather, and my forefathers before me fought for so long” (Frogner et
al, 2018). The TRC called for better funding for First Nation students seeking postsecondary education, and the CBC reports the federal government has already made such
commitments in budgets (Barrera et al, 2018).
The TRC made calls to action related to health care after hearing testimony about
medical maltreatment in residential schools. Former student Rudy Firth said at a TRC
event in Northwest Territories,
I’ve got chronic bronchitis today. Every winter I get pneumonia like two or three
times and I’m on two puffers ’cause when I was in Stringer Hall residential school
they used to put us in these little skinny red coats that weren’t even warm enough
for winter. And we used to have to walk across the street to go to school.… Both
my lungs are 50% scarred from having pneumonia seven times in [residential
school] (quoted in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 159).
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Others described severe psychological and emotional trauma, along with physical and
sexual abuse at the hands of staff. The TRC responded to these stories, in part, by
drawing attention to poor health supports:
The children in residential schools were powerless to take healing measures. They
were denied access to traditional foods and to families, traditional healers, and
communities who could have helped them, according to Aboriginal ways, to deal
with the physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual elements of ill health” (Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 159).
A statement provider also mentioned health challenges: “All the kids are, are, little kids
like that already, they're taking dope, they're taking, they get drunk, and the government
doesn’t really do anything about it. And a lot of people, a lot of young people hang, hung
themselves” (Frogner et al, 2018). The TRC made several health-related calls to action in
response, and the Canadian government has made significant progress in this area,
according to CBC reports (Barrera et al, 2018). In that vein, the TRC also called for the
expeditious resolution of any legal claims associated with abuse in the schools, after
hearing from multiple witnesses that they had not been able to find closure (Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 168-170). The TRC also drew attention to
disproportionate numbers of Aboriginal Canadians in prison, citing testimony from a
survivor named Daniel Andre who described his painful journey from residential schools
during an event in Yukon Territory:
I knew that I needed help to get rid of what happened to me in residential school.
Like, everywhere I went, everything I did, all the jobs I had, all the towns I lived
in, all the people I met, always brought me back to, to being in residential school,
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and being humiliated, and beaten, and ridiculed, and told I was a piece of garbage,
I was not good enough, I was, like, a dog.... So, one of the scariest things for me
being in jail is being humiliated in front of everybody… I had to build up a
system where I became a jerk. I became a bad person. I became an asshole. But I
survived, and learnt all those things to survive” (quoted in Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 171).
The TRC called for action to address what it called the “overrepresentation of Aboriginal
people in custody,” which it attributed to behavior patterns exhibited by residential
school survivors based on what they endured in school (Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 2015, 172). The federal government has already funded programs aimed at
addressing this issue (Barrera et al, 2018). The TRC also called for cultural support for
Aboriginal inmates, citing testimony from Chris Gargan, who had served time in the
Northwest Territories and told the TRC, “It would be nice if our own people would come
in here and teach us about life ... you know, how to live. This is not the way of life for us.
It’s not the way for us people. But if they would teach a program like that, that will catch
somebody for sure” (quoted in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 176).
Conversely, the TRC also issued several calls to action related to disproportionate levels
of violence against Aboriginal people, particularly women and girls, particularly after
they left residential schools. Residential school student Velma Jackson told the TRC,
“I only know of one [of the girls my age] that survived, all the rest are dead today.
Some died on the street. Some died prostituting. Others into alcoholism got run
over by vehicles…I can’t to this day wear a dress because of all the things that
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happened in the school. It was like a sanctuary for pedophiles…” (quoted in
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 180).
The TRC went so far as to call for an entirely separate inquiry into this matter, which was
launched by the Canadian government within a matter of months of the call being made
(Barrera et al, 2018).
Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Testimony Around Reconciliation and
Commission Calls to Action
Finally, the TRC made literally dozens of calls to action related to the broad
theme of reconciliation: the establishment of Indigenous law institutes to understand
Indigenous laws and access to justice (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 327);
the honoring of historic land claims for First Nations (Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 2015, 328); professional development training for public servants on
Aboriginal history and culture (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 329-330); a
Papal apology for the Catholic church’s role in residential schools, specifically requested
by survivors (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, 222-223 and 330-331); and
the establishment of an independent National Council for Reconciliation to oversee the
work of implementing Calls to Action (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015,
328). On the notion of land claims, one survivor explained to the TRC, “To take the
territorial lands away from a people whose very spirit is so intrinsically connected to
Mother Earth was to actually dispossess them of their very soul and being; it was to
destroy whole Indigenous nations” (quoted in Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
2015, 225). Another speaker said in private, “We want our, our rights back. We want our
land back” (Frogner et al, 2018). The TRC also made calls to action regarding the
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preservation or release of key records related to residential schools and regarding the
establishment of both monuments and “a National Day for Truth and Reconciliation to
honour Survivors, their families, and communities” (Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 2015, 334). That last call has attracted a significant amount of news
coverage in Canada, as has the call for a former Papal apology, which has not yet been
issued, though the federal government has supported it (Barrera et al, 2018). The
Canadian government itself has apologized for its part in creating and overseeing
residential schools, but statement providers like Eugene Arcand told the TRC, “[W]e as
First Nations, Métis, and Inuit people, especially residential school Survivors, want to
reconcile. We really, really want to. But it’s difficult when we see … the cuts to the
Aboriginal Healing Foundation and other cuts that have happened in regards to
education, in regards to our livelihood” (quoted in Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
2015, 216).
Data Analysis, Results, and Findings: Relationship Between Testimony and
Commission Calls to Action
The TRC’s calls to action seem to have honored a great many of the sentiments
expressed by those who testified before the Commission in the testimonies reviewed as
part of this study. Another critical aspect of the TRC’s responsiveness to public
sentiments is the ongoing role of the Canadian government in the implementation of the
TRC’s Calls to Action. While the Canadian government has been financially and
politically invested in the TRC since its inception as a clause within the government’s
settlement with First Nations, TRC officials said in interviews that the government and
TRC had to redefine its relationship within the first few years of its work. If anything,
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the government had become “too” involved for the comfort of the TRC and Aboriginal
people who could not trust the TRC process with such significant governmental
involvement. Control of the federal government changed just as the TRC issued its final
report, and the Trudeau government has moved aggressively to appoint high-level public
servants to work on implementing the calls to action. Interviews with TRC and
government officials suggest that the pace and exact form of implementation may vary
from what the TRC originally envisioned, but the commitment to act remains strong,
bolstered in part by the presence of former TRC Commissioner Murray Sinclair as a
Senator in the federal government.
One aspect of the TRC’s report and calls to action that merits further discussion is
the presence of calls to action that had less of a clear connection to public testimony than
other calls. Interviews with TRC officials suggest that some calls to action emerged
towards the end of TRC deliberations, based simply on the instincts and preferences of
the Commissioners rather than a clear call from the public to act in that fashion. One
example of this is the Call to Action for a statutory holiday, a National Day for Truth and
Reconciliation. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau indicated that a process has
begun to declare such a holiday, but the suggestion has drawn mixed reactions even from
Indigenous, who worry that the holiday “could simply devolve into another day off for
most Canadians” without progress on reconciliation (McQuigge, 2018). One columnist
opined,
I oppose Remembrance Day being a day off from work and school precisely
because it seems more likely that our fallen will be honored communally if we
interrupt the day to do so, rather than take it as holiday…How about taking an
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existing statutory holiday renaming it ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ and making the
government workers come in to office to get on with so much unfinished
business? (de Souza, 2018).
For its part, the TRC wants the holiday to focus not just on residential schools and their
legacy but on “improving Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples” (McCue,
2018). Other critics of the move cited the economics of it—nearly $200 million in daily
governmental payroll—and the potential for those funds to help pay for “an awful lot of
clean water systems…an awful lot of support for education” (McCue, 2018). The
ongoing debate over this specific call to action, which some call a “distraction” from the
more important work of the TRC (de Souza, 2018), suggests a possible link between how
much the public encouraged the TRC to act in a certain way and how readily the
government acted to implement the TRC’s call to action. In other words, when the TRC
issued a Call to Action that had less of a direct connection to the public’s own goals or
suggestions, government has had greater difficulty with implementation of that call.
Ultimately, though, the widespread support for the TRC’s findings, and the commitment
of the federal government under Prime Minister Trudeau to implement all of the Calls to
Action eventually, suggests that the TRC thoroughly took Commission testimony into
account as it formulated Calls to Action that the people’s elected representatives could
support.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Conclusions
Given the vast amount of data available to review from the three major North
American truth and reconciliation commissions in Canada, Maine, and Greensboro, it is
nearly impossible to draw definitive and precise conclusions about how well those
Commissions heeded public sentiments. But this study included a large sample of
testimonies from each Commission, spanning a variety of perspectives on the topics
under investigation—for example, statements of Ku Klux Klan and Communist Workers
Party members in Greensboro; statements of Wabanaki tribal members and child
protective services staff from the state of Maine; and Canadian residential school students
and staff. The study also included testimonies given both in public and in private so as to
understand the full breadth of sentiments expressed to the Commissions; in Maine, nearly
all of the statements gathered were done in private, while in Canada, an extraordinary
number (in the thousands) were provided publicly.
After this review, a few conclusions emerge. One is that each of the three TRCs
seem to have gone to great lengths to incorporate the sentiments of the public into their
reports, both in terms of findings and in terms of recommendations or calls to action.
This holds true even for what one might call a “minority” perspective in each case. For
example, in Greensboro, members of the Ku Klux Klan and the Greensboro Police
Department (or the City of Greensboro more broadly) participated in far fewer numbers
than those supportive of or formerly affiliated with the Communist Workers Party, and
many of Greensboro’s Commissioners found the Klan’s testimony and actions on
November 3rd truly abhorrent. But Commissioners still incorporated the Klan’s
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comments about the provocations of the Communist Workers Party into their findings,
and they went to great lengths to facilitate face-to-face interactions (and apologies)
between the two sides. In Maine, the TRC certainly paid greater heed to the travails of
Wabanaki tribal members who had been in foster care and their needs for healing and
support than they did suggestions from Maine’s Department of Health and Human
Services staff. However, they also attempted to frame their recommendations in ways
that would seem palpable and feasible to the state, and they quoted heavily from Maine
officials throughout their report. Canada also worked to bring as many voices as possible
into their work, from the numerous public events to the dozens of private interviews with
residential school staff unable or unwilling to come forward. When a residential school
staff member was verbally threatened, the TRC immediately intervened. Their eventual
calls to action did seem to favor the perspectives of residential school student survivors
more than staff, but they also included many references to staff testimony, recollections,
and context around the residential school experience in their report to the nation. Thus,
in all three cases, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions respected and incorporated
input given to them by members of the public from a variety of perspectives.
This conclusion seems to support the theories articulated above related to public
dialogue and deliberation, empowered participatory governance, public participation,
deliberative civic engagement, and “slow democracy.” In all three cases, TRCs granted
their populations chances to participate in discussions of how best to move on from dark
periods of their history, and the TRCs in Greensboro and in Canada were also particularly
successful at facilitating dialogue across different perspectives at public events. Each of
the three TRCs demonstrated the benefits of conducting dialogue processes open to all—
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benefits both to the TRCs themselves and to those who participated—by connecting their
work to the public’s stories and suggestions. Some scholars have suggested a TRC is less
a means of problem-solving or participatory governance and more of a tool for changing
pre-existing narratives, such as the characterization of the November 3rd shootings as a
shootout among extremist outsiders rather than a symbol of long-simmering local
tensions. In that analysis, each of the three Commissions studied here also made
significant contributions to history, broadening the public’s understanding of the
Greensboro incident while opening the eyes of many in Maine and Canada to the
existence of genocidal and unjust practices promulgated against Native Americans or
First Nations for decades. The two goals—of collective problem-solving through public
participation and of rewriting narratives through storytelling—seem less at odds and
more compatible, at least in the three cases studied here.
That said, the TRCs’ mixed results in their engagement with the public provides
important lessons for the field. Greensboro’s TRC struggled to distance itself from
surviving victims from the Communist Workers Party; as such, they failed to garner
political or financial support of the City of Greensboro or the broader local establishment.
Public hearings attracted decent, though somewhat modest crowds and often were left off
of the newspaper’s front page, and national media outlets paid limited attention to the
effort, perhaps owing to the perceived lack of popular support of (and perhaps interest in)
the TRC. That apathy may, in turn, have contributed to the sluggish pace taken by the
Greensboro City Council in considering or implementing the TRC’s recommendations. It
may also have colored the TRC’s recommendations, in that it was hearing from a selfselecting sample of witnesses, many of whom supported the TRC process because it
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would “correct” perceived mistakes made by the judicial system in its acquittal of all
suspects. The relative lack of funding (compared to, say, Canada’s TRC) for
Greensboro’s TRC limited its ability to do more outreach to encourage wider attention or
participation in its work. Thus, Greensboro helps illustrate the importance of securing at
least modest support from governing bodies and other community organizations, in the
hope that wider public interest, attention, and participation will strengthen the influence
of the TRC’s eventual recommendations.
Similarly, Maine’s experience suggests that a combination of limited funding and
political will can limit the public’s willingness to participate in a TRC’s process and, by
extension, can limit a government’s zeal to implement TRC recommendations. Maine’s
TRC lacked the resources and support to produce well-attended public events—nearly all
of its testimony came from circles hosted by tribes or in private. That limited the public’s
awareness of the process, as well as limiting opportunities for “reconciliation” between
state child welfare authorities and former foster children, for example. It also may have
made it that much easier for Governor Paul LePage to use an unrelated dispute with
Maine’s tribes to distance himself from the TRC’s work and decline to work for the
implementation of their recommendations. He, and other legislators, may have surmised
that they stood to lose little public support if they ignored the complex recommendations
made to them by the TRC. The Maine case proves the importance of ensuring that a TRC
has secured the funding necessary to reach as much of its population as possible and to
host public events that allow for wider public participation, reconciliation, and media
attention.
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Canada’s TRC, if anything, proved the importance of adequate funding for public
engagement. Its public events were attended by thousands and widely covered by the
Canadian press. The TRC received ample funding in the form of a settlement reached
between the Canadian government and survivors of residential schools who had filed a
class action lawsuit over their treatment. The funding allowed the TRC to invest heavily
in outreach to attract attendance at their events and to host many events all across the
vastness of Canada, from coast to coast. Canada’s TRC also paid for mental health
professionals to be present at their events, which undoubtedly attracted some more
reluctant witnesses to come forward, knowing they could receive aid in times of retraumatization. It comes as little surprise that the Canadian government, under Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau, ultimately provided robust support to the TRC’s
recommendations. After all, the government had invested heavily in the TRC and might
look irresponsible if it were to fail to act on its Calls to Action. Additionally, the
Canadian government could simply not ignore the TRC’s work, given the widespread
interest, participation, and news coverage. Thus, Canada’s TRC, in contrast to Maine’s
and Greensboro’s, suggests that the mere will to involve the public in a TRC’s work must
be accompanied by adequate resources to carry out robust public engagement.
It also is hard to determine the extent to which the Commissions’ final reports and
recommendations fostered reconciliation of the sort wished for by many who participated
in Commission processes remains difficult to determine or measure. In several cases,
those who provided statements to the three commissions used the opportunity to
apologize for the role they, or their institutions, played in the tragedies under
Commission examination. Some key participants in the tragic events even apologized
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directly to one another (former Communist Workers Party leader Nelson Johnson of
Greensboro apologized to a North Carolina Klansman, for example). But the
preponderance of recommendations from the three TRCs focused on actions that they
hoped governments, or schools, or other large institutions would take. While Greensboro
incorporated recommendations for individuals in several recommendations, the other two
Commissions did so to a much lesser extent. The TRCs seemed to prioritize
recommendations whose implementation might occur in a public, or at least measurable
and visible, fashion, over and above the desire many expressed for individualized action.
One additional aspect of the Commissions that must be addressed is the extent to
which they were able to bring about acts of restorative justice, as many of them explicitly
indicated they wanted to do. Restorative justice processes are meant to address both
harms and needs—the harms done to people and communities and the needs victims may
have to heal from the harm, as well as harms experienced by offenders, which “may
require us to address the root causes of crime” (Zehr, 2015, 21). Each of the
Commissions examined in this study seem to have made significant strides in this regard.
Maine’s success in restorative justice seemed significant from the vantage point of having
both victims and an offending agency (Maine’s Department of Health and Human
Services) explore how the child welfare crisis had come about and contribute to the
development of solutions to address child welfare issues. That level of collaboration had
begun before the TRC, but it continued throughout the TRC and to this day. Specific
episodes of reconciliation between parties, or encounters between victim and offender,
seemed rare, as did public gatherings of mixed audiences (state and tribal) where stories
were shared. But Maine’s TRC does seem to have undertaken a robust examination of
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the harm done to victims, their needs, and the root causes of the breakdown in child
welfare among Wabanaki tribes and nations.
Greensboro’s TRC structured its hearings in such a way that the root causes of the
shootings were explored publicly and in great detail. They also explicitly examined the
harms done by the incident, both in the short and long term, and asked victims (in private
statement gathering and public hearings) about their needs and those of the community.
Greensboro’s TRC was also able to foster a number of opportunities for apology and
amends from both members of the Ku Klux Klan, the Communist Workers Party, and the
City of Greensboro, though few were direct interactions between victims and offenders.
But the City’s unwillingness to play an active part in the TRC’s work meant that it did
not contribute much to its ultimate findings and recommendations, which may have
hampered implementation progress. Nevertheless, the TRC’s ability to highlight
concerns raised by all parties to the events of November 3rd certainly advanced the cause
of restorative justice, to an extent.
Canada created several opportunities for participants to engage in moments of
reconciliation. Its use of “honourary witnesses” from non-Native communities, often in
leadership roles within church or government, along with numerous opportunities for
facilitated dialogue between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians across the
country, helped foster a shared sense of responsibility for righting the wrongs of
residential schools, as well for apologizing and making amends where warranted.
Nevertheless, the Canadian TRC has admitted the difficulty it faced in facilitating
moments of reconciliation between residential school staff and surviving students, even
in creating opportunities for the two parties to hear one another’s truths. That speaks to
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the difficulties of bringing about restorative justice at such a large scale, but it also
suggests possible changes in the ways future TRCs design their processes to make more
of these opportunities possible—perhaps by inviting two people who have given
statements to meet in private, with trained support personnel.
While not working in the same transitional context as many other truth and
reconciliation commissions, the three TRCs were able to carry out their work in a way
that honored some of the main tenets of transitional justice. The Greensboro TRC argued
for a public memorial to the shootings of November 3rd, which has yet to be completed,
but a roadside marker erected after the TRC finished its work does memorialize their
trauma, as did public statements from the Greensboro City Council. Canada has made
plans for national days of memorial and statues to commemorate survivors of residential
school abuse. Maine has also made changes to its administrative policies that are
designed to ensure fair and lawful treatment of Native children, families, and tribes being
considered for foster care or adoption. It is possible that the somewhat limited
memorialization of the November 3rd shootings in Greensboro, the foster care tragedies in
Maine, and the residential schools in Canada relates to ongoing injustice or inequities in
the way people of different races and ethnicities are treated. While it is beyond the scope
of this study to examine the extent to which racial segregation persists in the United
States or Canada, reporting conducted by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(Barrera et al, 2018) does suggest that significant inequities persist between First Nations
and the rest of the population. Meanwhile, Maine’s TRC reported that “Native children
in Maine have entered foster care at disproportionate rates since before the passage of
ICWA until 2013” (Wishcamper et al, 2015, 64). It stands to reason, therefore, that in the
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absence of a more just society in Greensboro, Maine, and Canada, further societal
transition or transformation may be delayed.
Finally, the TRCs have affirmed the strength of theories of trauma healing,
narratives, and the theory of recognition. Statement providers in all three TRCs seemed
intent on receiving recognition in one form or another. In Greensboro, Klansmen wanted
others to understand their humanity and their willingness to live in peace alongside
people of other races and creeds. Communist Worker Party members wanted their worth
recognized as well, particularly when communism had declined in popularity and
acceptance. Prosecutors and police officers in Greensboro also wanted to be recognized
as doing the best they could in the circumstances they faced. In all cases, while not
absolving any party of responsibility for the bloodshed, the Greensboro TRC attended to
these narratives and traumas in their findings and recommendations. Children in Maine
and Canada who provided statements to the TRC felt their needs and Native heritage had
been ignored, and Maine’s TRC spoke of this at length in their report, labeling it “cultural
genocide.” The TRCs in Maine and Canada paid significant attention to the need for
state and federal governments to treat Native or indigenous populations equitably, not
just in foster care or education.
The governments in Greensboro, Maine, and Canada have taken significantly
different approaches to the implementation of the recommendations. An analysis of
government responses to these TRCs both before their formation, during their work, and
after their reports were issued, suggests that decisions regarding implementation have had
more to do with dynamics external to the TRC process, per se. For example, city
officials in Greensboro issued an official apology for its actions on November 3rd in the
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wake of a deadly incident in Charlottesville, Virginia, more than ten years after the TRC
issued that recommendation. It also adopted reforms of its police department and
increased wages for city employees as the TRC had recommended but did so years after
the fact. The widespread community support for the TRC at the outset did not persuade
the Greensboro City Council to support its work (officially, as a body), and that
reluctance seems to have carried over to its willingness to act on TRC recommendations.
That said, it is possible that community activists were emboldened by the support the
TRC gave to its calls for a police review board, a living wage for city employees, and a
marker at the site of the shootings, all of which were eventually implemented by City
Councils that differed from the one that opposed the TRC. The Greensboro TRC’s heavy
emphasis on mistakes made by the police department and other City officials, beyond that
of the Ku Klux Klan or the Communist Workers Party, may have engendered a backlash
among the City Council members who initially received the report, given that a majority
of them had previously opposed the TRC’s operations. But successive City Councils
seem to have taken a different approaching in tackling several of the issues raised by the
TRC.
The experience in Maine is quite different in several respects. The initial, highprofile support Maine’s Governor gave the Commission was evidently tied to his political
relationships with Maine’s tribes more broadly, and when those weakened, so did his
(and his administration’s) support for the Commission. It is clear that the Governor’s
conflicts with Native American tribes and nations on matters other than the TRC led him
to disassociate himself from the TRC. The Governor also feared that the appointment of
Maine’s Secretary of State to the Commission would somehow create legal liability for
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the State depending on the TRC’s findings, which may have contributed to the decline in
his support. Interviews with TRC officials there suggest they have chosen not to take a
more aggressive approach in their advocacy for reform in state government until a new
Governor is elected. The Governor and his administration have not made any easily
discoverable comments on the record about any of the TRC’s recommendations,
suggesting that the other political dynamics play a much greater role in their decision not
to act than the TRC’s findings and recommendations.
In Canada, the investment of funds and political capital made by two successive
federal governments of different parties seems connected to the need to comply with a
legal settlement (and fund a TRC) or face lengthy and costly litigation, as well as to the
extraordinary lengths taken by Canada’s TRC to engage people across the entire country
and spectrum of residential school experience. The government’s decision to commit to
implementing all of the TRC’s Calls to Action, despite political roadblocks or other
complexities embedded in some of those Calls, suggests that the government respects the
process the TRC undertook to make their work the people’s work, gaining a level of
popular and political traction that the other Commissions have not yet achieved.
Any process like a truth and reconciliation commission that depends upon
voluntary participation of the parties to the conflict risks being branded a failure, at least
from the vantage point of discovering the whole truth surrounding their topic. While
each of the three commissions did receive multiple perspectives on the subject at hand,
they received far greater testimony from one side than the other—Greensboro heard less
from the Ku Klux Klan than from the Communist Workers Party; Maine heard more from
survivors of foster care than from state officials; and Canada heard more from residential
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school students than from school officials. Invariably, that brings up questions of bias,
fairness, neutrality, and objectivity, questions that particularly plagued Greensboro’s
TRC in the runup to its launch and public hearings. While TRCs have often touted their
fairness and impartiality (Brown et al, 2006, 24), TRCs also allow those who felt silenced
by prior proceedings (courtroom trials, out-of-court settlements, political maneuvering,
etc.) to have a voice, which may seem like a “privilege” granted to one population
(victims) over another (residential school survivors over residential school administrators
and staff, for example).
Ultimately, the approach of giving the floor to a large multitude of victims did not
undercut the Commissions’ ability to deliver findings and recommendations that
incorporated all perspectives, even those they heard less frequently. There is no clear
evidence to suggest that progress on implementation of Commission recommendations is
in any way linked to the composition of the witnesses who provided Commission
statements. But it points to the continued tension with which a TRC must wrestle,
finding ways to coax all sides to the metaphorical table of discussion without compelling
their participation. The task of bringing the reluctant witness forward clearly must
include investment in a relationship with the witness, one that includes ample time spent
“off the record” (without the purpose of collecting information or a statement) and
opportunities to see or understand first-hand the value of participation and the low levels
of risk associated with doing so. The decision made by a witness to give a statement in
private, rather than in public, is certainly of greater value to a TRC than to give no
statement at all, but all three TRCs could have achieved more in bringing all parties
forward in public both to testify and to attempt reconciliation. Maine and Greensboro, in
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particular, likely were limited in what they could accomplish by their limited funding,
which covered the salaries of a small staff and the arrangements for the necessary public
hearings. Additional opportunities for reconciliation may have simply been beyond the
TRC’s reach. But their attempts to do so, in all cases, were noteworthy.
Ultimately, this study has concluded that truth and reconciliation commissions,
while often employed to help transition from one regime to another, can also play highly
important roles in involving large populations (local, state, and national) in addressing
public issues. The extensive public processes employed by all three Commissions, and
the attention they paid to opportunities for acknowledgement, apology, and forgiveness,
added significant value to the closure sought by the parties to their respective conflicts. It
also helped produce recommendations for paths forward that have, in many cases, proven
to be popular and worthwhile.
This study suggests that communities, organizations, and local, state and federal
governments, can and should consider the use of a truth and reconciliation commission
for those lingering conflicts that history has not put to rest. The TRC experience in
Greensboro, Maine, and Canada suggests that prior efforts to resolve the conflicts in
question within criminal and civil courts, or even in administrative or public policy,
failed to satisfy the needs and interests of those most affected by the conflicts. That
seems to stem, in part, from those parties’ inability to tell their stories to someone willing
to listen, and to influence the approach taken to resolve the conflict. Statement providers
often found themselves telling their stories for the first time in any setting (public or
private), and they were given ample opportunity to offer suggestions for how best their
city, state, or country could heal from tragedy. That opportunity may also have been
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offered to them for the first time—many of those who provided statements to the three
TRCs came from communities often underrepresented in public hearings or elected
office. While many assume that a citizen of a democracy gains the greatest influence
when given the franchise or right to vote, the TRCs afforded thousands the chance to
have a more direct impact on the writing of future public policy. That opportunity seems
to have indirectly produced many reforms ultimately welcomed by the governments of
Greensboro and Canada, while reforms have taken on a more administrative quality to
date in Maine.
This study also suggests that TRCs must ensure they receive adequate political
and financial support to enable them to host well-attended events across the area they
cover (an entire city, state, or nation) and to create opportunities both for testimony and
for dialogue among parties, which can produce reconciliation. While autonomy,
independence, and objectivity are important qualities of any TRC and may require some
distance from a governmental entity, support remains crucial if TRCs aim to include all
affected by a tragedy in both the documentation of truth and the advent of reconciliation.
Future research could analyze how other aspects of a truth and reconciliation
commission’s work—the level of government involvement and support, whether to allow
TRCs to grant amnesty, use subpoena power, or award reparations, etc.—can affect the
public’s participation and influence over their work. Other studies could explore the
relationship between testimony and a TRCs final report of findings and recommendations
across the dozens of other TRCs that have met worldwide. It would be particularly
worthwhile to compare a TRC’s utilization of testimony in its final report within
countries where democracy has either not taken hold or functions very differently than
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those of Canada and the United States. It would also be helpful to examine more closely
how the relationships between host governments and TRCs impact their work,
particularly the design of a TRC’s public participation process and the extent to which
TRC recommendations are taken up by those host governments after the TRC completes
its work. It might also be interesting to compare the work of a TRC on a macro scale to a
micro-scale restorative justice intervention in the same community or on the same topic;
perhaps two parties can more effectively and efficiently generate and carry out plans for
change than a multi-year TRC can. Finally, future research should explore what, if any,
impact the concepts and terms “truth and reconciliation” have on the public’s perception
of, and participation in, dialogue and deliberation on a topic, compared to any other form
of national, statewide, or citywide conversation aimed at bringing together different
perspectives for a shared purpose.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocols
For Greensboro TRC members:
1) What motivated you to serve on the GTRC?
2) What considerations did you have as you wrote recommendations?
3) What role did you view the public and public input playing in your work and in your
recommendations, separate from archival or other forms of research or datagathering?
4) What made the GTRC decide to hold public forums separate from hearings,
statement-gathering, etc.?
5) How did you choose whom to have testify during public hearings?
6) How did you decide upon questions to pose during public hearings?
7) How did you decide upon time limits or other conditions for public testimony?
8) What guidelines did you have for taking private statements, in terms of questions you
asked, other ways in which you interjected or participated during the giving of
statements?
9) Recommendations:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.

Why living wage for employees?
What made apologies important? Diff bet regret and apology?
Marker vs. monument?
Exhibit at the Greensboro History Museum?
Anti-racism training? Just for gov’t employees? Other orgs + $$ scholarships
Annual reports on race—Mosaic vs. Human Relations Commission vs Impact
GSO
Citizen review panel for police with subpoena power
More funding for Guilford Co HHS? Why?
Curriculum for GCS
Community Justice Center (RJ)
Jury selection
Citywide citizen group to comment on news media
GPD investigation (transparency, public input)
Role for individuals

10) Community Forums
a. Why have them, separate from testimony?
b. What was your plan for how to use the input?
c. How well do you think you did?
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For Greensboro Mayor pro Tem Yvonne Johnson
1) Talk about decision to testify.
2) Talk about the path to the City’s issuance of a statement of regret and apology
(August 2017Feb 2018). And trying to get City officials to apologize and difference
between apology and regret.
3) Talk about the path of getting a public monument erected. (Jan 2015)
4) Living wage for City/county employees + contractors and subs. Happened?
5) Anti-racism training for all employees
6) Annual reports on race relations and racial disparities
7) Expansion of Mosaic Project
8) Police Review Boards (especially subpoena and enforcement power)
9) Investigation into GPD
Questions for Canada:
1) What informed the way you went about involving public in process, specifically
a. Why national and regional events
b. Why online statement gathering
c. Why sharing circles?
2) How did you track public input
3) How did you incorporate perspectives of people other than IRS survivors?
4) How did TRC develop its calls to action
5) Why so many?
6) Reactions to so few of calls to action being taken (reference CBC report)
Questions for Maine TRC:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Appointment, conflict with governor, state role vs Commission role
Talk about decision to focus on private statements
Role of Commissioners during statement taking
Focus groups—why, what purpose, what did you learn differently
Genocide finding
Legislature? Executive action? LePage?
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Appendix B: Listing of Common Themes
Isolation and Loneliness: Many statement providers to the three TRCs mentioned expecting
and needing various forms of support (emotional, legal, financial, etc.) that they did not
receive. Before, during, and after a traumatic event like the November 3rd shootings in
Greensboro or removal from biological parents in Maine or Canada, statement providers
wanted institutions like police, government, church, or tribe to notice their needs and
respond to them—needs like safety, security, clarity, empathy, etc.
Multiple Traumas Happening Simultaneously and Sequentially: Numerous statement
providers experienced multiple forms of trauma, sometimes at the same time and sometimes
over time. Relatives of those killed during the November 3rd shootings in Greensboro, for
example, were traumatized by the shootings, the response of police and city government to
the shootings, the courtroom trials, and the impact the shootings had on their work and their
ability to find jobs. Survivors of Canadian residential schools or foster care in Maine faced
isolation from their culture, physical and emotional abuse, etc.
Being Forgotten and Remembered: Many statement providers felt their story had been
overlooked by their community, state, or nation, as well as by the pages of history books.
They wanted the TRC to promote official memorials of their respective tragedies—both oral
or verbal and physical—to promote respect of their experiences and prevention of the
repetition of those tragedies.
The Economics of the Tragedies: Testimonies often discussed economic factors that
precipitated the events under the review. In Greensboro, many statement providers spoke of
the efforts to organize textile factory workers and their poor economic conditions, as well as
ongoing economic challenges across the city. In Maine, statement providers spoke of their
own struggles with poverty both before entering foster care and after. In Canada, many
statement providers described the impoverished conditions they left to attend residential
school, as well as the poor conditions within residential schools and the struggles they faced
to make a living after leaving the schools.
Desire for Tangible Results + Skepticism Around TRC Process or Outcomes: Each of
the TRCs had strong proponents of their work and process, as well as opponents who either
refused to participate or voiced their opposition to the process during participation. Some
protested a lack of consideration of “reparations” for victims; some called for specific
changes in government policy, like a shift from tax incentives for businesses to social
services. Even those who supported the TRC’s efforts to construct a narrative of their
tragedy worried in their statements that the TRC’s work would not meaningfully improve the
lives of those most affected by the tragedies.
Correcting the Record: Statement givers seemed intent not just on telling their own stories,
some for the first time in any setting (private or public), but on convincing the TRC, the
public, and/or the government that their story was the truth. They questioned what they
perceived to be the official narrative generated in the immediate aftermath of the events
(particularly in Greensboro) or what someone else offered as a conflicting story during a
hearing (in Greensboro and Canada). This theme demonstrated the significance of both the
“findings” each TRC would provide and their recommendations for future action.
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Appendix C: Data Coding Sample
Second level codes (thematic):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Confusion
Loneliness
Isolation
Trauma
Connection and community
Clarity around identity
Help

11-4-2014
Statement by Alivia Moore collected by Heather Westleigh on November 4, 2014
General Information
Private or Public Statement? - Private
Statement Provider: Alivia Moore
Date: November 4, 2014
Location: Indian Island, Maine
Previous Statement? No
Statement Gatherer: Heather Westleigh
Support Person: N/A
Additional Individuals Present: N/A
Recording Format: Audio
Length of Recording: 59:24
HW: Great. My name is Heather Westleigh, and I am
here with…
AM: Alivia Moore.
HW: It is, um, November 4th, 2014, and we, we are in-on Indian Island. The file number is
P-201411-00127. Um… have you, um, been informed,
understood and signed the consent
form?
AM: Yes, I have.
HW: If there is any information that-- disclosed that
indicates that a child is in need of
protection, or there is imminent risk of death, serious
bodily harm to an identifiable person or
group, including yourself, this may not be protected as
confidential.
AM: Yeah.
HW: You and-- do you understand?
AM: Yes.
HW: Thank you.
HW: Um, ok, so. Here to talk a little bit about your
experience. It sounds like you have a few
different areas where you've been involved with, um,
child welfare and ICWA’s been involved
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so which area would you like to start with?
AM: Probably like the first that kind of informs and
shapes the others-HW: That makes sense.
AM: Yeah, um, so my -- so do you want me to share?
[00:01:44.07] That I am a former youth
in care. I, um -- again, so it’s-- sometimes it can be
tough to, like, linearly tell the story because
um, some of the history isn't exactly clear in my
memory or wasn’t-- like I didn't understand
what was going on at different points. So, but from my
understanding, I was formally in the
foster care system three different, um, times in my
childhood and officially aged out of the
system as well. And ICWA absolutely applied to, to my
case and I'm very happy and fortunate
that it did.

CARE (descriptive code)
“I am a former youth in care” = Values code;
Identity, multiple identities, both former
foster care child and now helping foster care
children

HW: Yeah, mmhmm. How old were you the first time
you were in…
AM: I was a few months old, less than a year. I don't
know exactly but I was a few months old
I think.
HW: So, um, you may not have a lot of memories of
what your life was like prior to…
AM: No, no memory of my own--of that. But, um, I
was fortunate, it was a family that was
right down the street from my, my parents and where I
was. Like literally four houses down.

LUCKY (descriptive code)
Values code: Lucky she was not sent to nonNative foster home outside of her community
and disconnected from tribe vs. other kids.
Sees it as a matter of chance, not good
intentions.

So yeah, so I was able to stay connected to-- I actually,
just until this morning, I just happened
to ask my grandmother about it. And I thought it was
always just an informal arrangement, that
they just saw things weren’t good and they just took me.
Um, but I guess it was a, a formal
intervention and I was formally placed there. Um, but I
didn't realize that until this morning.

INFORMAL (descriptive code)
Values code: Informal arrangement vs.
formal foster care arrangements that she
knew others had. Less stress.
Versus code: Informal vs. state foster care

(Laughs.)
HW: And did you maintain a connection with your
biological parents as well?
AM: Um, again, I don't have any memories of that time
but from what, the little bits, that I was
told, um, again, it seemed like they had a tremendous
amount of power? Oh, now I’m kind of
wishing I had ju-- um, chosen a different box perhaps
about this piece because they’re still in
the community and I'm not close to them but we, we,
we stayed connected and I don't know -this is just kind of what has been shared with me.

CONNECTED (descriptive code)
Values and Versus Codes: Even in foster care
felt tied to tribe, vs. other Native children
who were fostered in homes outside tribe
and/or community.

HISTORY (descriptive code)
“three different times” (values code) = long
history, lot of experience in foster care,
helped by federal law that protected Native
American children in foster care
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I don't actually know these things but it sounded like
they had a lot of influence about whether
I got to visit my father because I was told that my dad
would come to, like, visit with me and
they’d hide me in the back or say I was sleeping or just
wouldn't let him visit with me.
And
that they were trying to -- this is what I've heard -- is
that they kind of, that they really did care
about me, they cared about me tremendously, um, and
that they wanted to adopt me so they
kind of, not being as helpful with, with my mom or my
dad being able to get me back.
Um, so
again, I have no idea. Um, they were always wonderful
to me after I went back with my
parents, so… I don't know. Again, not memories of my
own.
HW: And was this family, um, was this a tri-- a family
that was a member of the tribe as well?

HIDE (descriptive)
Values: Fear, disconnection from biological
parents, carried trauma

AM: Yes, yep. Yeah. Um, they’re both also
Passamaquoddy. The father of the family, he’s--I
don’t think he’s Penobscot tribe, but he’s
Passamaquoddy, ah, tribe, but we’re all-- I'm
Passamaquoddy too, so we're all interconnected. Um,
but yeah, so they’re, yeah-- they're from
this community.

COMMUNITY (descriptive)
Values = “they’re from this community” =
from her tribe. Importance of staying
culturally connected.

CARE (descriptive)
Values and versus code: Mixed emotions
around adoption/foster care: wanted to be
back with parents vs. also in safe, stable
home.

HW: And what age were you when you were back with
your parents?
AM: Um, so again, I'm not exactly sure. I'm assuming
that was bef-- you know, I’m assuming
it was just a few months but I've been assuming lots of
different things and I'm not really sure.
(Laughs.) So I think it was just a few months and then I
was back with my parents. And, um, I
think it wasn't too long after that that my parents were
separated and then my, my younger
sister was born. And then we stayed-- we were with our
mom until our next formal child
welfare intervention, was when I was eight. I just found
that out this morning, I wasn’t sure -when I asked my grandma, so I was eight when we
officially went into foster care. And it was
the both of us at that point.
HW: And so your sister-- you have, um, ah, an older
sister and a younger sister?
AM: Yes, that I grew up with.
HW: And you-- was your older sister involved, um,
with the…

HELP and BUFFER (descriptive codes)
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AM: She was, so she is… she's fourteen years older
than I am, so she was involved in my care
ever since I was born, so I think she really helped buffer
things a lot. And, she took me and my
younger sister in with her often, even though she -- my
older sister -- she was nineteen and had
her first baby. And then she had her two younger sisters
with her. Um, oh yeah, she is a fierce
um, advocate and protector of us. She considers us her
first babies. (Laughs.)

Values code = “Helped buffer things” =
insulated her from abuse, trauma of being
taken from parents, moved multiple times.

Um, yeah I mean she was an-- is an incredible source of
resilience for my sister and I, for our
family, um, but there’s also, I think… I think what
happened, why… why child welfare
formally had to get involved [00:07:03.21] was because
there was only so much my sister
could do. There was only so much that she could protect
us from, and that, you know my mom,
may have needed the-- okay, the children, they-- they’re
not gonna be in your care. Like, this is
just not safe. You need to make serious changes.

FORMAL (descriptive code)
Versus code: “formal vs. informal”
arrangements for child care/welfare. child
welfare formally had to get involved” =
previously the care arrangements for her felt
informal, within the family or tribe, vs. now,
authorities are involved.
Values: Greater trauma when formal process
began.

Um, so I think that’s-- I, I think Reesy
advocated for formal intervention. And I have a feeling
that in the past she had advocated for
that not to happen and worked hard for it to not. But I
feel like sh-- it may have got to a point
where she realized, this, this might be necessary for
mom to get things together, um, and for
things to, to change for the better.
HW: What do you remember about that time period
between being a few months and up until
eight years that ...?
AM: Um, honestly, a lot of what I remember is really
challenging. Um, and so recently in my
life, I've worked really hard, um, to be mindful of more
of the positive because there were
really wonderful times too. And so re--really trying to
be more conscious, in, in thinking of
those times too. Um, but really things that kind of stand
out more are feelings?
Because again,
I think my memory is not great -- partially, as often is -as a protective mechanism so just
feelings of, um, uncertainty, of fear… um, loneliness, of
like having to be strong for my sister,
my little sister but also, I had to take care of my mom a
lot or protect her, from like some of the
men that she would bring into the house. So, just like
having to be strong but then also, like,

FEAR and LONELINESS (descriptive codes)
Values code: handling much more than she
expected at her age, lots of emotions that she
carries many years later.
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always afraid and always really scared. (Beginning to
speak through tears.) Um, but there's
also really beautiful times when my mom-- usually
when she was sober.
Sorry, I didn’t think-HW: No, it’s fine. I was just wishing we had tissues for
you.
AM: Oh, no it-- that’s ok. No, that’s ok. Um, yeah, I
mean my mom is a really beautiful person
and so, um, I think she has a lot of her own… her own
issues of not feeling worthy, and not
feeling whole. And then when she can't do something
like perfectly -- because poverty was a
huge issue for us -- and so, like, um, if we couldn't eat
well or we couldn't eat. Like, she, like
to her, like the way she um, kind of dealt with that was
in a way, that rather-- I don't know, she
just let it be more of a negative thing than it needed to
be and it led to her being, making poor
other like poor dec-- like things she couldn't control, I
think kind of manifested into her
behaviors. So she was making really poor decisions that
kind of amplified [00:10:04.11] the
bad deci-- the bad situations or challenging situations
we were in. And she absolutely has
mental health and substance abuse issues. But I think
they stem from a lot of these more core
issues.
Um, so yeah, a lot of… a lot of fear and a lot of like-and one thing I kind of wanted to share
and I hope will-- like one of my things as I’m looking at
it as an adult now and doing this work
now, and I feel like I, if I see anything that doesn't feel
right, like I am gonna say something!
I’m like, I’m just kind of wondering, like, people must
have known -- like neighbors must have
known, like how did it take so many years? And that’s
where I’m kind of thinking but maybe
Reesey, my older sister, she buffered? Maybe she
buffered some of those things like people
would have concerns and, so she tried to step up but I
still don't understand why so many
things were able to happen, with neighbors so close and
a community so close, um and
teachers, like how do they not know. Like I-- you know,
I was like this nervous little baby like
always crying, you know? Like, how did they-- I was so
skinny. Like how did they not know
something was wrong? And in my, like, report cards
they would have comments that like they

Values = “People must have known” –
wishes those around her had helped with
addressing the instability in her home.
Believes her trauma could have been
lessened, suffering mitigated or avoided.
Frustration, anger.
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were concerned, but… Like I'm not sure how it… you
know, how it just took, like, things
getting so bad for there to be, um,
intervention, why there wasn't more of a focus
on prevention, of needing child welfare
involvement. So, yeah. (Laughs a little.)

Values: “How it just took things getting so
bad for there to be intervention” – felt
neglected, overlooked, ignored, lonely.

HW: Um, thank you, by the way. And um, yeah,
emotions are fine. It’s totally okay. Um, you
had said that you were thankful that ICWA was
involved when the foster care intervention
happened, were you thinking specifically around 8,
or…?
AM: Yes, yeah. I mean, I guess since that first one was
also formal. But I know for sure when
I was 8, that was a formal intervention. And so, I was-well, my sister and I, we were placed
with a family-- a Native family here on the reservation.
I knew them. Um, the father of the
family, he was actually-- had been a counselor of mine.
I don't know, maybe Bianca's too, I’m
not sure -- my younger sister. Um, so he couldn’t
obviously be my counselor after, you know,
after that, but yeah.
So I was able-- we were always here in our community,
on the island, always familiar faces the
home we went to, as scary as it-- like, and I don't want
to, like, make it sound like it was not
scary and it was not an awful time, um but as I got older
and learned of other -- because I didn't
really know it was foster care actually then -- but as I
got older and met other foster youth, I
realized, "Oh my god, they are being sent across the
state." They had to go to completely new
schools, all of their friends were gone. Any, any sense
of stability that they had -- for so many
youth, when it was crazy at home--they lost everything.
That it wasn't just like their
relationship with their parents or, or, you know, their-their comfortable things in their home
that they’re familiar with. But it was, you know, the
trees that they’re familiar seeing, like, the
river that they’re used to seeing. Like everything
changes. [00:13:33.18]
And I just realized how fortunate I was to always stay
connected to my culture and everything
that I knew. You know, my school, my peers, like my
family was always there. Um and, and
so, and so it's huge, it’s so critical. And I absolutely
understand the history for Native
communities, and tribes, and nations, and the
importance of that. But I think it really should be

Values: “thankful that ICWA was involved”
– feels fortunate/lucky that federal Indian
Child Welfare Act allowed her to be placed
with Native family vs. outside tribe or
community.

COMMUNITY (descriptive code)
Values = “We were always here in our
community…always familiar faces” –
believes trauma could have been much worse
vs. not staying physically close to tribe,
family.
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valued for-- and this probably isn’t the place to get on
that soapbox -- but for all children of
any cultural background, from any community that, that
you know, so much more could be
done to maintain connections to anything familiar, um,
and comforting--yeah, should really be
more of a focus.
And so absolutely, there’s more that needs to be done
for Native children because I hear
attorneys in California, who -- because that’s where I
live now -- who say “Don't check the box
ever. That opens Pandora's box.” They just have-- you
know, it's still… as much as folks are
supposed to be aware of the federal mandate and also
the spirit of the law, um, it's not being
implemented that it should everywhere. But for all
children, connection to community,
anything familiar, keeping them in their schools.
So for me, and I say everywhere -- the work that I do -like ICWA, like changed my
life and I'm so, so fortunate that that was the law of the
land when I had contact with the
system. Because I just think about, um -- because again
-- I work a lot with youth who are in
the foster care system, and they have so many identity
issues, right? Like so-- and a lot of it
comes from their… their close relationships.
And I definitely have issues around my relationship
with my mother, with my fa-- those pieces,
but there were some things that I never have any
question about. Like I know-- ever since I was
a child, I knew I was a Penobscot girl, I know I am a
Penobscot woman. I know where I
belong, this island is my home. There’s no question
about that. [00:15:51.20] I've never, I've
never ever ever not known where I belong in this
universe. I've never had a question of that. So
even when, um, I wasn't sure how my mom was doing,
right. I wasn't sure if she was alive or
those types of things, I knew I was going to be okay.
Like I always knew there was gonna be
people, a community that loved me, where I belonged,
where I was known, acknowledged,
accepted. Yeah, and I just can't, like, fathom that there
are children who don't have that
experience, who don't have healthy relationships with
their parents but then also have nothing
outside of that, totally lost outside of that. It breaks my
heart that that’s a reality for so many
children. So. I, um, I've had a relatively very positive
experience with the child welfare system
because I have-- my identity has been kept intact
through, through all the instability and

IDENTITY (descriptive code)
Values and versus codes = “I knew I was a
Penobscot girl” – was clear about her identity
within the tribe, because of being able to stay
in/physically near tribal members. Vs. kids
who were sent away.
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craziness of a home life -- which is gonna happen for
some children.
HW: Right and it, it sounds like, um, for you, that
happened-- did that happen right away?
Um, like thinking about the day that things really
changed for you...there must have been kind
of a pivotal moment where people came in and said,
um, "This isn’t-- this is changing" um and
was it right away that they said, "But you’re staying in
your community?"
AM: Well, for me, I guess it was never--I never, I never
knew life anywhere else. I don’t-- like
it was crazy and scary to have to live in someone else's
house. And that was as crazy as I could
imagine it being at that point. That was as scary as I
could imagine it being. And mostly the
scariness, I think for me, was in not knowing how-- like
not being there with my mom, not to
make sure that she was safe and okay and alive and
those things. Like I think that was really
the scary. Um, I never fathomed that I could have been
anywhere else or that that-- the decision
could have ever been made. Yeah.
But my gram told me this morning -- because
eventually we were placed with my grandparents
-- that when we were teens, she felt like, you know, that
now, we-- like, there was the
possibility that we might be placed outside of the island.
I don't know that she was ever told
anything like that, but she just felt like she needed to
make sure that we didn't go anywhere
else, so my grandparents took us in when I think I was
12. So. But I never had any idea that I
could-- I never felt like I could go anywhere else.
HW: Right, and was that the additional... you said you
were-- you were in placement three
times?
AM: Yes, yeah.
HW: Was that the third time?
AM: Yep, third time was, um, placed with my
grandparents.
HW: Had you returned to your-AM: Oh yeah. So I had been-- I honestly, so, the second
time was when I was eight years old?
And I’m not sure, I think that was only for a few
months as well. Again, I have no, no clue but
I think -- because I don't remember other major markers
happening there at that house, so I
think it was only a few months. And then with my mom
until I was twelve.
after 8, you know, I got better at hiding things because I
didn't want, the-- to go…I didn’t

HIDE (descriptive code)
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want to be taken away again. So we got really good at-well, I mean I think we were always
pretty good at, like, not talking outright. But I would
think, I see pictures of myself and I’m
like how did people not know that-- like we’re all
greasy and, like, tiny? Like, how did people
not know? And I was just so nervous. (Laughs a little.)
HW: Mmhmm. Scared.
AM: Yeah. (Laughs a little more.)

Values codes = “Better at hiding things…not
talking outright…how did people not
know…I was just so nervous…scared.” –
isolated while in care, felt overwhelmed,
carried trauma into adulthood

HW: Yeah, um. [00:20:01.23] This asks a little bit
about what a typical day would look like,
um, when you went into foster care. I guess you had
those different environments. Um, so um,
did you see a difference between, um, the daily routine
at the community placement and
between your grandparents?
AM: Um, yeah, I mean, definitely, definitely a
difference like I didn't know. Yeah, I don’t
know. It definitely was um, I don't know. It was
definitely different. How would I describe it
being different though? (Pauses.) I feel like it-- like my
experience in my second placement,
the community placement, that…that that felt more like
the, like a foster placement. Um,
because I, I think maybe I did know a little bit -- or
maybe it was a bit easier to distinguish,
like, the process? Because the visits with my mom felt
very structured, like much more
structured, you know, because like the visits with her
were either in a community setting or
eventually at the house, back at our house. I don't
remember. I'm trying to think if I remember
visits at my gram-- my grandparents.
HW: Did you have visits with your dad as well?
AM: Um, yes, in the second placement yes, he would
have been more present then. I think I
was 11 or 12 and he had a serious, ah, brain injury.
Um… so his, like, mobility and-- yeah he
had to-- yeah, so that became a different thing.
(Laughs.) He became a different kind of person
and parent at that time. Um… so visits. I don't know.
How would--? And I feel like, I feel like
because I was older when I went with my grandparents
too -- because I was a teen -- I was able
to be more autonomous and able to protect myself a
little bit more. It wasn't as scary. I don't
know, there are just so many differences. That it's hard
to, I don't know, it’s hard to kind
of…yeah.
HW: That makes sense. [00:22:30.15] Were there, um,
similarities between customs and
adherence to Native traditions?

INFORMING (descriptive code)
Values code = Decisions made for her
welfare without her knowledge or
understanding, makes her feel even more
traumatized than the move itself traumatized
her.

Values code = “I had no idea what was going
on…” needed more support from social
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AM: Oh for sure, yeah, um, I mean I think. Well, so in
my grandparents’ house, they are
more… Catholic and I was actually raised with my
mom. My mom’s more Catholic and Native
spirituality, so like a blend of both which a lot of folks
are. And my gram's more--even though
she still, like, speaks some Passamaquoddy and she still
like totally believes in a lot of our
ways, like explicitly she's more Catholic. So, and then,
with the community placement, I mean
I feel like they…were wonderful and open to anything,
that if there were community things
going on, they would have, um, brought us along to
them too. Again, I really don't remember
much about that time there. I just, yeah, I remember. It
was just kind of like I-- ah that time
when I was eight.
HW: It's a very feelings age.
AM: Yes, yes, yeah. It is.
HW: And, and how did the--so it sounds like your, your
involvement was with Indian Child
Welfare. Do you-- I mean, and you of course probably
don't remember the details, but it
sounds like that was mostly tribal involvement--through
Indian Child Welfare?
AM: Yee--es, it must have been because all of our
workers were based here at DHS on the
Island. Um, yeah. So they must have been. And I just
kind of know these things by looking
back and my work experience in the field now, I can
kind of decipher my history. But that's
another like big thing that I like always bring up is like
informing kids, like even if you think
they’re too little because I feel like I had no idea what
was going on. I had this nice person who
I like gather now was a social worker from DHS that
would come, like check in, or whatever-not very often I will say. Um, from my memory, not
very often. You know, but I really had no
idea what was going on like why this person-- like I
didn't know that I had anything to do with
like where I was living. Like no, no idea. And I feel like
I was-- I am like a really… like in
tuned to my environment -- even though I can't recall it
now, but I know that I am, like, really
aware. So that if there had been…some important
information that had been shared with me
that I would have integrated that into my understanding
and maybe felt more secure.
But um, I don't know, I just felt like -- and I know
decisions are made very quickly in the child
welfare system and so it's not always possible to give
people a heads up or children a heads up

workers to know why things were happening,
made her feel more isolated.
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-- but some of like, my really, like… like, you know,
there's one type of trauma in my
household, but I'm used to that. I’m used to that kind of
trauma. You know, like, it’s not as…
disruptive. But the types of trauma from entering the
system, or different points when the
system kind of gets involved -- just so abrupt and
abrasive.
You know like, ah, the way, the way that I learned
about, I guess, entering the foster care
system at age eight, was -- I don't know if it was when I
was getting on the bus or some teacher
at the school right before I got on the bus said, “You're
gonna get off the bus at Dale and
Leann's house.” And I’m-- you know, I know them but I
have no idea of like, what I-- I
wouldn’t get off the bus at their house. [00:26:32.25]
There's no reason that I would ever go to
their house. So I told the bus driver, “I’m not getting
off-- like I, I don't know why they’re
asking me to go there, I’m not going there.” So the bus
driver dropped me off at my sister,
Reesy's work, which is the day care here, and my sister
Reesy had to tell me, "You are going to
live there for a while and mom’s going to try to get
better so you can live there again." But just
like, to try to get me to just hop off the bus at-- like, yes
it is in my own community and I do
know them but I had nobody who told me why. Nobody
said anything about it.
You know, um, and so then I, you know, I was really
upset and then I probably traumatized a
few kids in the daycare by-- because I totally freaked
out, you know, I’m like, I'm not going to
their house. So, and then, how we had to get out things
was--I think this happened a couple of
different times. Like, um, I think the second time that
we went into the foster care system too,
the police escorted us to our mom's house which is
scary enough-- because it's our mom, you
know, why do we need police to like escort us there?
And we just had, like, I feel like it's kind
of an iconic thing-- like, a black trash bag and we
literally just like had a couple minutes to
throw in whatever we could in the black trash bag. And
it just seemed like… and I get it
because my mom can totally throw a scene or whatever,
but she never would have like
threatened our safety or anything like that. So I just feel
like the element of like the police like
to the level of uncertainty we're already having living
with someone else, suddenly, was really

ABRUPT and ABRASIVE (descriptive
codes)
Values and versus = Household trauma that is
ongoing vs unexpected jarring episodes of
suddenly removed from home without
understanding or input.
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weird. Like why do we need police to go to our house,
to, to like where our mom is? You
know. Um, so just like.
And having no idea things were happening until we
were supposed to just…do something. We
were just supposed to go wherever we were pointed to
next. And didn’t really-- I had no idea
like, what was going on with my mom and ‘cause for
me, my whole life was taking care of my
mom, and making sure she was-- she’d wake up and all
like those things and to not know
where she was (speaking through tears) or what the plan
was or… [00:28:48.03] Yeah, so it’s
like, I understand you want to protect kids. You don't
know what’s gonna happen so you don't
want to like get their hopes up or you don’t know when
things are suddenly going to change,
but that's a different level of trauma on top of
everything else that is going on. So, and usually,
you know, us kids, like, we’ve already dealt with a lot?
So, like, we can handle whatever your
system needs to tell us. We can handle those things.
Um, so yeah that’s just one thing and I see
it now too. The system really needs to-- like, and they
take input from youth but a lot more can,
can go to have youth shape and be really aware of
what's going on for their present and how-because it really impacts their futures too, so.
HW: Right. So what did you see as-- how, what was life
like after child welfare intervention?
AM: Um, so like after the last time we were? So my
sister, Bianca and I, we stayed in
placement with my grandparents until we turned
eighteen. So you mean, kind of, in that time?
Or, or like after I turned eighteen?
HW: Right, good question. Really whatever you'd like
to speak to. But it seems like along the
way, there would be these, there would be a lot of-- it
would be different. So you, you were in
care and then you returned to your parents. You know,
how do you see those stage-- different
changes that may have occurred after each placement?
AM: Um, after each placement. I mean, my mom. There
was, again, I don't remember exactly
if it was 5 years or 3 years. But after one of those times,
she had either 5 or 3 years of sobriety.
And she was with a man that we consider like a very,
very close, like, you know, not a father,
but a loving male figure, and he considered us his
children. You know, so that was-- I mean, it
was not a perfect time. There was still other dr-- you
know she was… there was still other drug
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use, and domestic violence but that was still a
relatively-- we have some really great memories
from then.
So, [00:31:29.04] I don't know, so we had some really
good years with our mom then. So I
know, some people were like, “why would they ever put
children back, don’t put children
back” and, you know, just to have that all happen again.
I would rather spend those years with
that type of, um… I don't know. Those things that, I
don’t know, stuff I was used to. And it
wasn't as bad and we had-- and I had those really
wonderful memories and I did have time with
my mom, you know. So, I don't know, I get it, I get it,
but sometimes I just don't get it. Like,
like, you know, I think people really underestimate the
trauma of like being in foster
placement. Even if they’re wonderful people!
Wonderful people, completely caring people,
even in your community, you know.
So, so I mean, I'm really glad I went back with my mom
but things did get really bad before we
went back with our grandparents again. Um, and then
the time-- so then we stayed with gram
12 to 18. Twelve years old to eighteen. Um, I think my
mom-- so there were periods where my
mom was okay and we had a good, pretty good
relationship. And I think, I-- I know it just, it's
something that my mom has tremendous guilt around, is
that, you know, we had to spend so
much of our childhood raised by other people and she
feels like, you know, she failed as a
mother.
Um, but I think it was important that we were not with
her. Um… I think, yeah, she just-- just,
yeah, I don't know. So I feel like we had-- and we, yeah,
that we had-- I don't know there’s so
many different thoughts. But that we had good, we were
able to have some good while we
were placed stably with my grandparents. And she was
able to have downs, but when she was
good, we'd still be there with gram and grampy and, um,
I don't know, I feel like she’s in a
better place now than she has been in a long time. So, I
mean feel like it's all his-- I think it's
all… absolutely the way that it needed to be, with the
level of support that my mom has gotten,
you know, as much as she could do, I think it's as much
as she could have done. And I think it
was as good of a turn out as it absolutely could have
been with the circumstance. So I don't
have any negative feelings anywhere against anyone
whatsoever so. Yeah.

COMMUNITY (descriptive code)
NO INFORMATION (descriptive code)
Values code = Can accept foster care within
tribe, but not being surprised by placement or
having no input.
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HW: Ok. Is there more you want to say about ICWA,
and how that, maybe active efforts, or
anything may have impacted your experience?
AM: Active efforts, how that would have impacted my
experience… I mean, I had no idea at
the time that I was in the foster care system. So I guess,
which in-- in a way is a good thing
because you can feel more normal. But then it's kind of
feels like all of these things that are
going on in the background, and that are actually
impacting where you are and shaping things,
um that you also weren't aware of that information. Um,
but no, I mean, I didn't know what
was going on. I didn't know about any active efforts. I
didn't about ICWA. I didn't know. I
didn't know these things.
HW: Is there anything more that you would like to see
happen?
AM: In terms of ICWA? In terms of, like child welfare
in general?
HW: Right, specifically for ICWA and for Indian
children in child welfare. I’m sorry I was
trying to ask that question but sort of dropped it off so I
apologize for being confusing.
AM: So for Indian children and child… let me see my
notes and if the.... Um, well I mean, I
guess a lot of this can applied to anywhere in child
welfare. But really focusing on prevention,
on strengthening and empowering families as a unit, not
just nuclear families, because there are
going to be times when individual parents, sets of
parents, when they, they can't do it, or they
can't do it alone. I think, I mean I guess it's, I think it’s a
societal problem that we have, that we
see child rearing as a nuclear-- you know, more so,
rather than as more of a community focus
which I think it should be to begin with. Um and that
disperses the challenge of raising kids
because it is not an easy thing. Um, but if there are
ways that we can strengthen families as a
whole and communities as a whole to be able to step up
and care for, for kids when things
aren't optimal in their, their home lives, so they don't
ever even need to enter the system.
Um, (exhales) [00:36:49.27] I mean and so a piece
around that is I know one of the, one of the
things that-- so my gram was telling me about AA. So
she would go to AA meetings to try to
like, when she was caring for my older sister. And they
would tell her in those meetings that
she needed to stop caring for her grandchildren. She
needed to stop taking in the grandchildren

AWARENESS (descriptive code)
Values coding = Kids being taken into care
ought to have more of a say than they have
historically.
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because she’s enabling her children's addiction. She's
enabling her children's bad decisions.
Um, and she's taking on their responsibility. So this
level of shaming around stepping up to
care for children who, you know, you know, it's not the
children's fault. The children shouldn't- they, they are not able to care for themselves at the
time. So that there’s these strange and I
feel like, not traditional currents, and I think
Catholicism has some of that and I know AA is
religious based, and I'm not all against religion but you
know, but these ideas that shame us in
stepping in and, and caring for kids, you know, like
what? That is not-- I don’t think that is
traditional. I don't think that was our ancestors’ way at
all. Um, we lived in close knit villages,
like we all, we all cared for one another's kids. So if we
can-- and we do that in some of our
ways, you know, if we -- any of us -- if we see a kid
who's not doing something they should
be, you know, any of us have the right to tell them,
"Hey, that's not okay." It's not just
something parents can do.
Um, so, so I think, really being more intentional about
growing and strengthening those-those, um… I don’t know, those tendencies that I think
we have and those traditions that we
have. And also very practical thing that I think could be
helpful, is also, um, and I'm very
biased because I'm doing this work now-- but um, free,
legal aid for relatives and near-kin
caregivers who want to obtain a guardianship for
children who are informally with them.
[00:39:05.17] Right, so, this is--the children are just
there informally. There has not been CPS
involvement, but right now mom and dad can still come
and go, take the kids whenever and
grandparents -- or whoever -- can't make the decisions
for their medical care, educational care,
but those legal processes can feel daunting and the can
be expensive if you feel like, like… So
you just never go near the legal process, you don't even
contemplate that. But if there was a
non-profit or an agency that could assist them in
achieving some form of legal permanence,
you’re not terminating the parental rights. The parents
can get it together, and get the kids later,
but for right now, the kids need safety and stability and
legal guardianship is a way that that,
that can do that for families. So, um, it's just an idea.
HW: That's good. Um, and uh so you've touched on this
a little bit and I'm curious if you have

STRENGTHEN/EMPOWER/PREVENTION
(descriptive codes)
Values and versus code: fixing the process
when kids are going to foster care vs. trying
to prevent that scenario in the first place.
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anything else you want to say about your relationship
with your parents now?
AM: Yeah, um, I think it’s in a really good place. I just
work really hard-- because again, a lot
of the things that I saw my family do, like when my
mom was drinking, what they would do is
shame her for those decisions and turn away from her
and you know, "You can't be a part of
this family while you are acting like this. When you’re
in a good place, you can come back."
Didn't work very well. I don't, I think it just kind of--my
mom’s really good at feeling shame, I
don’t-- and I think that's for a lot of people, that
outcasting, the shaming… is, is not a helpful
tool in their healing. I think they need to be around
healthy people who will accept them. So I
made a really intentional effort to, regardless of where,
really it’s my mother with the
substance abuse issues. And it's a, it’s an ongoing
struggle for her. And my father--he just
doesn't really know how to be like an engaged father.
He's a very caring, very caring man, but,
ah, never really been involved in like, the, the parenting
side of things. Um, but a positive
relationship with both of them. I work really hard to,
"Let’s focus on the now, when we don't
need to--" You know, I have written letters, like "I
forgive you.” And I also, I'm really, like-some of the families I'm working with, parents
disappear. Right? Parents totally lose touch
with the children. My, you know, my mom fought. She
was never able to get us back, but she
fought and she did show up. She disappeared
sometimes, but she always came back. She
always told us she loved us. You know, there was never
a question of that. Um, so I'm just, you
know, in the scheme of things, like I'm very, very-- I’m
very fortunate. And so I recognize that
and I recognize the multitude of, um, supports I have
around me. So everything is, overall, is
very good. Yeah. [00:42:30.29]
HW: Anything else you want to share about that
experience?
AM: No.
HW: And by the way you’re very articulate, you said
you were going to be nervous. But
you’re-AM: Oh, oh… sorry. Sometimes once I get… going…
HW: No, it’s good! Don’t apologize, it’s wonderful!
You’re doing a-- I mean that’s, I-- I just
I’m impressed as to how are articulate you are and, um,
able to describe these experiences, it’s,
you’re very to the point, and um, yeah.

ASSIST/HELP (descriptive)
Values = offers specific idea for how to
manage fostering process that could become
a recommendation from the TRC
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AM: Thank you. I spend a lot of time thinking about it
and working with it in my, my, you
know, daily work. So, trying to do things differently for
other children. Yeah.
HW: Right. Do you want to talk about that a little bit?
In terms of your, um, your work with it.
Sounds like you are a, um, a state and federal child
care-- uh, child, I’m sorry, child welfare
policy…
AM: Yeah. Yeah, well so really, most of that work was
done while I was a youth, like a teen
in the foster care system. I got connected with YLAT-Youth Leadership Advisory Team -and, and then to a national body. Oh goodness. The
KSSP Alliance, I'm sorry that I could not
tell you what KSSP stands for now. Um, and that was a
consortium of national partners
including the Center for Social Policy, the, like, Annie
E. Casey Foundation, Marguerite Casey
Foundation-- whole, and so, and so that was doing the
federal level policy. And a lot of my
focus-- so on the national level, yeah, they really
wanted my input as a, as a Native youth and
my Native experience. And, um, strengthening tribal-- I
think also looking at how a lot of tribal
practices could be infused throughout all of the child
welfare system to strengthen all the child
welfare systems, so that was… But also a big focus of
mine has been older youth and
connecting resources as they age out of the foster care
system -- supports and resources. And
also siblings. I did some work on the Sibling Bill of
Rights. Um…so it's wonderful we have
that -- there's still so much more that can be done on the
ground. You know, it’s, it's just so
challenging when there’s wonderful policies in place,
but then it’s like, you know, once a
month phone call? With your sibling? Like, that should
not be considered a visit. You know,
like that shouldn't meet a minimum for a mandate. Like,
no. Like I’m-- I know social workers
are way overworked, everyone’s overworked. Figure it
out, figure it out. That’s-- you’re
paying…foster parents. Make sure they’re getting’ their
visits. So yeah, I have all kinds of
opinions, but, um…yeah. (Laughs.)
HW: That’s gr-- that’s great. And that is a question that
I had forgotten to ask you, that I was
really curious about was, how was your transition into
adulthood? Did you feel supported and,
um, well-resourced around that?
AM: Yeah, I, um…yes. I had wonderful, wonderful-um, I mean wonderful family, really
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supportive family, always, you know, everyone, all of
my-- my parents really wanted me to, to
do whatever I wanted to do and to achieve that. Um, but
someone who helped me with like the
really practical skills of that-- her name should go in the
record: Esther Attean. She's a saint,
and a second mother, and… (speaking through tears)
she shaped my life in ways she’ll never
realize, and I try to tell her, you know, how much I love
her. Um, but yeah, she just really like
fought for me in a lot of like really practical ways. You
know, because, folks can tell you, yes
they want you to go to college, um, but she will help
you figure out the steps to do that -- like
what does that look like? I don't know…I don’t know
how to do that. [00:46:50.26] You know
and Esther will stay up far later than she should helping
you figure that out. And she's just -just having someone who will do the, the hard dirty
work with you to like figure out how to be
a healthy adult, and how to like, manifest those things
that you-- positive things that you want
for yourself, to like show you those steps and skills, and
the… the condition-less love that she
gives. Um, yeah, she’s a really amazing individual, and
so how can we really value those
individuals in our communities, too? Because I see that
she’s not really valued in this
community. And it just blows my mind. It’s just really
upsetting that this community actually
sometimes outcasts some of the people who, who-- who
are just doing the most selfless,
wonderful work and I don't know what that--that, that
is. And that's something that our
community really needs to deal with, um... because it's,
it’s holding people down who are just - are just loving people and making people healthier...
like, why, what are-- yeah. Um, yeah so
I feel like it was overall, a positive and healthy
transition, and there’s absolutely things that like
-- personally -- like, I have to work on and always
working on, and you know, but I feel like
I'm in a good place and on a good track. So.
HW: That's great. It sounds like she may have been a bit
of a role model for your current
work?
AM: Oh for sure, oh absolutely. [00:48:31.05]
Absolutely. Her and my older sister, Reesy, like
really, um, are strong women who yeah, have absolutely
like shaped who I am and, um… yeah,
everything. All of the decisions I make are really based
around what is going to improve the
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lives of, like, our communities and lives of children.
Like that’s-- like, and I really work hard
at every decision to -- now kind of unconsciously,
which I’m glad for, you know -- to check in
to those, um, those beliefs. Yeah.
HW: And you said you work in California now?
AM: Yeah, I live in California. Been there for about
two and a half years. But I'll be moving
home either next year or the year following. I’ll never
be away from home forever. And I
would love, love to do this, the work I'm doing in
California, here locally. (Laughs.) But the
work that I'm doing now is, um-- the agency that I work
for is actually is a foster and adoption
agency, but their program is to support informal
relatives, so it’s those who do not currently
have child welfare involvement. It's a preventative
program and my, my program was created
within it. I got to start it up which is very exciting, is to
do the le-- we’re calling it legal
permanence work and so again, it's around primarily
legal guardianship. So obtaining legal
guardianships for grandparents, aunts, uncles, other near
kin so that they can safely care for
children that otherwise… don't have, don't have that
safety and stability right now. So and we
do some-- I do some support around independent
adoptions, but that’s more limited.
HW: So, were you working in the field prior to that as
well? It sounds like you did some work
as a teen and...?
AM: Yeah, yeah, um, so I've done work as a support
counselor for teens in an intensive
treatment foster care program. And so, yeah, just
supporting them around a lot of, a lot of, um,
emotional regulation of emotional awareness. And so
teens who are currently in the system
and who are jeopardizing their placement and so
supporting them and their caregivers around
some of those challenging issues that they are coming
up against. Um, but it’s like, yeah, the
problem is not the-- the real problem cannot be fixed
working one-on-one with a child--it's the
system! (Laughs.) So, yeah, um, and then what other?
And then I've done some other work in
human services as an elder advocate here for the tribe
and a few other things, but.. yeah.
[00:51:41.10]
HW: What are some ways that do you-- do you ever
work with ICWA in those environments
or in your current work?
AM: Right now, I encourage-- so, before it sounds like
families were being told to not-- don't
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even, like, you don’t even want to go there with ICWA.
You don’t even like, you just, you just
check no. You just check the “no” box on that. And so
now, like I'm working to raise the
awareness with staff in my agency and with my
supervisors and having discussions about what
it is, why it's important. Okay, like and I’m asking the
question, how many Native families do
we work with? How many, you know, how many
Native kids have we come in contact with?
And they can't tell me. And I had someone higher up
would tell me, “You know, I don't think
we have.” No, you're in California. There are hundreds
of tribes in California alone. You have,
you just, you don't know it. You haven't identified them.
You haven't tracked them. You have,
you absolutely have. So right now, it's just kind of an
awareness place right now. And, and
having those conversations with my families as we're
going through the legal documents
because they have questions about ICWA, and I
explain, you know, the importance of, you
know, reflecting on these questions and really thinking
about them. Their primary question is,
well, is this going to open up all kinds of benefits? And
I'm like, that's not what this is about
specifically, you know, um… So it's been, it’s a little,
it’s a little interesting having discussions
around ICWA.
HW: I bet, I bet. So you have families who self-identify
but are not members of tribes? Is that
where those conversations are happening?
AM: Yeah, well so far -- which -- so far, it's been folks
who think that it is somewhere in their
history. And as far as they know, not members of a
tribe, or their, you know, grandparent was
not a relative of-- I mean, um, I’m sorry, a member of
tribe. Um…so that's kind of-- there was
one family, but ICWA had already been established and
eligibility had already been
established, so, and I am-- and honestly, as much as I
love, and I profess, ICWA--I don't know
what we’re gonna do when we get a case.
(Interruption by TRC Research Coordinator.)
Research Coordinator: When she's ready to do a
statement, she's gonna have a commissioner
sit in. Thank you.
HW: Thank you.
AM: Um, so I’m not even su-- I’m not sure what it’s
gonna look-- I mean, because I know it
can look like quite a few different things. (Laughs.) You
know, if um-- whether a tribe takes
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jurisdiction, whether, you know, the child is determined
to be eligible. So I'm not sure what
that's going to look like and so that, yeah, is a little bit
scary because you like to know how,
you know, how to let families know what to anticipate.
But I fee-- I heard an attorney, and like,
they don't know what to anticipate, and so they're telling
folks, “No.” You know, it’s-- so if
there's some more education we can do, um. And I
know we’re trying to do it here in Maine,
you know, but across the country, with informing
people -- but maybe helping people have a
better picture of what the different, you know, avenues
might look like after, if ICWA is, is
deemed to apply to the child. So I think that could be
helpful. Because me, I’m like, I don't
care, we're gonna figure it out, because if ICWA applies
to this child, that's how it's going, you
know? We’re gonna-- you need to share that
information, that needs to happen--um, I am
invested in that. But a lot-- most people are not invested
in that, and so they are not invested in
the mystery and uncertainty of what ICWA looks like to
them right now. And so they would
much rather just check no. [00:55:58.24] And that's
scary, pretty scary.
HW: You know, I was just thinking, sort of thinking
how to frame a question but I'm having
trouble getting my mind around how to ask it. I guess
I’ll just say that it seems like maybe
there’s some people missing the point about the huge
cultural differences.
AM: I don't know if they care. Not everybody is gonna
care. I-- yeah. I really don't, especially
because I am not an attorney. Not an attorney. But, um,
I am doing this legal work, and I am
coming in contact with a lot of attorneys and a lot of
attorneys are being really helpful in the
work that I am doing. I'm not sure that… all of them
care about that. So I'm not sure how the
heck to get through to someone who is missing that
little piece of their heart. (Laughs.) I don't
know. But I don't think -- and I know, because a lot of
times we frame it, it’s about the spirit of
the law -- and for some people, totally, like especially
social workers, it's gonna get to them,
it's gonna make sense to social workers, right?
Attorneys as a group, I'm not sure that will get
through to all of them. (Laughs.) Just in-- [00:57:23.00]
HW: I guess that’s why they have a legal mandate
because that’s what does speak to them.
AM: Right. Right. And so again, they-- I think they like
to know, okay if you check A/B then

AWARENESS/CARE (descriptive codes)
Values code = attorneys and social workers
don’t care that Native children stay connected
to their culture, and if they don’t, how do we
make that happen? Mentions legal mandate
of Indian Child Welfare Act.
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you’re gonna get these op-- they want, they want it so
maybe that information isn’t there, it’s,
um… and then there’s a way that that can be shared
with other folks who are coming in contact
with these children, but aren’t identifying them. Or even
wanting -- actually averse to
identifying them as Native children.
HW: Do you think that’s because of the higher
standards?
AM: Oh, I am sure. And, and the mystery. Higher
standards and not exactly, because-- because
I think, I think he's heard from other attorneys and
because sometimes it is really complicated
and drawn out, right? Like any potential legal process
could be. But, so I think that it’s not-- I
don’t think every attorney deals with it much, so I think
with his experience, he's just heard of
attorneys who’ve had negative experiences so he doesn't
even want to go there, so he's not
gonna even venture. Like he said, he doesn't want to
open Pandora’s box by checking yes. He
told that to-- like in a public setting, a large group of
caregivers. He said: "Don't even go
there." Don't open Pandora’s box.
HW: It will be interesting to see what your experience
is like here in Maine in similar work
when you come back.
AM: I know, I’m so hopeful that it’s-- I’m so hopeful,
because I know that intentional efforts
around informing, you know, social workers, and
judges, and guardians ad lit-- you know,
about ICWA, has been happening here so I’m very
hopeful that it's a much more positive
environment here. (Laughs.)
HW: Anything else you would like to share?
AM: No, that's far more than I planned on. (Laughs.)
I'm sorry.
HW: No, it's been great. Well, thank you very much.
AM: Yeah, thank you, Heather.
[END OF RECORDING.]
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Appendix D: Commission Recommendations and Outcomes
The chart that follows on the next page documents the recommendations issued
by the TRCs in Greensboro, Maine, and Canada. Data on the outcomes of these
recommendations was drawn from interviews conducted for this dissertation as well as
the “Beyond 94” reporting project of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).
“Not completed” refers to projects that have not been begun. “Partially complete”
implies some progress has been made in carrying out the recommendation, and
“Completed” means that the recommendation has been fully carried out. “Unknown” or
“unclear” refers to recommendations whose outcome was difficult to ascertain.

Canada

Acknowledge that Aboriginal rights include Aboriginal
language rights
Collect and publish data on the criminal victimization of
Aboriginal people
Appoint a public inquiry into the causes of, and remedies
for, the disproportionate victimization of Aboriginal
women and girls
Church parties to residential school settlement to educate
congregations on why apologies necessary
Canada Council for the Arts to establish a strategy for
Indigenous and non-Indigenous artists to undertake
collaborative projects
Restore and increase funding to the CBC/Radio-Canada
to enable it to support reconciliation
Aboriginal Peoples Television Network to support
reconciliation
Tell the stories of Aboriginal athletes in history
Continued support for the North American Indigenous
Games
Ensure that national sports policies, programs and
initiatives are inclusive of Aboriginal Peoples
Implement Jordan's Principle
Reduce the number of Aboriginal children in care
Publish annual reports on the number of Aboriginal
children in care
Establish national standards for Aboriginal child
apprehension and custody cases

Canada

Repeal the 'Spanking Law'

Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Completed
Completed

Completed
Completed

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Mostly complete
Not completed
Not completed
Not completed
Not completed

181
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada

Canada

Publish annual reports on education funding and
educational and income attainments

Not completed

Appoint an Aboriginal Languages Commissioner
Reaffirm the independence of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police to investigate crimes in which the
government is a potential party

Not completed

Review and amend statutes of limitations
Work collaboratively with plaintiffs not included in the
Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement
Amend the Criminal Code to allow trial judges to depart
from mandatory minimum sentences
Develop Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD)
preventative programs that can be delivered in a
culturally appropriate manner
Undertake reforms to the criminal justice system to
better address the needs of offenders with FASD
Eliminate barriers to the creation of additional
Aboriginal healing lodges within the federal correctional
system
Eliminate the overrepresentation of Aboriginal youth in
custody
Commit to the recognition and implementation of
Aboriginal justice systems
Develop a Royal Proclamation of Reconciliation to be
issued by the Crown
Develop and sign a Covenant of Reconciliation among
parties to the Indian Residential Schools Settlement
Agreement
Governments to repudiate Doctrine of Discovery and
terra nullius and reform laws that rely on such concepts
Establish Indigenous law institutes
Government of Canada to develop policy of
transparency on legal opinions upon which it acts in
regard to Aboriginal and Treaty rights

Not completed

Adopt legal principles on Aboriginal title claims
Provide multi-year funding for the National Council for
Reconciliation
Provide annual reports or any current data requested by
the National Council for Reconciliation
Prime Minister of Canada to issue an annual 'State of
Aboriginal Peoples' report
The Pope to issue an apology to residential school
survivors
Require publicly-funded denominational schools to teach
comparative religious studies including Aboriginal
spiritual beliefs
Mark the 150th anniversary of Confederation with a
funding program for commemoration projects on theme
of reconciliation

Not completed

Not completed

Not completed
Not completed

Not completed
Not completed

Not completed
Not completed
Not completed
Not completed

Not completed
Not completed
Not completed

Not completed

Not completed
Not completed
Not completed
Not completed

Not completed

Not completed
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Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Records on the deaths of Aboriginal children in
residential schools to go to the National Centre for Truth
and Reconciliation
Establish and maintain an online registry of residential
school cemeteries
Inform the families of children who died at residential
schools of the child’s burial location
Develop and implement procedures for the identification
and maintenance of residential school cemeteries
Aboriginal communities should lead development of
residential school cemetery identification and
maintenance strategies
Commission and install a Residential Schools National
Monument in Ottawa
Commission and install a Residential Schools
Monument in each capital city
Amend the Physical Activity and Sport Act to ensure
policies are inclusive to Aboriginal Peoples
Develop culturally appropriate parenting programs for
Aboriginal families

Not completed
Not completed
Not completed
Not completed

Not completed
Not completed
Not completed
Not completed
Partially completed

Eliminate educational and employment gaps
Eliminate the discrepancy in federal education funding
between on-reserve and off-reserve students

Partially completed

Draft new Aboriginal education legislation
Provide adequate funding for First Nations students
seeking post-secondary education
Develop culturally appropriate early childhood education
programs

Partially completed

Partially completed

Canada

Enact an Aboriginal Language Act
Create university and college degree and diploma
programs in Aboriginal languages
Waive administrative costs for five years for revision of
official identity documents
Recognize and implement the health-care rights of
Aboriginal people
Identify and close the gaps in health outcomes between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities
Recognize, respect, and address the distinct health needs
of the Métis, Inuit, and off-reserve Aboriginal peoples
Provide sustainable funding for existing and new
Aboriginal healing centres
Recognize the value of Aboriginal healing practices and
use them in the treatment of Aboriginal patients
Increase the number of Aboriginal professionals working
in the health care field

Canada

Require all medical and nursing students to take a course
dealing with Aboriginal health issues

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
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Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Canada
Canada
Canada
Canada

Ensure lawyers receive appropriate cultural competency
training
Require all law students to take a course in Aboriginal
people and the law
Eliminate the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in
custody over the next decade
Implement and evaluate community sanctions that will
provide realistic alternatives to imprisonment
Provide culturally relevant services to inmates on issues
such as substance abuse, family and domestic violence
Provide more supports for Aboriginal programming in
halfway houses and parole services
Create adequately funded and accessible Aboriginalspecific victim programs and services
Adopt and implement the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Develop a national plan, strategies and other concrete
measures to achieve the goals of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
(UNDRIP)
Church parties to the residential schools settlement and
other faith groups to adopt and comply with UNDRIP
All faith groups to repudiate the Doctrine of Discovery
and terra nullius (which asserted that lands belonged to
the Christian powers that 'discovered' them)

Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed

Partially completed

Establish a National Council for Reconciliation
Educate public servants on the history of Aboriginal
peoples
Faith groups to develop and teach curriculum for all
student clergy and staff who work in Aboriginal
communities
Church parties to residential schools settlement to fund
reconciliation and culture revitalization projects

Partially completed

Develop and fund Aboriginal content in education
Council of Ministers of Education Canada to maintain an
annual commitment to Aboriginal education issues
Establish a national research program with multi-year
funding to advance understanding of reconciliation
Establish multi-year funding for youth organizations to
deliver programs on reconciliation

Partially completed

A national review of museum policies and best practices
Library and Archives Canada to adopt UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ensure records on
residential schools accessible to public

Partially completed

A national review of archival policies
Develop and maintain the National Residential School
Student Death Register created by the TRC
Archives to provide residential school records to
National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation

Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed
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Commit to funding of $10 million over seven years to
the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation
Develop a reconciliation framework for Canadian
heritage and commemoration
Establish a National Day for Truth and Reconciliation as
a statutory holiday
Journalism programs and media schools to require
education for all students on the history of Aboriginal
peoples
Ensure that Indigenous Peoples’ territorial protocols are
respected by officials and host countries of international
sporting events
Corporate sector in Canada to adopt the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
Revise the information kit for newcomers and
citizenship test to reflect a more inclusive history of the
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada
Replace the Oath of Citizenship
The City should formally recognize that the events of
Nov. 3, 1979, provided a tragic, but
important occasion in our city’s history; it should make a
proclamation that lifts up the
importance of that date in the history of the city.
As described in its Declaration of Intent, the Greensboro
Truth and Community Reconciliation
Project, along with GTRC Report Receivers, should host
community forums at which this
report will be reviewed and discussed.
The City should issue annual reports on race relations
and racial disparities.
The Greensboro Historical Museum and the
International Civil Rights Museum should work
either collaboratively or independently to create exhibits
commemorating the tragic shootings
on Nov. 3, 1979.
The Mayor’s Mosaic Project
should be continued and expanded as planned to include
more people from all sectors of the community
The Guilford County Schools should create a curriculum
based on the events of Nov. 3,1979, for use in public
elementary and secondary schools.
Citizens as well as city and state officials should push
for enabling legislation, if
necessary, to create a community justice center in
Greensboro, then make sure its
existence is well-publicized.
Citizens as well as city and state officials should push
for enabling legislation to
expand the pool of potential jurors to be more
representative of the community as a
whole.

Partially completed
Partially completed
Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed

Partially completed
Partially completed

Completed

Completed
Not completed

Not completed

Not completed

Not completed

Not completed

Not completed
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The city’s largest local newspaper, the News and
Record, should act alone or in
concert with other media outlets including the Carolina
Peacemaker, Yes! Weekly, and
the Rhinoceros Times to host a citywide citizen group
that would comment on news
process, content, quality and ethics.
Individuals who were responsible for any part of the
tragedy of Nov. 3, 1979, should reflect on
their role and apologize – publicly and/or privately – to
those harmed.
The Greensboro Police Department and the City of
Greensboro should issue public apologies for their
failure to protect the public – specifically, the
Communist Workers Party demonstrators, Morningside
Homes residents, media representatives and others
present at the shooting site. These institutions also
should issue an apology to city residents for not
appropriately acknowledging the event and taking the
necessary steps for community healing.
A public monument should be built on the site of the
shootings to honor those killed and
wounded on Nov. 3, 1979.
A citizen’s committee should be established immediately
by the Human Relations
Commission to create both temporary and permanent
police review boards. The
committee’s role would be to determine the respective
boards’ purposes, powers,
funding, and relationships to the city government
structure.
In response to unresolved crises or lingering issues in the
community, such as the
issues surrounding the events of Nov. 3, 1979, city
officials, religious leaders and civic
organizations should play an active role in
acknowledging, investigating and providing
open forums for discussion.
The current investigations into the alleged corruption in
the Greensboro Police
Department, including the surveillance of citizens,
should be thoroughly and expeditiously
completed. We recommend that the reports of these
investigations be publicly released once
they are finalized and a town hall meeting held to solicit
citizen questions and feedback.
If appropriate, criminal prosecutions or civil action
should be pursued to help heal
the damaged credibility of the police department and
reassure the citizens that there is
accountability for illegal acts done by the city’s agents.

Not completed

Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed
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All city and county employees should be paid a living
wage; all city and county
contractors and sub-contractors should be required to
pay workers a living wage.
All city and county employees should engage in antiracism training
Others who were involved in the shootings on Nov. 3,
1979, and who regret the role they played
are encouraged to offer restitution to the victims by
making contributions in their name to
support the public monument commemorating this
tragedy (see recommendation 1.h) or to
organizations advocating for civil and workers rights and
other economic justice initiatives.
The Guilford County Board of Commissioners should
commit to addressing the needfor increasing funding to
Departments of Social Services and Public Health, two
keyagencies serving low-income residents, in order to
expand and enhance staff andservices, and to fund staff
sensitivity training
Social work departments should work in conjunction
with advocacy and faith
organizations to: (1) document the need for increased
funding based on information
from service providers and clients, and (2) urge state &
federal policymakers to
increase funding to Social Services and the Health
Department commensurate to meet
the need in Guilford County.
Other community organizations such as the Chamber of
Commerce should engage in
anti-racism training similar to that described in
Recommendation 2.a.ii.
The City of Greensboro and other organizations should
provide resources to support the participation of
grassroots leaders in local or out-of-state programs and
activities
that affirm and enhance their leadership ability
Individuals, like institutions, can benefit from antiracism and diversity education
programs, and we encourage people to take advantage of
pre-designed programs they first
evaluate for both breadth and depth.
The religious leadership in Greensboro should plan and
facilitate a healing workshop or
retreat for the children of CWP members, shooters and
others directly involved in the events
of Nov. 3, 1979. Furthermore, these children should be
actively consulted in all of the
reconciliation and reparation efforts recommended in
this report.

Partially completed
(city)
Unclear/Incomplete

Unclear/Incomplete

Unclear/Incomplete

Unclear/Incomplete

Unclear/Incomplete

Unclear/Incomplete

Unclear/Incomplete

Unknown/incomplete
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Recognizing the role they play in creating the
environment for events like Nov. 3, 1979,
individual community members must commit to
understanding issues of capital, labor,
race, poverty, oppression, privilege and justice, and
exploring ways to have a positive
impact on the way they play out in the community.
Fund the renewal of the ICWA Workgroup and
involve them in designing and implementing
training so that all levels of leadership are
involved; their work may well include training
people on the new Bureau of Indian Affairs
regulations being developed on ICWA
Create ways for people to continue to add
to the archive at Bowdoin College and look
beyond the mandate to keep these truth-telling
conversations flowing at every level: in tribal
communities, among the general public and
within agencies that work with Wabanaki
people.
Respect tribal sovereignty and commit to
resolve and uphold federal, state and tribal
jurisdictions and protocols at both state and
local levels.
Honor Wabanaki choices to support healingas the tribes
see fit and celebrate the culturalresurgence of the tribes
within the Wabanakiconfederacy so that both individuals
andcommunities may be strengthened.Among the
suggestions we have heard: thecreation of longhouses,
language centers andclasses, places in which rituals of
birth, comingof age, and death may be celebrated, food
andeconomic sovereignty, healing circles, andtraditional
health and wellness modalities.Other suggestions
included welcome homeceremonies for people who are
returning totheir territory after time away.
Create better and more consistent supports for
non-Native foster and adoptive families so that
Wabanaki children have the strongest possible
ties to their culture.
Resolve as quickly as possible issues with IV-E
funds.
Explore the expansion of tribal courts to include
the Maliseet and Micmac communities, should
these communities express a desire to do so,
and explore as well what funding possibilities
exist for this initiative. Also hear concerns from
those who do not feel well represented by tribal
courts.
Resolve problems surrounding blood quantum,
census eligibility and the provision of services

Unknown/incomplete

Completed

Completed

Not completed

Not completed

Not completed
Not completed

Not completed
Not completed
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for children, as these issues are often contested
or unclear.
Reinstate the Maine governor’s executive order
of 2011 that recognizes “the special relationship
between the State of Maine and the sovereign
Native American Tribes located within the State
of Maine.” This executive order also recognizes
that the “unique relationship between the
State of Maine and the individual Tribes is a
relationship between equals.”
Develop ways to expand on the work of Chapter403 of
the Public Laws of Maine of 2001,“An Act to Require
Teaching of Maine NativeAmerican History and Culture
in Maine’sSchools,” also known as LD 291, so there is
anenlarged understanding of bias and genocidalpractices
in the greater community andWabanaki-state relations
are held in a broaderframework.
Develop DHHS, legal and judicial trainings
that go beyond the basics of checklists and
toolkits to recognize bias and build cultural
awareness at all levels of leadership and
accountability in ways that frame ICWA within
historical context.
With the counsel of the tribes, develop a policy
to monitor regular compliance with ICWA, the
selection of ICWA liaisons and the eventual
provision of a supervisory-level staff member
responsible for ICWA in each DHHS district
office.
Support the work of Maine-Wabanaki REACH
in both Wabanaki and non-Native communities
to foster truth, healing and change.
Explore the creation of more Native foster
homes in general and additional Native
therapeutic homes in particular.

Not completed

Not completed

Partially completed

Partially completed

Partially completed

Unknown/incomplete
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Appendix E: Bio
Larry Schooler is a mediator, facilitator, public engagement consultant, and
educator. He is director of community engagement and consensus building at Engaged
Public, a Denver-based consulting firm. He is an adjunct faculty member at
Northwestern University and has designed and taught a public policy dispute resolution
course at Southern Methodist University, along with training courses on facilitation and
the design of public engagement processes. He is a senior fellow at the National Civic
League and an advisor to the Divided Communities Project at Ohio State University and
the 100 Resilient Cities project of the Rockefeller Foundation. Prior to his work in
conflict resolution, Larry was a reporter for National Public Radio and Voice of
America.
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Appendix F: Endnotes
i

The Greensboro TRC is a noteworthy exception; it focused strictly on the events of
November third, their context, and their aftermath.
ii
Occasionally, Truth and Reconciliation Commissioners have used requests made under
the Freedom of Information Act or similar to secure materials for review.
iii

